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Can Risks be Reduced in the Derivatives Market? Lessons
from the Deal Structure Analysis of Modern Financial
Engineering Debacles
Jongho Kim*
Die kunst iiber geld nachzudenken: Wer viel geld hat, kann speku-
lieren; wer wenig geld hat, darf nicht spekulieren; wer kein geld hat,
mu3 spekulieren (loosely translated as "nothing ventured, nothing
gained").
-German investor Andre Kostolany
Look before you leap.
-Proverbial wisdom
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last couple of decades, modern "financial engineering"1 has
made great strides under the Securities Act of 1933,2 the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,3 and the Commodities Exchanges Act.4 Not-
withstanding the catastrophic collapse of the "derivatives" 5 operation,
* The author earned his LL.B., MA, and Ph.D. from SungKyunKwan University School of
Law in Seoul, Korea and his LL.M. at the University of Minnesota School of Law and Washing-
ton and Lee University School of Law. He is an S.J.D. candidate at Indiana University School of
Law-Indianapolis. He is a Clerk of Court at Seoul Central District Court and the Supreme Court
of Korea. The author expresses his gratitude to attorney Brooke Smith for helpful comments on
earlier drafts.
1. "The term 'financial engineering' refers to creating tailor-made solutions to highly complex
problems in managing the financial risk of price fluctuations." Peter H. Huang, A Normative
Analysis of New Financially Engineered Derivatives, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 471, 477 (2000). "The
process of combining derivatives with other financial instruments, derivatives or otherwise, is
known as financial engineering." Willa E. Gibson, Investors, Look Before You Leap: The Suita-
bility Doctrine is Not Suitable for OTC Derivatives Dealers, 29 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 527, 537 (1998).
2. See generally THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 21-22 (5th ed.
2005).
3. See generally id. at 22.
4. See generally id. at 807-17.
5. "Derivatives are financial instruments whose value is based on or derived from other assets
or variables." HAL S. ScoTr & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE TRANSACTIONS,
POLICY, AND REGULATION 936 (10th ed. 2003). See also Huang, supra note 1, at 483; Allen D.
Madison, Derivatives Regulation in the Context of the Shingle Theory, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
271, 274 (1999) ("[D]erivatives are financial instruments whose value is determined by or de-
rived from an underlying reference rate, index, or asset."); Jason M. Rosenthal, Incorporation
May Not Mean Sophistication: Should There be a Suitability Requirement for Banks Selling De-
rivatives to Corporations?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1249, 1252 (1995).
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the "over-the-counter ("OTC") market ' 6 has drastically expanded.7
As indirect investment asset management, the OTC derivatives vehi-
cles clearly constitute assets under the Acts.8 As a matter of course,
current global markets grow rapidly and domestic financial institu-
tions, such as investment banks, security firms, and insurance compa-
nies, as well as foreign investment banks, engage in the transaction of
OTC derivatives.9 However, permitting large financial companies with
the characteristics of investment banks to operate in derivatives in the
OTC market provides a revolutionary opportunity for further devel-
opment of this market.
Why is the OTC derivatives market important? 10 Most of all, given
the global and open economy characteristics of the U.S. economy, the
OTC derivatives market is sine qua non." In terms of the real econ-
omy, the U.S. economy depends to a high degree on imports and ex-
ports of goods as well as capital. In addition, after the numerous
economy crises and turmoil,12 as the capital market has been entirely
opened, the geographical capital market is largely influenced by the
movements of foreign or global investors.13 In other words, due to
6. See generally ScoTt & WELLONS, supra note 5, at 792.
7. Through the Securities and Exchange Act and Commodities Exchanges Act, the operation
of derivatives transactions in the OTC market has become a rolling stone. However, in invest-
ment bank and securities companies' businesses, whose basic assets include such derivatives
products as swaps, forwards, and options that make the basic assets of currencies, interest rates,
stocks (individual stock prices, basket index, stock index), things seem to have settled down. In
1991, the notional amount of OTC derivatives trading surpassed exchange-traded derivatives,
and, in 1992, credit derivatives began to trade in the OTC market. See ROBERT E. WHALEY,
DERIVATIVES: MARKETS, VALUATION, AND RISK MANAGEMENT 15 (2006).
8. According to the Acts, the indirect investment asset management that has been gradually
permitted since 1972 and the first OTC derivatives are stipulated as being applicable subjects in
1980. Now under the Acts, the exchange-based derivatives, the OTC derivatives, real estate, and
actual assets are stipulated as the subjects for working assets. See id. at 13-15.
9. See Todd E. Petzel, Derivative: Market and Regulatory Dynamics, 21 J. CORP. L. 95 (1995)
("The United States was the birthplace to ... [derivative industry] innovation, but it has been
transported and rapidly applied to virtually every active capital market in the world."). See also
Christine Cuccia, Informational Asymmetry and OTC Transactions: Understanding the Need to
Regulate Derivatives, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 197, 199 (1997) ("As corporations have become more
international and rely more heavily on foreign markets, Wall Street financial institutions have
developed new products to help corporate clients manage varied financial risks.").
10. See generally Scorr & WELLONS, supra note 5, at 1024.
11. See Joan E. McKown & Anita T. Purcell, Enforcement Actions Involving Derivatives: BT
Securities Corp. and Beyond, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 118-19 (1996) (indicating that a number of
factors have combined to bring derivatives to the forefront of today's financial marketplace).
12. Examples include the 1997 Asian exchange currency crises, 1998 Russia moratorium, and
2001 Argentina sovereign crisis.
13. See Eric D. Roiter, Investment Companies' Use of OTC Derivatives: Does the Existing
Regulatory Regime Work? 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 271, 273 (1995) ("[D]erivatives can provide
an opportunity for an investment company to geographically reorient its portfolio by allocating a
greater portion of its asset mix to a specific region such as Latin America or East Asia.").
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external factors beyond the control of the United States, volatility in
the capital market has increased. 14 Therefore, from the standpoint of
corporations or investors, various means of managing such risks have
become necessary. 15
Derivatives are used as a means of risk management while the OTC
derivatives market is in a complementary relationship with the ex-
change-based derivatives market. 16 The OTC derivatives make cus-
tomized management possible, 17 something which the exchange-based
derivatives cannot offer. 18 The OTC derivatives market development
is of great significance as a means of managing the risk of price volatil-
ity in financial markets that is necessary in the global and open
economy.
Promotion of OTC derivatives is also important in terms of bal-
anced growth in the capital market. In U.S. financial markets, direct
finance centered on the capital market is growing significantly. For
balanced growth of the capital market, the securities, bonds, and de-
rivatives markets should all grow together, particularly because the
OTC derivatives can be used in new securities planning in connection
with either bonds or stocks. This allows for the development of vari-
ous securities, with the equity-linked security that is becoming an issue
in the United States serving as an example.
From the perspective of promoting the operation of the investment
banks, the OTC derivatives market has significance. The core opera-
14. According to Willa Gibson:
Financial derivatives began assuming a predominant role in the financial markets in the
early 1970s, after the world's major industrial countries abandoned the Bretton Woods
system of fixed currency rates. During this period, the financial markets also faced an
increase in the volatility of interest rates, resulting from governmental policy changes
that permitted interest rates to fluctuate more freely. With the increased volatility in
both the exchange and interest rate systems, businesses faced new risks. Consequently,
derivatives contracts emerged as vehicles to manage the newly faced risks and as a
means of allowing traders to profit from market fluctuations.
Gibson, supra note 1, at 532.
15. Modern portfolio theory classifies the risk associated with any particular financial assets
into two broad categories: "alpha" and "beta" risk. The former is firm specific, while the latter
results from the economic situation. Lynn A. Stout, Betting the Bank: How Derivatives Trading
Under Conditions of Uncertainty Can Increase Risks and Erode Returns in Financial Markets, 21
J. CORP. L. 53, 58 n.13 (1995); Huang, supra note 1, at 487 ("Derivatives permit global capital
market participants to hedge volatility in those underlying financial market."); Gibson, supra
note 1, at 531 ("Investors use derivatives instruments as a means of transferring risk associated
with the fluctuation of some underlying asset or reference rate ... .
16. See Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 1254-55.
17. See Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge of Derivatives, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001 (1995).
18. See Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 1253. See also Christian 0. Nagler, Derivatives Disclosure
Requirements: Here We Go Again, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441, 444 (1996).
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tion of the investment bank is the undertaking of securities.' 9 In other
words, along with selling, the main function of the investment bank is
the planning and undertaking of securities that can satisfy both inves-
tors and the company. Therefore, an investment bank needs the abil-
ity to plan various securities, along with a systematic base for doing so.
As the OTC derivatives can create various designed-structured securi-
ties via a combination of securities,20 they can be very useful in securi-
ties planning. In addition, if the OTC derivatives are efficient from the
viewpoint of a securities company and an investment bank that have
issued designed-structured securities with built-in derivatives, the risk
can be efficiently hedged.
What kinds of features do these important OTC derivatives have?
As OTC derivatives are a kind of a derivative, they have the basic
features of derivatives. However, they are differentiated from such ex-
change-based derivatives as the "stock index futures"21 or the "stock
index options" 22 that are currently traded in the exchange market.
The OTC derivatives do not have standardized product structures.
Thus if the exchange-based derivatives can be thought of as ready-
made clothes, the off-exchange derivatives are custom-made ones. 23 It
is possible to create various OTC derivatives according to their pur-
pose, with the only factor limiting the development of products
through OTC derivatives being imagination.
However, expert knowledge is required in the planning of the OTC
derivatives, setting prices, and risk management. Therefore, in most
countries the counterparts of the transactions of OTC derivatives are
limited to corporate or accredited investors meeting certain require-
ments.24 As the term indicates, the transactions of OTC derivatives
are made through the contract between the concerned parties, but not
in an official market. Therefore, risk management is done through the
19. An investment bank is one whose "primary purpose is to acquire financing for businesses,
esp. through the sale of securities. An investment bank does not accept deposits, and apart from
selling securities, does not deal with the public at large." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 154 (8th ed.
2004).
20. See generally Bernard J. Karol, An Overview of Derivatives as Risk Management Tools, 1
STAN. J.L. Bus. & Fnq. 195, 200 (1994) (giving examples of uses of caps, floors, and collars in
combined contracts).
21. "[Stock] [i]ndex futures are standardized contracts, with a number of conventions regard-
ing denomination, expiration, and method of settlement." WHALEY, supra note 7, at 477.
22. "Stock index options are written on both stock index futures and the stock index. There
are subtle differences in the contracts design . I..." d  at 478.
23. See Huang, supra note 1, at 485.
24. In the United States, accredited investors refer to those individuals or companies who
have over $5 million for an investment balance, or corporate investors with an investment bal-
ance in excess of $25 million. See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
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credit and collateral of the concerned parties of the transaction. Un-
like the exchange-based derivatives market, the "counterparty risk" is
regarded important in OTC derivatives transactions.25
To summarize the above discussion, it can be shown that the OTC
derivatives market is an important axis of the capital market. In the
United States, the promotion of OTC derivatives is a requisite for the
economic system, the development of the capital market, and the rein-
forcement of the functions of the investment banks in the securities
industry.26 However, as the structure of OTC derivatives is not stan-
dardized, if not properly used, the risk is higher as compared to that of
exchange-based derivatives. 27 Particularly when a concerned party to
the OTC derivatives transaction goes bankrupt, it leads to a series of
bankruptcies of the organically-linked participants affecting the stabil-
ity of the entire financial system.28
Accordingly, development of the OTC derivatives market must in-
clude protection against the factors leading to failure. However, due
to their nature, just as the derivatives are not standardized, but rather
vary in kind, the factors affecting failure are also diverse. Therefore, it
is very meaningful to analyze the factors of failure through actual
cases of OTC derivatives failure and, thus, find the critical issues.
The analysis of cases of OTC derivatives failure can be the corner-
stone for inducement of the best practice in the use of OTC deriva-
tives. Lessons derived from case analysis can offer useful information
to not only the market players directly carrying out the operation of
OTC derivatives, but also the policy makers, regulators, and investors.
Based on such a critical mindset, the purpose of this Article is to de-
duce the issues useful, not only for U.S. market players, but also for
global capital market participants, by describing the factors of failure
through analysis of cases involving the main domestic and foreign
OTC derivatives.
The organization of this Article is as follows: Part II discusses the
Orange County repo and inverse floater-rate note ("FRN") case. In
Part III, the focus turns to the Procter & Gamble ("P&G") and Gib-
son Greetings's leverage interest-rate-swap cases. Part IV deals with
25. "In the context of the credit derivatives market, counterparty credit risk refers mainly to
the chance that a protection seller will fail to make good on its promise to make previously
agreed-upon payments in the event of qualified defaults by reference entities." ANTULIo N.
BOMFIM, UNDERSTANDING CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND RELATED INSTRUMENTS 267-68 (2005).
26. See WHALEY, supra note 7, at 18 (comparing an analysis of exchange-traded and OTC
derivatives activity as of December 2003).
27. Derivatives also include exchange-traded instruments, such as options and futures, with
standardized contracts for size, maturity, and delivery. See Cohen, supra note 17, at 2000-01.
28. See infra Part IV.
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Long-Term Capital Management's trading, in which the volatility of
securities cases are analyzed and the issues deduced. Part V analyzes a
local market case: Diamond Fund's total return swap. Because deriva-
tives include exchange-based instruments,2 9 some failure cases are se-
lected for discussion. Thus, Part VI covers Metallgesellschaft Refining
and Marketing's ("MGRM") commodity futures stack hedge transac-
tion; Part VII discusses Barings's straddles and arbitrage of stock in-
dex futures transaction; and Part VIII addresses NatWest Capital
Market's ("NatWest") interest rate options and swaptions. In Part IX,
cases analyzed in the previous sections are integrated and factors of
failure are compared and reviewed. Issues focused on systematic infra,
investment bank and securities companies, and investors and counter-
parts in transactions; issues concerning supervision and supervisory
and regulatory authorities are classified and solutions are suggested.
II. ORANGE COUNTY'S REPOS AND INVERSE FRN TRANSACTIONS
In 1994, Orange County in California suffered a loss of $1.69 billion
due to the investment failure in OTC derivatives. 30 In the end it filed
for bankruptcy. 3' The investment by Orange County was led by Rob-
ert Citron, the treasurer.32 The resulting Chapter 9 petition filed by
Orange County in December 199433 was recorded as the largest finan-
cial failure by a local government in the history of the United States. 34
A. Background
In Orange County, in which the mainstream faction was Republi-
cans,35 Citron was a Democrat who was elected treasurer seven times
and, thus, administered the investment fund of Orange County for 24
years. 36 The size of the fund in 1994 was $7.5 billion, of which some
187 public institutions, such as other municipalities, the office of edu-
cation, and managers of pension funds, had made investments. 37 Cit-
29. Cohen, supra note 17, at 2000.
30. Rob Jameson, Orange County, ERISK.COM, June 2001, http://www.erisk.com/Learning/
CaseStudies/orangecounty.pdf.
31. At that time, Orange County was the fifth largest municipality in the United States, with a
GDP larger than those of Portugal, Israel, and Singapore. See generally PHILIPPE JORION, BIG
BETS GONE BAD: DERIVATIVES AND BANKRUPTCY IN ORANGE COUNTY 92 (1995) [hereinafter
JORION I].
32. McKown & Purcell, supra note 11, at 120.
33. Jameson, supra note 30, at 2.
34. Id. at 1.
35. MARK BALDASSARE, WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY BANKRUPTCY
41-46 (1998) (describing the political propensity of Orange County voters).
36. See JORION I, supra note 31, at 7.
37. Jameson, supra note 30, at 1. See also Nagler, supra note 18, at 458.
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ron set a great rate of return on investment with a 9.4% annual
average. 38 While the average rate of return on investment was 5 to 6%
during the 1991 to 1993 depression, the Orange County Investment
Pool ("OCIP"), which was under Citron's management, reached a rate
of return of 8 to 9%.39
Such a difference in the rate of return yielded a difference in re-
turns of $500 million; such a return had a very significant meaning in
Orange County, a place extremely hostile to tax increases. 40 In other
words, it provided the financial foundation to administer the local
government without increasing the tax burden. Thanks to such a mar-
velous rate of return, Citron was free from any intervention by the
supervisory board over funds and was able to manage the fund on his
own.41 In addition, the investment banks refrained from criticizing
Citron's management decisions or investments, as they wanted to
maintain their relationship with Orange Country, the big hand feeding
them. 42
With the economic situation in California at the time, the impor-
tance of Citron became even more apparent. During the continuing
depression from 1992 to 1993, the value of assets decreased and the
relative importance of the property tax in the entire Orange Country
budget went from 60% to 25%, a rapid slide. 43 In contrast, the relative
importance of the rate of return from the bond-type investors in-
creased from 3% to 35%.44 The returns from the fund had become
such an important financial source, and fund manager Citron was able
38. JORION I, supra note 31, at 84.
39. One Congressional hearing revealed the Citron fund was earning interest at an annualized
rate of 7.8% in April 15, 1994. Statement for the Record for the S. Foreign Relations Comm.
Hearings on the Nomination for Dir. of the Peace Corps, 107th Cong. 4 (2001), available at http://
peacecorpsonline.org/scanned/ocbankruptacy2.pdf [hereinafter Statements] (articles from the
Orange County Register).
40. See BALDASSARE, supra note 35, at 61-67 (illustrating Orange County tax policy).
41. Dr. Gilman, Special Assistant to the Director of the United States Office of Government
Ethics, explains:
Robert Citron, the County Treasurer of Orange County, California was made responsi-
ble by the Board of Supervisors for effectively investing receipts to allow a decrease in
taxes and fees. The high risk investment strategy he employed led to bankruptcy of the
county and felony charges against him. This was a purely entrepreneurial "gamble" on
Citron's part, but it was devoid of any compliance to any set of standards.
STUART GILMAN, REALIGNMENT AND PUBLIC SECTOR ETHIcs: THE NEGLECTED MANAGEMENT
PROBLEM IN THE NEW PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1997), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/40/15/2093526.pdf.
42. See JORION I, supra note 31, at 8.
43. See id. at 15.
44. See id.
20071
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to arbitrarily make investment decisions almost without any
supervision.4 5
Through lobbying activities in the early 1980s, Citron prepared the
foundation to make investments in repurchase agreements ("repos") 46
and inverse floating-rate notes ("FRNs"), 47 rather than simple forms
of securities. It was risky for Citron to invest money he obtained from
reverse repos into inverse FRNs because such an investment strategy
is made in anticipation of falling interest rates; if the interest rate in-
creased, investors would face a huge risk. Contrary to expectations,
the interest rate did increase, and OCIP assumed an enormous loss.
However, the possibility of loss had been anticipated to a certain
extent, 48 at least by those other than Citron. During the 1994 election
for Citron's seventh term as Orange County treasurer, John M. W.
Moorlach, Citron's rival, criticized Citron's investment strategy as be-
ing "a major bull market in the middle of a bear market," noting it
could lead to $1.2 billion in loss. 49 Citron ascribed Moorlach's asser-
tions to political maneuvering based on groundless allegations, espe-
cially Moorlach's assertion that a decline in the credibility of both
Orange Country and the fund would give rise to a huge loss to the
investors, the city, the office of education, and the public institu-
tions.50 Subsequently, Citron defeated Moorlach.51
However, contrary to Citron's expectation, in February 1994 the
Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") raised the interest rate.5 2 Because
most of the investment pool of Orange County had been put into in-
vestments that were interest-rate volatile, the pool's value took a
nose-dive. 53
45. One commentator describes him as being "no new kid on the block." Jameson, supra note
30, at 1.
46. See generally JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 77 (6th ed.
2006).
47. See generally BOMFIM, supra note 25, at 43-51.
48. Orange County Assistant Treasurer Matt Raabe and Citron were aware that:
[Ain investment manager can run into trouble with reverse repurchase agreements. If
the market value of the bonds used as collateral falls, a dealer will want cash to bring
the value of the collateral up to market value. If no cash is available, the investment
manager may have to sell bonds at reduced value, creating a loss for the fund.
Statements, supra note 39, at 8.
49. JORION I, supra note 31, at 87.
50. Id. at 16.
51. Id. at 9.
52. Jameson, supra note 30, at 1; see also SATYAJnT DAS, STRUCTURED PRODUCTS & HYBRID
SECURITIES 987 (2001).
53. See JORION I, supra note 31, at 67-68.
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B. Investment Strategies
Citron set investment strategies based on the assumption the inter-
est rate would continue to drop, or at least remain stable.5 4 Through
reverse repos, financial leverage was secured by investing funds in
structured bonds, such as inverse FRNs,5 5 to be bought and held to an
average maturity of 4 years.56
Thus, Citron engaged in a speculative transaction where a high re-
turn would be received if the interest rate fell, but a high loss might be
suffered if the interest rate rose.57 In terms of duration, financing was
made through short-term bonds, but was invested in long-term, high-
risk bonds. 58 In terms of leverage, it was an investment strategy with
high leverage from both financing and investment-object perspec-
tives.59 In other words, with respect to financing, the leverage was not
only raised through reverse repos, but also by adding structured bonds
in terms of investment. 60 The strategy of buying bonds and holding
them to maturity was also used. For this particular strategy to succeed,
a sufficient cash reserve must exist to meet the margin call, and it must
be correctly assumed that the investors will not make a repurchase
request before bond maturity. 61
In October 1992, Merrill Lynch warned Citron that the average ma-
turity of OCIP was 1.4 years, but the effective duration was 7 years.62
"When Merrill Lynch informed Citron of the risks and volatility that
had been built into the Orange County portfolio and suggested he
reduce the portfolio's market risk exposure, Citron politely re-
54. Nagler, supra note 18, at 458.
55. Note that FRN is not a credit derivative. See BOMFIM, supra note 25, at 43.
56. See WHALEY, supra note 7, at 666.
57. See id.
58. This investment pattern is called "riding the yield curve" in the financial industry. Id. at
n.14.
59. See McKown & Purcell, supra note 11, at 120.
60. See DAS, supra note 52, at 987.
61. Citron's strategy, doubling up, requires a sufficient investment amount in reserve to
succeed.
In theory it seems fine as we all know that neither one nor the other result of an even
money bet will continue to come up forever. So if we are betting on Odd and it hasn't
come up in 2 or more spins we just keep doubling our wager amount until it does.
There are three problems with this approach. The first is we can't double forever as
there is a table limit to the amount we can wager. The second is we would need a huge
stake to cover the size of some of the bets. And the third is we can be placing a huge
bet to win a single dollar.
Zen Gambling, Roulette Betting Strategy 1: Doubling Up, ZENGAMBLING.COM, http://
www.zengambling.com/roulette-betting-strategy.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2008).
62. See JORION I, supra note 31, at 29.
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fused. '63 In 1994 when the short-term interest rate rose by 3%, the
loss to the $7.5 billion fund was about $1.6 billion.64
Generally duration and maturity are either the same, or the dura-
tion is shorter than maturity. Therefore, in the case of OCIP, how
could the average maturity end up longer than the duration? The an-
swer is that reverse repos were used. 65
1. Financing by Reverse Repos
Repurchase agreements are financial contracts in which a certain
bond is sold on condition that it is either repurchased at a specified
price or resold.66 Generally, a repo refers to selling the bond holdings
to finance, while a reverse repo refers to raising bonds by paying in
cash.67 In short, from the bond dealer's standpoint, repos are when
cash is financed and reverse repos are when bonds are raised.68
The repo of OCIP is either an "open repo," with a maturity of 3 to 6
months, or a "term repo. ' ' 69 Reverse repos, in particular, played the
63. Jonathan E. Duchac & Jack E. Wilkerson, Jr., Evaluating and Controlling Derivatives Op-
erational Risk, 1996 J. BANK COST & MGMT. Accr. 25, 28 (1996), available at http://findar-
ticles.comlp/articles/mi-qa3682/is_199601/ain8740425/pg1.
64. Making a substitution in "amount of loss = duration x amount of the portfolio x percent
increase of interest rate," 7 x $7.5 billion x 0.03=$1,575,000,000.00.
65. See LILLIAN CHEW, MANAGING DERIVATIVE RISKS: THE USE AND ABUSE OF LEVERAGE
17 (1996).
66. Repurchase agreements, commonly known as "repos," "are ... nothing more than financ-
ing arrangements by which one party provides funds to another for a short period of time." Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 41, 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
67. See Satina P'ship LP v. Comm'r, No. 25084-96, 2000 WL 1700928, at *21 n.4 (T.C. 2000).
Generally, complicated transactions called "repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements" are
applied in financing. "A repurchase agreement transaction, or repo, as it is commonly referred
to, is a short-term investment vehicle that can be used for cash management purposes by an
institutional [or individual] investor." Michael A. Spielman, Whole Loan Repurchase Agree-
ments: An Assessment of Investment Transaction Risk in Light of Continuing Legal Uncertainty,
99 COM. L.J. 476, 476 (1994).
68. As a hybrid loan transaction, "the repo[s] generally consist of U.S. Treasury securities,
commercial paper, corporate securities, or whole loan mortgages." Spielman, supra note 67, at
476. Moreover:
In each repo transaction, one party is a provider, and one party is a user, of funds. The
provider of funds (hereinafter "Buyer"), enters into a contract with a user of funds
(hereinafter "Seller"), whereby the Buyer purchases agreed-upon financial instru-
ments, while the Seller simultaneously agrees to buy back the financial instruments at a
specified date, or on the Buyer's demand, for a price exceeding the purchase price. The
additional amount received by the Buyer upon resale of the financial instruments re-
flects the accrued interest which is earned on the transaction. From the perspective of
the Seller, the transaction is referred to as a "repo", whereas from the perspective of
the Buyer, the transaction is referred to as a "reverse repo."
Id. at 476-77.
69. An open repo refers to one in which the maturity is not previously specified and the
agreement can be terminated by either party's notification of repurchase. "In 'open' repurchase
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deciding role in the bankruptcy of OCIP. In December 1993, OCIP
was in possession of approximately $100 million in Federal National
Mortgage Association ("FNMA") bonds maturing in 1998.70 Citron
offered the bonds as a security to Credit Suisse First Boston ("CSFB")
at a fixed interest rate for 30 days, and made a reverse repo for financ-
ing in the amount of $100 million.71 If the interest rate for the repo
was 3% with the size of the bonds at $100 million, Orange County had
to pay interest of $250,000 ($100 million x 3% x 30/360), plus a total of
$100.25 million to CSFB.
The reason Orange County financed using a reverse repo is it ex-
pected the interest rate to decline, or at least remain stable; in which
case, it wanted to expand its investment in FNMA bonds where high
returns were achievable. As FNMA bonds are inverse FRNs, they
have a structure where interest income becomes higher when the stan-
dard interest rate declines. Thus Citron increased the size of its invest-
ment by reinvesting the financed funds from reverse repos in inverse
FRNs.72
Reverse repos had the function of increasing the effective duration
of a portfolio as much as the rate of leverage. The structure of creating
leverage through reverse repo required three steps: first, FNMA in-
vested $100 million in inverse FRNs; second, it invested additional in-
vestments through reverse repos (totaling $200 million invested); and
third, it invested additional investments through reverse repos (total-
ing $300 million invested). 73 For simplification purposes, a 0% hair-
cut 7' was assumed.75
When a reverse repo contract is made, the bonds are not sold in
their entirety. Because bonds had to be repurchased after a certain
time, Orange County was still exposed to the volatility of the interest
rate. Due to the constant increase in interest rates between December
1993 and November 1994, the return on the bonds rose from 5.24% to
agreements, the interest charge on the loan fluctuates with the prevailing market rate, entitling
the investor to an interest expense deduction since a profit or loss may be realized on the trans-
action." In re Messinger, 627 A.2d 162,163 (N.J. 1993). A term repo is a repo agreement that has
the maturity specified for a certain period. HULL, supra note 46, at 77.
70. See JORION I, supra note 31, at 51.
71. See McKown & Purcell, supra note 11, at 120-21.
72. See Jameson, supra note 30, at 2. See also WHALEY, supra note 7, at 666.
73. "[W]hen Orange County bought an inverse floater with notional amount of $100 million,
it had an exposure equal to non-leveraged inverse floater worth of $300 million. This type of
synthetic leverage allows an investor to execute leveraged plays with cash instruments, and with-
out having to borrow funds." CHEW, supra note 65, at 17.
74. See HULL, supra note 46, at 494. See also Cohen, supra note 17, at 2020-21 n.150.
75. In this case, theoretically the investment amount can be expanded infinitely. If the haircut
is 2%, the size of investment can be expanded up to fifty times.
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7.88%, while the price of the bonds dropped from $100.44 to $92.34.76
The three-fold leverage effect, due to two reverse repos, increased the
duration of the bonds, thus expanding the magnitude of the loss. 77
This led to a margin call by CSFB.78 As the decline in the price of
bonds meant a decline in the value of collateral, the counterpart of the
reverse repo contract, CSFB, who had the bonds, asked for additional
collateral from Orange County. 79 When Orange County failed to re-
spond to the request to put up additional collateral, CSFB quickly liq-
uidated the bonds it kept as collateral, which put Orange County on
the road to bankruptcy court.80
2. Investment with Inverse FRNs
In the investment failure of OCIP, inverse FRNs had an important
function. As an FRN is re-adjusted regularly by the coupon rate,
which reflects the market interest rate, it is equivalent to making a
promise to "rollover" during the period of the short-term discount
bond. Therefore, the sensitivity to the value of bonds against the vola-
tility in interest rate is as low as in the discount bonds.
Inverse FRN refers to a bond whose coupon rate varies inversely to
the volatility of its reference rate. For example, the coupon interest
rate of the inverse FRN can be expressed as MAX[10%-LIBOR, 0].
Generally, the lowest coupon interest rate is set at zero. This means
the issuing company has sold the inverse FRN to investors at a price
outside the interest rate caps. As in the previous example, if the cou-
pon interest rate is set as [10%-LIBOR], the coupon interest rate de-
creases when LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) increases. In
the extreme case that LIBOR exceeds 10%, the coupon interest rate
becomes zero, the worst case for investors.
As the inverse FRN is very sensitive to the change in interest rate, it
is a highly risky subject of investment. 81 As for a fixed-interest bond,
the coupon interest remains the same when the interest rate is on the
rise, but when the market interest rate increases, the value declines.
However, as to the inverse FRN, when the coupon interest rate de-
clines and the market interest rate goes up, the value will decline more
than a fixed-interest-rate bond would. In other words, the sensitivity
76. JORION I, supra note 31, at 95.
77. The duration of five-year bonds with the addition of three-fold leverage has about the
same level of duration as twenty-five-year bonds. The duration of a five-year bond is 4.4; when
the three-fold leverage is taken into consideration, the duration becomes 13.2.
78. See HULL, supra note 46, at 27.
79. JORION I, supra note 31, at 36.
80. Id. at 36-37.
81. BOMFIM, supra note 25, at 46, 51.
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of the value of a bond to the volatility of interest rate is increased in
the inverse FRN. For example, the risk of a five-year maturity inverse
FRN is about twice a five-year fixed-interest-rate bond, 82 making it
similar to that of a ten-year maturity fixed-interest-rate bond. Gener-
ally, at the beginning, a relatively high coupon interest rate is pre-
ferred, but with the rise in the interest rate, the value of the bond
rapidly declines.
As FNMA invests in long-term assets, paying fixed interest rates,
such as a mortgage, by financing short-term funds becomes a problem
of mismatched assets and liabilities. When the interest rate went up,
the cost of financing increased; however, because the income from the
mortgage was fixed, FNMA tried to settle the difference through in-
verse FRNs. In other words, inverse FRNs were issued as a means of
hedging against the risk of an increase in the interest rate. When an
inverse FRN was issued, the interest expense was reduced once the
interest rate increased.
In anticipation of the stability in interest rate or the continuance of
its decline, OCIP invested $1 million in inverse FRNs issued by
FNMA using the formula of [15.5% - 2 x LIBOR]. 83 As LIBOR was
multiplied by the leverage multiplier 2, it had a structure in which the
degree of decline in the coupon interest rate was expanded by the
amount of the interest rate increase. The risk is about three times
higher compared to a fixed-interest-rate bond with the same matur-
ity.84 As LIBOR rapidly increased from 3.63% in January 1993 to
6.5% in November 1994, the coupon interest rate took a nose dive
from 8.25% to 2.5%.85 As a result, the value of the bond fell sharply,
which was directly linked to OCIP's loss.
82. By dividing the cash flow of the fixed-interest-rate bond, FRN and inverse FRN can be
created. Adding the values of FRN and inverse FRN should equal the value of the fixed-interest-
rate bond. For example, assume that a five-year maturity fixed-interest-rate bond has a value of
$100, and the values of FRN and inverse FRN are $50 each. Assume also for the purpose of this
example (perhaps somewhat unrealistically in the real world) that the duration of a five-year
fixed-interest-rate bond is 5 and that of FRN is 0. If the interest rate goes up 1%, the value of the
fixed-interest-rate bond declines by $95. As the duration of FRN is 0, the $5 decline in value
occurs in inverse FRN and the value declines from $50 to $45. In this case, the duration of
inverse FRN become 10(50/5). That is, the risk of a five-year maturity inverse FRN is about
twice that of a five-year maturity fixed-interest-rate bond.
83. JORION I, supra note 31, at 51.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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C. Structure of OCIP
OCIP held various securities, but the $800 million in FNMA bonds
were the majority of the bonds issued by the public agencies.86 In
1994, the FRB raised the interest rate three times, resulting in a 6%
decline in value of the FNMA bonds.8 7 Considering the leverage of
2.71 using the reverse repo, the actual decline in value of the FNMA
bonds was about 16%. The decline in value of the overall investment
pool was about 21%.
Table 11-1 below shows the sizes and average maturity of various
securities in which OCIP invested. During the treasurer election cam-
paign, based on this information, Moorlach very accurately forecasted
a bankruptcy. 88 However, Moorlach's assertion lacked persuasive
power because the information was formulated in a document pre-
pared by financial experts who wanted to remain anonymous due to
the influence of Merrill Lynch and Citron, the big guns in the capital
market.89 Consequently, Moorlach's claim was treated as only a politi-
cal opinion.
The influence of both Citron and OCIP can be seen in the Califor-
nia city of Irvine, for example, which invested in OCIP by financing
through bond issuance.90 Standard and Poor's ("S&P"), a company
that provides financial market intelligence, gave the highest credit rat-
ing to the Irvine bonds conditioned on the funds being invested in
OCIP.91 Peer Swan, the mayor of Irvine, compared Moorlach's asser-
tion to shouting "fire" in a movie theater and further claimed that
Irvine's cost of financing rapidly increased as a result of Moorlach's
statement.92 Ironically, as OCIP's potential insolvency was revealed,
86. Id. at 93.
87. "[Tlhe Federal Reserve pushed interest rates up from 3.25 percent in February to 5.5
percent Nov. 15, [1994;] the market value of the bonds Citron has borrowed against declined,
forcing him to either invest more cash or sell the leveraged securities at a loss." Statements, supra
note 39, at 36 (testimony of Gaddi Vasquez).
88. The Orange County board of supervisors has now discovered "the concerns John Moor-
lach had regarding the safety of the Orange County Investment Pool (OCIP), in his race for
county treasurer against Robert L. Citron, were true. Higher returns do mean higher risks." Id.
at 38.
89. JORION I, supra note 31, at 15-18.
90. Id. at 131.
91. Id. at 94.
92. Note that:
By investing in short-term "reverse repurchase" arrangements, and using the money to
buy long-term bonds, Citron has earned an arbitrage, or differential profit, that even
Moorlach says gave the county "incredible performance numbers." But if interest rates
continue to rise, as they have in the past six months, Citron will be stuck with billions of
dollars worth of bonds returning less-than-market rates, Moorlach said. If he's forced
to sell the bonds in a down market, the losses could cut into principal. "I'm not trying to
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Swan was the first to withdraw the Irvine monies from OCIP.93 Table
II-1 also reflects the structure of OICP:
Face value Cost Average
Classification of Asset (in millions of dollars) (in millions of dollars) Maturity
Treasury Bond 582 591 4.5
Agency fixed-rate notes 8,480 8,493 4
Agency floating-rate notes 5,693 5,692 4
Corporate notes 1,912 1,912 4
MBS 127 127 10
Certificate of deposit 1,609 1,609 4
Mutual funds 421 421 NA
Discount notes 686 683 0
Commercial paper 350 349 0
Total securities value 19,860 19,879
Reverse repo -12,529 -11,833
Net securities value 7,331 8,046
Leverage 2.71
TABLE II-1. STRUCTURE OF OCIP94
D. Result of Derivatives Application
1. Astronomical Loss
The investment results of OCIP indicate it was achieving excess
profits until 1993. 95 However, as the FRB increased the interest rate
cry wolf or scream fire in a theater," Moorlach said. "All I'm saying is, 'Board of Super-
visors, look, this is risky.' If interest rates rise, based on how he's grown his garden, the
harvest isn't going to be very attractive. Win, lose or draw, the problem's still there."
Citron said Moorlach's dire scenarios are based on speculation. "We don't believe that
situation will crop up," Citron said. "If interest rates do go up, not all of the securities
we have will (lose value) in that way. "We may not be earning the very high interest
rates, but we are still predicting that we will earn no less than 6.5 percent in the fiscal
year that begins July 1.
Statements, supra note 39, at 24 (testimony of Gaddi Vasquez).
93. Note that:
[W]hen IRWD's Swan approached county officials last week and asked for his deposits,
he was told he would not be able to collect the money for 30 days. Tuesday, Swan said,
he learned that he would also have to take a 20 percent loss - his share of the market
decline. "I'm not panicked about the deal," Swan said. "The most prudent thing to do
would be to take the money out. But for the benefit of the people of the county I would
be willing to leave the money there, as long as I can participate in the (investment)
review committee.
Id. at 37.
94. JORION I, supra note 31, at 92. See also WHALEY, supra note 7, at 668.
95. JORION I, supra note 31, at 8.
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six times to curb inflation in 1994, the fundamental basis of investment
strategies began shaking.96 Citron's anticipation of the interest rate
decline was ascribed to the belief that the U.S. economy would con-
tinue to remain in a stagnation phase.97 This erroneous belief seems to
have resulted from the inability of the state of California (unlike other
U.S. states) to come out of the depression.98 Despite anticipation of
having at least an inconsistent economic situation, Citron continued a
high-risk investment strategy of expanding the fund leverage by
means of reverse repos to compensate for the previous loss.99 Below
Table 11-2 shows the leverage of OICP from June 1990 to December
1994.
Date Holdings Borrowings Leverage
June 1990 3.6 1.7 1.5
June 1991 3.9 1.9 1.5
June 1992 5.6 3.9 1.7
June 1993 7.7 7.5 2.0
June 1994 9.4 12.7 2.3
Dec. 1994 7.6 13.0 2.7
TABLE 11-2. LEVERAGE OF OCIP100
During the Orange County treasurer election, Moorlach argued the
need for investigation into the fund. 101 Although there were four in-
vestigations after 1994, no restriction was put in place regarding the
management of the fund. 102
In the end, the total loss to the OCIP reached $1.6 billion in No-
vember 1994.103 The average maturity of the fixed-interest-rate bonds
was 4 years, during which a total of $12 billion was invested. Between
96. Statements, supra note 39, at 47.
97. JORION I, supra note 31, at 87.
98. Id.
99. The most significant characteristics of "derivatives make it possible to start large positions
with small amount of money by using leverage." CHEW, supra note 65, at 15.
100. JORION I, supra note 31, at 88.
101. See BALDASSARE, supra note 35, at 104-07 (describing campaign for Orange County trea-
surer election).
102. JORION 1, supra note 31, at 89-90.
103. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE No. 36,761, REPORT OF INVESTIGA-
TION IN THE MATTER OF COUNTY OF ORANGE, CALIFORNIA As IT RELATES TO THE CONDUCT
OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS (1996), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/
municipal/mbonds/publicof.htm [hereinafter SEC ORANGE COUNTY REPORT]. "The County also
suffered a loss of $157 million in estimated and budgeted interest earnings from the County
Pools, contributing to a projected deficit for fiscal year 1994-95 of approximately $172 million."
Id. See also BALDASSARE, supra note 35, at 123-24.
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December 1993 and November 1994, as the interest rate increased
from 5.2% to 7.8%, the rate of loss of the fixed-interest-rate bonds
was 3%, equal to $360 million.' 0 4 The maturity of inverse FRN was 5
years, with a total of $800 million invested.'0 5 Likewise, as the interest
rate increased by 2.6% during the same period, the value dropped by
12.8%; considering the coupon interest rate of 5%, the rate of loss was
7.8%, yielding an investment loss of $620 million.'06 In addition, if the
money financed was $1.24 billion and the short-term borrowing cost
was 5%, the total amount of loss came up to $1.6 billion.10 7 Below
Table 11-3 provides an analysis of OCIP's losses.
Subject of Amount of Investment Revenue rate Loss
Investment (in billions of dollars) (Jan-Dec. 1994) (in millions of dollars)
Initial Portfolio $7.6
Fixed-rate notes $12.0 -3.0% $360
Inverse FRN $8.0 -7.8% $620
Loan cost $12.4 -5.0% $620
Total portfolio: -21% $1,600
Estimated loss
TABLE 11-3. ANALYSIS OF OCIP Loss 08
2. Bankruptcy of Orange County
In December 1994, Orange County entered bankruptcy proceedings
for adjustment of debts of a municipality pursuant to Chapter 9 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which governs the bankruptcy of
municipalities. 109
Chapter 9 allows for reorganization only of the financial asset struc-
ture of the municipality.'10 Because the means of bankruptcy liquida-
tion for a municipality is not mentioned in Chapter 9, many other
means were considered for the liquidation of the portfolio; a public
auction was the means selected."' Because the restructuring was
made very quickly, the process was completed within 5 months." 2 A
total of $7.5 billion worth of securities was sold; after paying off the
104. JORION I, supra note 31, at 95.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2006).
110. See generally id.
111. JORION I, supra note 31, at 77.
112. "Prompted by due date of certain repo transactions, Orange County file[d] for Chapter 9
protection" on December 6, 1994, and the "US Bankruptcy Court endorse[d] settlement of what
[was] left in the investment pool" on May 2, 1995. Jameson, supra note 30, at 2.
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remaining debts, $4.8 billion of the recovered amount was returned to
Orange County.113 In 1996, Citron was sentenced to a year in jail and
fined $100,000.114
3. Litigation Against Merrill Lynch
In January 12, 1995, Orange County sued Merrill Lynch for having
irresponsibly sold high risk securities; Orange County alleged Merrill
Lynch was responsible for the $1.7 billion loss. 11 5 At that time, Merrill
Lynch had focused on financing by municipalities; it was the leader in
the field of undertaking bonds issued by municipalities.1 16 The two
points at issue in the litigation were as follows:
First, whether Merrill Lynch provided OCIP with sufficient infor-
mation on the risk of the structured bond position vis-A-vis the interest
rate change. 117 Merrill Lynch insisted it had told Citron of the possible
negative result of an interest rate hike and of its intentions to repur-
chase the structured bond in the amount of $3.5 billion. 118 However,
Citron claimed that between October 1992 and November 1994, Mer-
rill Lynch sold inappropriate additional structured bonds of $2.8 bil-
lion in the form of the inverse FRNs. 119
The second issue was whether the structured bonds Merrill Lynch
offered to OCIP were suitable. 120 Though it is difficult to define the
concept of suitability, in securities law, the client should at least be
protected from speculative products suggested by the broker.1 21 Or-
ange County alleged the product offered by Merrill Lynch was unlaw-
113. JORION I, supra note 31, at 81.
114. Andrew Pollack, First Boston To Pay Fine in Orange County Bond Offering, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 1998, at Al.
115. JORION I, supra note 31, at 97.
[In the related lawsuit,] [pilaintiffs argue[d] that Merrill Lynch permitted, encouraged,
and advised Citron to pursue an unlawful, speculative scheme that included the bor-
rowing, primarily through short-term Repos, of billions of dollars and the transfer of
billions of dollars of securities owned by the County to Merrill Lynch. As a result of this
investment strategy, the County suffered catastrophic losses in 1994.
County of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re County of Orange), 191 B.R. 1005, 1010-11
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).
116. BALDASSARE, supra note 35, at 171.
117. See generally id. at 170-74.
118. JORION I, supra note 31, at 99.
119. Id.
120. This issue arises because "derivatives are often such complex and highly leveraged prod-
ucts." Aaron Rubinstein, Common Law Theories of Liability in Derivatives Litigation, 66 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 737, 743 (1997). But see Gibson, supra note 1, at 546 (noting that federal securities
laws do not impose liability rules).
121. Dealers and brokers can normally obtain the necessary information through standard
questionnaires and customer profiles in the course of business. Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 1260.
Generally, the doctrine of suitability can be defined as:
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ful in that it was completely inconsistent with the investment purpose
of OCIP.122
Although this litigation ended in a $400 million settlement paid by
Merrill Lynch to Orange County in June 1998,123 other suits followed.
The creditors of Orange County filed a suit against Merrill Lynch and
Citron;124 also, Orange County sued Nomura Securities, who had im-
mediately disposed of a security worth $900 million in violation of the
automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code. 25
E. Implications
In terms of supervision, a major problem was people in authority in
Orange County failed to understand the investment strategy of OCIP.
In other words, a sufficient analysis of the risk factors regarding the
subject for investment, its suitability to the municipality, or even why
OCIP had previously achieved excess profit was not given to the
investors.' 26
In conclusion, it is estimated the main cause of Orange Country's
failure in the use of derivatives lay not in the derivatives themselves.
but in the people who acted without knowledge of them, 127 as well as
[A] legal principle by which brokers (and, potentially dealers) owe a duty to investors
to make suitable recommendations regarding the purchase of investment instruments.
In the context of derivatives, suitability relates to a dealer's responsibility for ascertain-
ing the extent to which the counter-party understands the risks of the transactions into
which it enters-i.e., is the counter-party "suitable?"
David C. Sienko, The Aftermath of Derivatives Losses: Can Sophisticated Investors Invoke the
Suitability Doctrine Against Dealers under Current Law?, 8 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 105, 115 (1995).
122. See JORION I, supra note 31, at 99 (noting that the issue of the suit against Merrill Lynch
was suitability).
123. Andrew Pollack & Leslie Wayne, Ending Suit, Merrill Lynch to Pay California County
$400 Million, N.Y. TiMES, Jun. 3, 1998.
124. Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code prohibits investors from filing a lawsuit against
the municipality. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
125. John Greenwald, The California Wipeout, TIME, Dec. 19, 1994, at 55. In Chapter 9 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the collection of the assets of a bankrupt entity by the creditors is pro-
hibited through the applicable automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a), 901(a) (2006). In Chapter 11
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code where the bankruptcy cases of general private firms are dealt with,
repo is subject to exemption from the automatic stay. In other words, at the time of bankruptcy,
the creditors can dispose of the secured debts. However, at that time, it was not clear whether
repo was subject to the exemption from the automatic stay provision in Chapter 9 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, leaving it a matter to be settled by the bankruptcy court. BALDASSARE, supra
note 35, at 172.
126. Under the California Government Code Section 25303, County Supervisors are required
to oversee the official conduct of independently elected officials such as Citron and their respon-
sibility with regard to "the assessing, collecting, safekeeping, management and disbursement of
public funds." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 25303 (2007). However, they did not meet those legal obliga-
tions. Statements, supra note 39, at 3, 46.
127. Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 1252.
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the lack of suitability between the investment purpose and the subject
of investment.'2 8 There would have been no problem if such an invest-
ment strategy had been used by a hedge fund rather than a municipal-
ity. For a municipality, a high-risk investment is erroneous because of
the city's purpose. Before making this investment decision, the munic-
ipality should have determined whether the characteristics of the pos-
sible investment were suitable for its purpose, selecting only an
investment that allowed its objectives to succeed. 2 9
In 1997, as the person in charge of Orange County was replaced and
the governance structure reformed, a system of direct reporting to the
supervisor by the internal auditors was installed, and a strict invest-
ment policy was put in place. 130 In the new Orange County investment
policy statement, guarantees of the principal and liquidity were estab-
lished. 131 Moreover, restrictions were placed on certain investment
strategies; specifically, borrowing for investment purposes, repos, re-
structured bonds (particularly inverse FRNs), and derivatives (partic-
ularly options) were prohibited. 32
Because OCIP was a fund for taxpayers and their families, a clear
investment purpose reflecting such characteristics should have been
made. By its nature, the first priority of OCIP's investment purpose
should have been guaranteeing its principal. Once the investment pur-
pose is clearly established, it must be accomplished through risk man-
agement guidance and management. For example, by setting the
maximum exposure to the market risk through VaR, 133 the investment
128. There is however a different argument:
Regarding the justifiable reliance element, if Citron was as ignorant [warning] ... Mer-
rill Lynch could argue that Citron would have bought the financial instruments anyway.
[In such a case,] Orange County could have responded that the shingle theory was in-
tended to protect unsophisticated investors, thus giving rise to a duty to disclose that
the investments were unsuitable prior to selling them to the investor. Nevertheless,
there are circumstances where Merrill Lynch would not be under a duty to disclose the
unsuitability of the transactions. For example, Citron may have called [Merrill Lynch
salesperson] and told him exactly what he wanted to purchase and on what terms. The
suitability doctrine probably would not provide relief to Orange County based on this
scenario because [salesperson] would have been acting as an order taker rather than
adviser.
Madison, supra note 5, at 295.
129. McKown & Purcell, supra note 11, at 121.
130. Jameson, supra note 30, at 3.
131. Id. at 4.
132. Id.
133. HULL, supra note 46, at 435.
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purpose can be controlled, but in OCIP's case, a risk management of
portfolio was not made. 34
There is a risk not only in derivatives, but in all investments in fi-
nancial products. The question is how much risk investors can toler-
ate, and Orange County assumed too much. As a result, out of an
investment pool of $7.5 billion, a $1.6 billion loss, or 22% of the pool,
was generated.' 35 In contrast, in 1994 the average loss to passive inves-
tors was only 4%.136
The excessive risk Orange County faced was due to the speculative
transactions (for example, inverse FRNs, structured bonds, and repos)
that were engaged in, causing a high leverage unsuitable for a fund
managed by a municipality. 137 In addition, as there was absolutely no
control over the use of excess leverage, Citron was able to make deci-
sions on his own, which was an important risk management problem
in itself. Moreover, the fact that it was difficult to quickly hedge or
dispose of the Orange County portfolio due to its complexity was an-
other factor that lead to such a large-scale loss.
However, it would be extremely erroneous in a regulation plan to
preclude derivatives or products with built-in derivatives on account
of their possible application problems. At that time, there was an as-
sertion that filing litigation should be made easy by stipulating that a
municipality is an unsophisticated investor. However, the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") disapproved of that approach on
the grounds that it would be ineffective; an honest securities company
was likely to get caught in a lawsuit merely because the client lost
money with the securities company, ultimately passing on such a cost
to the client.' 38 The SEC concluded the best practice for regulating
134. "A sophisticated party will measure the market risk to its overall portfolio. That is, it will
measure its net exposure after accounting for all its positions." Norman Menachem Feder,
Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 677, 722 (2002).
135. JORION I, supra note 31, at 9, 132.
136. Id. at 133.
137. It should be noted "derivatives are not necessarily more or less risky than the underlying
assets. The degree of risk is related to the degree of leverage." Cohen, supra note 17, at 2007
n.73.
138. There were some critics who have criticized SEC actions in the municipal securities mar-
ket. Rachel Witmer, McLucas Defends SEC's Enforcement of Laws in Municipal Securities Mar-
ket, 28 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 5 (1996). They believed Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman, "has been
biased in favor of bringing individual actions and should not have participated in SEC decisions
to file them." Id. However, the SEC Enforcement Director William McLucas argued that "[t]his
attitude of shoot the messenger misses the mark." Id. On January 30, 1996, Director McLucas
asserted that "the SEC is pursuing plain vanilla securities fraud and has not applied new fraud
standards in the [municipal securities] market." Id. (emphasis changed). According to McLucas,
the SEC policies with respect to the municipal securities market are reasonable. Id. Indeed, it
should be noted that:
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derivatives was to have the investment agencies and securities clarify
the investment purpose and investment guide, establish a risk man-
agement system, and reinforce public notice to the investors. 139
What we must notice that the SEC in the United States did not
make the mistake of burning down the house to get rid of the mice. In
other words, based on the understanding that structured bonds are
basically useful securities, the SEC adhered to its position of settling
the problem raised due to erroneous application of the investment ve-
hicle. There are situations where price setting for the structured bonds
can be difficult, including those when a particular purpose calls for a
special structure. In addition, though the structured bonds have vari-
ous built-in derivatives, as they are often traded as bonds, unsophisti-
cated investors are likely to misunderstand them as secure products.
Therefore, rather than regulating the structured bonds themselves,
regulations were established to reinforce the necessity of an explana-
tion of the inherent risks of the structure bonds when they are sold to
unsophisticated investors.
After Orange County, a G-30 Study Group Report proposed the
best practice for risk management of the OTC derivatives.1 40 The spe-
cifics are as follows: First, the range of OTC derivatives transactions
should be determined on the top management level.141 Second, by
evaluating the market prices of the OTC derivatives every day, the
size of profits and losses should be understood. 42 Third, the market
risk 143 that could occur in the worst possible situation should be one
measured. 144 Fourth, the credit risk 45 of the transaction counterpart
should be frequently evaluated. 146 Fifth, an individual department,
The scope and even the existence of investor protection rules vary according to the
regulator and the type of instrument regulated, ranging from fairly rigorous require-
ments to looser provisions that essentially amount to only risk disclosure. The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission . . . has enacted bright-line rules that in some cases
impose fewer restrictions on transactions involving parties that meet certain objective
criteria, such as particular levels of income and net worth.
Geoffrey B. Goldman, Crafting a Suitability Requirement for the Sale of Over-the-Counter Deriv-
atives: Should Regulators "Punish the Wall Street Hounds bf Greed"?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1112,
1114 (1995).
139. SEC ORANGE CoUNrv REPORT, supra note 103.
140. GROUP OF THIRTY, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES (July 1993), http://riskin-
stitute.ch/136160.htm.
141. GROUP OF THIRTY, THE RECOMMENDATIONS: GENERAL POLICIES 1 (July 1993), http://
riskinstitute.ch/138280.htm [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS].
142. Id.
143. "It is best measured as [VaR] using probability analysis based upon a common confi-
dence interval ... and time horizon." Id.
144. Id.
145. HULL, supra note 46, at 481. See also SCorr & WELLONS, supra note 5, at 1035.
146. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 141.
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separate from the department engaged in the transaction, should per-
form the function of supervision and risk management.1 47 Sixth, deriv-
atives transactions should be permitted to be used only by
professionals with the necessary knowledge, skill, and experience. 148
Government bonds or municipal bonds that have been issued by the
government or a municipality with a credit risk, 149 however low, are
not free from market risk,150 or in other words, the risk of interest rate
volatility. In 1994, although government bonds did not have a credit
risk, there was a large loss of 12% due to the market risk.151 There-
fore, an investor must be able to understand and control the market
risk and the credit risk 52 at the same time. Based on regular reports,
the value of the investment position and VaR 153 must be accurately
understood.
In addition, when an investment decision is made regarding a par-
ticular OTC derivative, the investor must be aware of all relevant risk
factors affecting the investment and the degree of exposure to this
risk. From an unsophisticated investor's standpoint, it is advisable not
to invest in a product whose fair value is not easily determined due to
its complex structure.1 54
III. LEVERAGE INTEREST RATE SWAP TRANSACTIONS OF
PROCTER & GAMBLE AND GIBSON GREETINGS
Among many other cases of derivatives failure in 1990s, the interest
rate swap contracts 155 between Procter & Gamble ("P&G") and
Bankers Trust ("BT"), and between Gibson Greetings and BT
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. "Credit risk involves exposure to possible losses resulting from a counter-party's failure
to meet its financial obligations." Gibson, supra note 1, at 542.
150. "Market risk involves exposure to possible financial losses from an adverse movement in
the interest or currency rates, equity or commodity prices, or other market factors." Id.
151. JORION I, supra note 31, at 157.
152. "The credit quality of both the reference asset and the counterparty are the principal
determinants of credit risk." Andre Scheerer, Credit Derivatives: An Overview of Regulatory
Initiatives in the United States and Europe, 5 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 149, 163 (2000).
153. "Value at Risk analysis expresses the potential loss in fair values, earnings, or cash flows
of market risk sensitive instruments .... "Sco-r r & WELLONS, supra note 5, at 1076.
154. Who are unsophisticated investors? One commentator has presented one standard to this
question which are "[ildentity, age, education, intelligence, and investment and business experi-
ence of the [investor]." Sienko, supra note 121, at 127. Under this standard, "if the [investor] is
engaging in derivatives transactions such as swaps, it is logical to assume that they have a fair
degree of experience and sophistication. Indeed, such requirements are included in the CFTC's
exemption allowing swaps to occur off-exchange." Id.
155. "A swap contract is a bilateral agreement that obligates the contracting parties, who are
referred to as counter-parties, to exchange a series of cash-flow payments at specified times."
Gibson, supra note 1, at 534-35.
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presented the biggest issues. 156 The cases of P&G and Gibson Greet-
ings developed from inappropriate sales practices by BT, who held the
leading position in the field of derivative instruments. 157 This was not
the last word of the debate, but rather was the starting point of regula-
tory and legal issues regarding OTC derivatives transactions.
A. P&G's Failed Transactions
1. Background
P&G, a leader in cosmetics, infant products, and grocery industries,
offered almost 250 products to 5 billion consumers in 130 countries. 158
In August 1993, as the maturity of the interest rate swap ap-
proached what P&G had paid, that is [CP Federal Funds Rate -
0.40%], the company relied on BT for a swap contract replacing the
interest rate swap in order to maintain BT's financing structure. 159 Al-
though BT proposed a swap contract similar to the previous swap in
structure, P&G refused on account of its inconsistency with P&G's
risk factors.160 Later, the second swap contract proposed was a swap
linked with the rate of return on 5-year/30-year maturity U.S. Trea-
sury bonds. 161
Instead of refinancing at a fixed rate, the company may enter into a swap contract to
hedge against the risk of increases in the interest rate. Through a swap contract, the
company can swap the floating-rate loan payment liability for a fixed-rate payment
liability to insure against rises in the interest rate.
Id. at 535.
156. Feder explained:
A swap is an exchange of cash flows. A cash flow is a series of future cash payments. In
a swap, a party agrees to make future payments to the counterparty determined by
reference to a certain fixed or floating rate on a notional amount, and the counterparty
agrees to make reciprocal payments at a market floating rate on a notional amount.
Feder, supra note 134, at 701-02.
157. See CHEW, supra note 65, at 33-37, 47-49.
158. See PROCTOR & GAMBLE, FORM 10-K 2-3 (1998), http://ccbn.10kwizard.com/xml/
download.php?repo=tenk&ipage=504540&format=PDF.
159. See CHEW, supra note 65, at 33.
160. See Baird et al., Recent Developments in Litigation Involving Derivative Contracts, in
ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, SECURITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING AND STRATEGIES FOR THE
'90s AND BEYOND 310-12 (1996) (introducing swap contracts between P&G and BT based on the
complaint that file by P&G in federal court in Cincinnati).
161. CHEW, supra note 65, at 33-34 ("The United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Ohio [ ] held that a derivative product, referred to as a 5s/30s swap, sold by BT to another
counterparty was not a security within the meaning of Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Ex-
change Act."). See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1282 (S.D.
Ohio 1996). However, SEC has a different angle on this issue:
In BT Securities and Vazquez[,] the Commission found that the Treasury-Linked Swap
was a security. There are some similarities to and some differences between the 5s/30s
swap and the Treasury-Linked Swap here. In any event, the Commission disagrees with
the Court's analysis and reiterates its position that the Treasury-Linked Swap is a secur-
[Vol. 6:29
LESSONS FROM MODERN DEBACLES
The main motive for P&G's entrance into an interest rate swap con-
tract with a 5-year maturity with BT in November 1993 was reduction
of the borrowing cost.162 P&G anticipated the interest rate would de-
cline between November 1993 and May 1994.163 Therefore, P&G en-
tered into an interest rate swap contract to convert the fixed-interest-
rate debt in its possession into a debt with a floating interest rate.
The only difference from the ordinary interest rate swap was the
spread took on the characteristics of an option in the equation that
determined the variable rate. However, contrary to P&G's expecta-
tions, the FRB raised the interest rate, and P&G incurred a large
loss. 164 P&G filed a lawsuit against BT on the grounds that BT had
breached its fiduciary duty by failing to provide a clear explanation of
the characteristics of OTC derivatives. 165 The two companies reached
an out-of-court settlement, 66 but the lawsuit set off an examination of
the need for regulation of the sales practices used by sellers of OTC
derivatives. 167
2. Structure of Derivatives Deal
The interest rate swap contract that P&G entered into with BT had
a 5-year maturity, $200 million face value, and semiannual interest
payment.1 68 In return for receiving a fixed interest payment of 5.30%
ity within the meaning of the federal securities laws because it was in actuality a cash-
settled put option on the spread between the price and yield of two different Treasury
securities.
Missner, 62 S.E.C. 265, n.4 (1996), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/337304.txt
and 1996 WL 316296.
162. See CHEW, supra note 65, at 33.
163. Id. at 34-35; see also Michael S. Bennett & Michael J. Main, The Casablanca Paradigm:
Regulatory Risk in the Asian Financial Derivatives Market, 5 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 7 (1999).
164. See ERisk, Case Study: Bankers Trust, ERISK.coM, http://www.erisk.com/Learning
CaseStudies/BankersTrust.asp. (last visited Feb. 9, 2008) [hereinafter ERISK CASE STUDY I].
165. Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 1267. See also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.,
925 F. Supp. 1270, 1275 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
166. CHEW, supra note 65, at 37.
167. See, e.g., William K. Maready, Jr., Regulation for Disaster: Federal Attempts to Control the
Derivatives Market, 31 WAKE FOREST L.REV. 885, 898-912 (introducing several federal solutions
that related to solve the derivatives problems, i.e., "The Derivatives Limitations Act of 1995,"
"Risk Management Improvement and Derivatives Oversight Act of 1995," "The Derivatives
Safety and Soundness Supervision Act of 1995," "The Derivatives Dealers Act of 1995," and
"The SEC's Proposed Amendments."). In the International Symposium on Derivatives and Risk
Management, held at Fordham University School of Law in 2000, one practitioner argued vari-
ous issues in derivatives dealing practice, i.e., capacity, ultra vires, Statute of Frauds, misrepre-
sentation, fraudulent concealment, fiduciary duty, etc. See Denis M. Forster, Derivative
Litigation and Dispute Resolution, 5 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 65, 71-76 (2000).
168. Nagler, supra note 18, at 457.
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from BT, P&G agreed to pay a floating interest payment of [Daily 30-
day average CP interest rate - 0.75% + spread]. 169
The characteristics of the interest rate swap P&G entered into with
BT are as follows: Unlike ordinary swap transactions where the float-
ing interest rate is interlocked with LIBOR, here the floating interest
rate was determined by the CP interest rate. 170 In calculating the CP
interest rate, a 30-day average CP interest rate was used instead of the
CP interest rate of a particular day. 17' Additionally, a spread with the
characteristics of an option was added to the formula that determined
the floating rate. 72 This spread had a structure determined by the
price difference between a 5-year government bond and a 30-year
government bond, or the difference in the rate of return, 73 demon-
strating the core characteristic of the interest rate swap between P&G
and BT.
The formula for the spread included in the interest rate swap en-
tered into between P&G and BT is as follows:
Spread = max [0, 98.5 x (5-year government bond)/5.78% - 30-year
market price of government bond]. 174
For the first six months of the 5-year contract, the spread was 0,
while for the remaining 4 years and 6 months (i.e., nine semesters),
the spread was determined by the standard of the price of the 30-year
government bond and the rate of return of the 5-year government
bond as of May 4, 1994, six months after the beginning of the con-
tract.175 In this way, once the spread was determined, it was fixed for
the remaining period.' 76 As the spread is determined by the rate of
return on a 5-year Treasury bond and the price of a 30-year Treasury
bond, the interest rate swap is called a "5/30 leveraged swap.' 77
169. Procter & Gamble, 925 F. Supp. at 1276.
170. Id. at 33. See also CHEW, supra note 65, at 33.
171. Similar to this, the structure in which the average price of a certain period is used instead
of the price of a certain date is called an Asian structure. In case of an option, the option whose
strike price is determined by the average price for a certain period is called an Asian option. See
DON M. CHANCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES 651-52 (4th ed. 1998).
172. See CHEW, supra note 65, at 34-35.
173. See id. at 29.
174. Id. at 33. See also Procter & Gamble, 925 F. Supp. at 1276.
175. CHEW, supra note 65, at 33-35.
176. The rate of return on a five-year Treasury bond is the rate of return of the five-year
Constant-Maturity Treasury Note ("CMT"). The price of a thirty-year maturity government
bond, the thirty-year Treasury ("TSY"), is the mid-price between the price asked and the price
offered on the 6.25%, maturing in August 2023; accrued interest is not included.
177. CHEW, supra note 65, at 34. The reason this swap was called a "leveraged swap" is it
increased the possibility of the volatility of the interest rate by adding a spread with the charac-
teristics of an option. Id. at 35.
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The formula for spread had the characteristics of an option in which
P&G was the option seller and BT became the option buyer. The de-
duction of 0.75% from the interest rate of BT referred to the "option
premium" P&G receives.178 The spread increased when the rate of
return on the 5-year Treasury bond rose and the price (the rate of
return) of the 30-year Treasury bond became lower (higher). 179 In
other words, as the price of the bond declined and the rate of return
rose, the P&G's exposure to risk increased. When the spread became
0, it was most advantageous for P&G because P&G paid only [CP
interest rate - 0.75%] for five years. Considering that the CP interest
rate was 0.25% higher than the 30-day short-term T-bill on average, as
the deduction item of 75bp is included, when the spread became 0, it
amounted to P&G assuming an interest rate even lower than that of
the short-term T-bill.
Consider when the spread was 0: on May 4, 1994 (the date of deter-
mining the spread), if the rate of return on the 5-year Treasury bond
and the price of the 30-year Treasury bond were 5.02% and 102.58
(rate of return 6.06%), respectively, on November 2, 1993 (the date of
the swap contract), the spread would be 0. In other words, the spread
at the time of contracting the swap is defined as "out-of-the
money. "180
Table 111-1 shows the change of the spread according to the change
in the rate of return on two Treasury bonds. For the convenience of
discussion, assume the rate of return on the 5-year Treasury bond is
5.00% while that of the 30-year Treasury bond is 6.00%.
In this case, the spread was -18.21%. The larger the rate of return
on the 5-year bond, the larger the spread, and the larger the rate of
return on the 30-year bond, the larger the spread. In other words, the
spread appears to be determined by the difference in the rates of re-
turn on two bonds, but, in fact, as the rate of return on bonds in-
creases, so does the spread.
178. Id. at 35.
179. Id. at 34-35.
180. See HULL, supra note 46, at 188.
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30 yrs 5.75 6.00 6.25 6.50 6.75 7.00 7.25
5 yrs
4.75 -26.08 -22.47 -19.04 -15.79 -12.69 -9.75 -6.96
5.00 -21.82 -18.21 -14.78 -11.52 -8.43 -5.49 -2.70
5.25 -17.56 -13.95 -10.52 -7.26 -4.17 -1.23 1.56
5.50 -13.30 -9.69 -6.26 -3.00 0.09 3.03 5.82
5.75 -9.04 -5.43 -2.00 1.26 4.35 7.29 10.08
6.00 -4,78 -1.17 2.26 5.52 8.61 11.55 14.34
6.25 -0.52 3.09 6.52 9.78 12.87 15.81 18.60
6.50 3.74 7.35 10.78 14.04 17.13 20.07 22.86
6.75 8.00 11.61 15.05 18.30 21.39 24.33 27.12
7.00 12.26 15.87 19.30 22.56 25.65 28.59 31.38
TABLE 111-1. PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN SPREAD 181
In such a situation, the change in the spread varies due to the
change in the slope of the "yield curve." If the rate of return on the 5-
year Treasury bond is intact at 5.00%, while that of the 30-year Trea-
sury bond increases to 7.00% (an increase of 1%), the spread becomes
-5.49% as the slope of the yield curve increases. If the rate of return
on the 5-year Treasury bond increases to 6.00% (an increase of 1%),
and that of the 30-year Treasury bond remains intact at 6.00% (or in
other words when the slope of the yield curve declines), the spread
becomes -1.17%. These two cases demonstrate the spread is more
sensitive to the change in the rate of return on the 5-year bond. Fi-
nally, if the rates of return on the two bonds increase by 1% each,
resulting in the fixed difference between their rates of return (or in
other words, when the slope of the rate of return curve moves in a
parallel way), the spread becomes 11.55%.
From the option seller's standpoint, P&G could make a profit if
there was no change in the rates of return on the two bonds between
November 1993 and May 1994 or if the rates of return did not increase
to the point where the spread has a positive value. Although P&G's
profit was limited to 0.75% semiannually,18 2 it was not limited on the
amount of potential loss because there was no limit or ceiling existed
on the rise in rate of return of the bond.
The compensation structure of the "interest rate swap" that P&G
entered into can be duplicated by combining the "plain vanilla swap"
that pays a fixed interest rate and a put-option on the Treasury
bond. 183 The strategy P&G used was intended to reduce the cost of
181. For a different analysis, see CHEW, supra note 65, at 33-37.
182. Id. at 35.
183. CHANCE, supra note 171, at 575.
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borrowing stemming from use of the premium of 0.75% by issuing an
option.184
It was normal to issue an option to reduce the cost of borrowing on
the exchange, but adding an option on an OTC swap was very novel.
P&G added an option on the OTC swap for several reasons.
As the "strike price"'185 and maturity are limited for the OTCs,
there was no product suitable for P&G's situation. P&G needed an
option expiring precisely in May 1994, but products on the exchange
were only for March and June, and, as most futures options on the
Treasury bonds were centered on the nearest-to-delivery contracts,
they did not meet P&G's time constraints. 186
Differences in accounting treatments of these two strategies were
also important. From P&G's standpoint, entering into an OTC swap
contract with a built-in option and issuing an option on the exchange
were financially the same, but could achieve different effects from an
accounting perspective. The reason for these different accounting
treatments was due to the difference in recognition of profit and ex-
penses. At that time, in generally accepted accounting principles
("GAAP"), the estimated profit and loss on the option was stipulated
to be included in the current term, as directly issuing an option on the
exchange was regarded not as a hedge, but as an intention to sell. 18 7 In
other words, it was not possible to defer the estimated profit or loss.
On the other hand, as there was no clear guideline in the accounting
treatments for the built-in derivatives, the swap with a built-in option
was treated as a plain vanilla swap. In turn, treatment as a plain va-
nilla swap became the subject of hedge accounting because it was not
necessarily risk-free and because the amount of change in the market
price (the estimated profit or loss) was to be deferred.18 8 In addition,
the premium from the built-in option was depreciated during the swap
maturity.1 89 For example, if the value of a fixed-interest-rate swap de-
clined due to the interest rate hike, the estimated profit or loss was
not reported on the current financial statements in hedge accounting.
184. CHEW, supra note 65, at 35.
185. See Scott & Wellons, supra note 5, at 960.
186. See CHEW, supra note 65, at 33-37.
187. See Baird et al., supra note 160, at 319-21 (arguing SEC's proposed rulemaking on the
accounting of derivatives).
188. See Karol, supra note 20, at 200 n.12.
189. CHEW, supra note 65, at 36.
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3. Results
In February 1994, as the FRB tightened monetary policy, Treasury
bond yields increased and became a factor working against P&G. 190
At that time, the pattern of the increase in the rate of return of yield
on the 5-year/30-year maturity Treasury bonds had continued to climb
upward, with a gentle slope continuing from early 1993 through the
first half of 1994.191
However, as the yield curve of the Treasury bond rose, it became
flat, and the difference in the yields between the 5-year and the 30-
year bonds narrowed. On May 4, 1994, the date for determining the
spread, the yield on the 5-year Treasury bond was 6.71% and the price
of the 30-year Treasury bond was 86.84 (yield 7.35%);192 thus, the
spread was expected to be 27.5%. 193
If the equation for the spread was not adjusted and the price of
spread was fixed in May, P&G was in a situation where it would pay
[CP interest rate + 26.75%] instead of receiving a fixed interest rate of
5.30% on the principal of $200 million for the next 4.5 years.' 94
In the end, P&G and BT amended the swap contract terms. 195 The
date to set the spread was postponed from May 4 to May 19, and the
floating rate of the swap was adjusted to [CP interest rate - 0.88% +
spread].196 The reason for this postponement was an anticipated
change in the development of the yield on the Treasury bond, as the
Federal Open Market Committee ("FOMC"), the highest legislative
branch for the open market management, was scheduled to meet on
May 17.197 From the standpoint of the option theory, a review of the
significance of the amendments to the interest rate swap between
P&G and BT was as follows:
190. Id. at 35.
191. See MICHAEL H. MOFFETT & BARBARA S. PETITr, PROCT-ER & GAMBLE VERSUS BANK-
ERS TRUST: CAVEAT EMPTOR 16, app, 4 (2005).
192. See CHEW, supra note 65, at 34 Table 2.3.
193. The numerical percentage can be acquired through this formula: Spread = Max [0, 98.5
(6.71% / 5.78%) - 86.84] = 27.5%.
194. CP interest rate plus the spread 27.50% and subtract 0.75% equals CP interest rate plus
26.75%.
195. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1282 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
196. Id.
197. Expected federal funds rate was 4.25 on May 17, 1994. Daniel L. Thornton & David C.
Wheelock, A History of the Asymmetric Policy Directive, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. Louis
(Sept./Oct. 2000), available at http://research.stlouisfed.orgpublicationsreview/00/09/0009dt.pdf.
Arguably, "[p]rior to the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting
in February 1994, monetary policy objectives for the federal funds rate and the outcome of the
FOMC meeting itself had been confidential and had never been announced." Selva Demiralp &
Oscar Jordi, The Announcement Effect. Evidence from Open Market Desk Data, 8 ECON. POL'Y
REv. 29 (May 13, 2002), available at http:llwww.ny.frb.orgresearchepr/O2vO8nl/O205demi.pdf.
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P&G came to receive an additional premium of 0.13%, a deduction
of 0.75% from 0.88%; while, from BT's standpoint, not only was the
maturity increased by 2 weeks, but it received an option that was
worth even more as the volatility increased. However, had the yield
on the Treasury bond continued to rise, P&G thought it more advan-
tageous to lock in the spread in March than to wait until the amended
date to set it, thus increasing the risk of the position.198 In the end,
with the spread fixed at 15%, $50 million on March 10, $50 million on
March 14, and $100 million on March 29 were applied in three phases,
resulting in a $106 million loss to P&G.199 It was an extraordinary
situation to have a loss exceeding $100 million from a swap with a face
amount of $200 million; the cause was found to be leveraging of up to
31 times from the spread equation.200
In October 1994, P&G filed a suit against BT alleging fraud and
misrepresentation in the sale of derivatives, claiming a total of $200
million in damages.201 In the first allegation, fraud, P&G argued it had
not received a sufficient explanation regarding the spread equation,
and it would not have entered into the swap contract had it known
about the impact of the spread equation on the swap value.20 2 In other
words, P&G acknowledged BT had explained how the spread would
be determined, but it claimed BT failed to explain how the spread was
to be determined 6 months in advance. In addition, P&G stated BT
told them their position would not be very affected by the change in
the interest rate if BT fixed the spread 6 months in advance.20 3 The
safety of the swap transaction would be guaranteed regardless of the
change in the interest rate. In the second allegation, misrepresenta-
tion, one issue was the calculation method for the spread as explained
at the time of entering into the contract differed from the actual
method used.204
BT denied P&G's allegations in their entirety, insisting P&G knew
the swap transaction had characteristics of an option and the formula
198. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., No. C-1-94-735, 1994 WL 16135846, at *7
(S.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 1994).
199. Id.
200. See CHEW, supra note 65, at 48.
201. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1274 (S.D. Ohio 1996);
see also Gibson, supra note 1, at 556 (describing the parties' allegations).
202. See Nagler, supra note 18, at 456-57.
203. See Henry T. C. Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention: Wholesale Derivatives, Retail Mutual
Funds, and the Matter of Asset Class, 84 GEO. L.J. 2319, 2346 (1996) (quoting P&G's allegation
against BT in the complaint).
204. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., No. C-1-94-735, 1995 WL 17141442, at
*14-19 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 1995).
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used for the spread reflected these option characteristics. 205 BT added
P&G was also aware that P&G did not have any contractual right
over the formula for the spread.206
This statement by BT was in accord with the annual report of P&G,
indicating P&G did receive sufficient information that the spread
would vary according to the value of the option.20 7 BT also claimed
that P&G had a lot of experience in complex derivatives transactions,
possessed sufficient knowledge regarding the characteristics and the
inherent risk of the derivatives, and could have estimated the value of
the swap on their own.20 8
In the end, the suit between P&G and BT was settled on May 9,
1996, two weeks before the public hearing. 20 9 Because "[t]he settle-
ment occurred before the facts of the case were litigated, [it is] diffi-
cult to determine if Banker's Trust would have been liable under a
traditional suitability analysis. '210 Of the $106 million that P&G origi-
nally would have owed BT, P&G was only required to pay $35 million
per the settlement; the stock prices of both companies increased be-
cause P&G's loss was less than expected and BT's loss of reputation
was avoided to a certain extent. 21'
205. BT alleged in its answer that:
P&G was aware that the Transaction (and the proposed transactions reviewed by P&G
in the period April 1993-August 1993) in effect contained the economic equivalent of
an imbedded put option, the value of which would change as market conditions
changed; avers that Bankers Trust informed P&G that Bankers Trust, like other firms
that engage in derivatives transactions, would be willing to quote a price to P&G if
P&G wished to amend the Transaction by buying back or "tearing up" all or a part of
the option-like component of the Transaction.
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., No. C-1-94-735, 1994 WL 16135846, 21 (S.D.
Ohio Nov. 17, 1994).
206. See Nagler, supra note 18, at 456-57.
207. BT answered against P&S's complaint that "P&G requested, and that Bankers Trust sup-
plied, historical information about the yields and volatilities of the 5-year and 30-year Treasur-
ies." Procter & Gamble, 1994 WL 16135846, at *7.
208. BT pleaded in its answer that:
P&G well knew, the Transaction entailed the risk that if Treasury yields increased,
P&G's payments could increase substantially .... P&G is a sophisticated company that
suffered losses in this case because of risks it knowingly took and because of its own
refusal to cap its losses after those losses were made known to it.
Id. at *2. BT further answered that "in many swap transactions and other derivative transactions,
including the Transaction that is the subject of the Complaint, P&G knowingly increased (rather
than decreased) P&G's exposure to interest rate fluctuations by taking on floating interest rate
obligations." Id.
209. See ERISK CASE STUDY I, supra note 164, at *2. See also Paul Wilmott, The Use, Misuse
and Abuse of Mathematics in Finance, 358 PHIL. TRANS. R. Soc. LON. 63, 65 (2000).
210. Madison, supra note 5, at 305-06.
211. See ERISK CASE STUDY I, supra note 164, at *2. See also Kimberly D. Krawiec, More
than Just New Financial Bingo: A Risk-Based Approach to Understanding Derivatives, 23 J.
CORP. L. 1, 27 n.136. (1997).
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B. Gibson Greetings's Failed Deal
1. Background Regarding Application of OTC Derivatives
Gibson Greetings ("Gibson"), an American manufacturer of cards
and wrapping paper, is one of the companies that suffered a large-
scale loss by entering into a complex swap contract with BT. 212 With
the purpose of reducing short-term debt and funding cost, Gibson is-
sued preferred debt in the amount of $50 million with a fixed rate
coupon of 9.33% in May 1991.213 Long-term debt rapidly increased in
1991;214 in addition, because one of the retail drug stores of its busi-
ness clients filed for Chapter 11 reorganization, Gibson could not re-
cover on a $1.6 million note receivable, and its net profit in 1992 was
reduced by 84% compared to the previous year.215
Under such financial circumstances and in anticipation of the de-
cline in the interest rate, Gibson intended to change its fixed rate debt
to floating rate debt and increase its net profit.216 On October 1, 1992,
Gibson entered into two additional swap contracts2 17 known as the
"ratio swap" 218 and the "basis swap. '219 The terms of the swap con-
212. See McKown & Purcell, supra note 11, at 124-25.
213. See CHEW, supra note 65, at 38.
214. See Gibson Greetings, Inc., 60 S.E.C. 1154 (1995), available at 1995 WL 597476, at *3. See
also Letter from David Damant, Chair of AIMR Financial Instruments Task Force, to Jim
Saloman, Technical Director of International Accounting Standards Board, Attachment C (Jan.
18, 2002), in CFA INSTITUTE CENTRE ADVOCACY COMMENT LET-rERS, available at http://
www.cfainstitute.org/centre/issues/comment/2002/02jwgdraft-c.html [hereinafter "Damant
Letter"].
215. "The decline in business acquisition costs reflects lower amortization costs resulting from
the write-off of long-term sales contracts with Phar-Mor Inc. totaling $16.4 million in 1992. Phar-
Mor, the Company's largest customer in 1991, filed for bankruptcy in September 1992." Gibson
Greetings Inc., 1992-1993 Amended Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q/A) (Aug. 29, 2004), available
at http://sec.edgar-online.com/1994/08/29/00/0000717829-94-000025/Section 6 .asp.
216. See CHEW, supra note 65, at 38-39.
217. Missner noted:
While called a swap, the Treasury-Linked Swap was in actuality a cash-settled put op-
tion that was written by Gibson and based initially on the "spread" between the price
of the 7.625% 30-year U.S. Treasury security maturing on November 15, 2022 and the
arithmetic average of the bid and offered yields of the most recently auctioned obliga-
tion of a two-year Treasury note.
Missner, 62 S.E.C. 265, n.4 (1996), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/337304.txt
and 1996 WL 316296. The structure of a swap linked with the rate of return on 5-year/30-year
maturity U.S. Treasury bonds will be discussed in detail in the following section.
218. In the Gibson case:
Under the Ratio Swap, based on a $30 million notional amount (the amount used to
determine the periodic payments between the counterparties), for a period of five years
Bankers Trust would swap an interest payment determined at a fixed rate of 5.50% in
exchange for Gibson's variable rate interest payment determined by the square of the
six-month [LIBOR] rate divided by 6%, i.e., (LIBOR X LIBOR)/6%.
Gibson Greetings, 60 S.E.C. at app.
219. In the Gibson case:
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tracts were set as a 5-year maturity, coupon rate of 5.50% with a face
value of $30 million and, as a 4.5-year maturity, coupon rate of 5.50%
with a face value of $30 million. 220 Through the swap, Gibson was able
to change the fixed interest rate debt of the preferred debt to floating
interest rate debt during the swap contract period.221
2. Structure of the Derivatives
The swap contract Gibson entered into was a structured swap with a
new form of floating interest rate structure. Unlike the plain forms of
swap contracts where the floating rate was determined by the stan-
dard of the LIBOR interest rate, the floating interest rate of this swap
contract was determined by [LIBOR 2 / 6.0%].222
The LIBOR was 3.08% during the first swap period between Octo-
ber 1992 and April 1993, and, after receiving a fixed interest rate of
5.50%, Gibson paid a floating rate of 1.58%, acquiring a net interest
rate of 3.92%.223 The preferred $50 million debt issued by Gibson in
May 1991 was paying a coupon rate of 9.33%.224 Taking away the
fixed interest rate of 3.92% achieved through the swap, Gibson was
paying only 5.41% of the cost of financing.225 In addition, between
April 1993 and October 1993, the LIBOR interest rate became 3.37%,
and, after Gibson received a fixed interest rate of 5.50%, the deal paid
a floating rate of 1.89%, acquiring a net interest rate of 3.61%.226
Under the Basis Swap, for a period of four-and-a-half years, based on a notional
amount of $ 30 million, Bankers Trust and Gibson would swap variable rate interest
payments structured such that Gibson would receive a net semiannual payment of as
much as fourteen basis points, i.e., $42,000, as long as six-month LIBOR was not more
than 0.29% lower than six-month LIBOR at the beginning of the immediately preced-
ing semiannual period. If six-month LIBOR fell more than 0.29%, Gibson would have
to pay $1,500 to Bankers Trust for each additional basis point, or 0.01%, decline in six-
month LIBOR.
Id.
220. See CHEW, supra note 65, at 40-41.
221. See Damant Letter, supra note 214, at 69-70.
222. For further discussion, see CHEW, supra note 65, at 33-49.
223. See CHEW, supra note 65, at 40. The numerical number came from this expression: 5.50%
- [(3.08%)2 / 6.00%] = 5.50% - 1.58% = 3.92%. See also Damant Letter, supra note 214, at
Attachment C.
224. See CHEW, supra note 65, at 38.
225. See In re BT Sec. Corp., CFTC No. 95-3, 1994 WL 711224, at *1 T 6 (Dec. 22, 1994).
226. The numerical number came from this expression: 5.50% - [(3.37%)2 / 6.00%] = 5.50% -
1.89% = 3.61%). CHEW, supra note 65 at 39. See also Damant Letter, supra note 214, at Attach-
ment C.
[Vol. 6:29
LESSONS FROM MODERN DEBACLES
3. Result of the Use of Derivatives
In February 1994, the interest rate increased as the FRB tightened
the monetary policy.227 When the interest rate rose, Gibson incurred a
loss of $3 million from the interest rate swap; a month later, in April,
Gibson announced it had suffered an additional loss of $16.7 mil-
lion.22 8 Around the same time, it was revealed that P&G, who had had
a similar transaction with BT, also had suffered a loss of $106 million
from the interest rate swap. 229 Further, it became known both Feder-
ated Paper Board and Air Products & Chemicals suffered losses of
$11 million and $122 million, respectively.230
The derivatives these four companies entered into with BT had
common features. They were all swap contracts with complex floating
interest rate formulas, with these formulas being used as the source of
the leverage. The customary accounting practices that had not been
systematically maintained were the primary factor in the parties enter-
ing into the swap contracts.
Gibson filed a lawsuit against BT on the grounds that BT failed to
provide a sufficient explanation of the inherent risk of the swap con-
tract and that BT intentionally reported the anticipated amount of
loss from the swap as being small. 231 The subsequent administrative
investigation revealed Gary S. Missner, the treasurer in charge of BT
derivatives, had intentionally underreported by more than 50% of the
estimated amount of loss from the swap calculated through BT's com-
puter model.232 Unaware of the actual amount of loss, Gibson, there-
fore, continued to purchase interest swaps and entered into some 29
swap contracts, subsequently suffering a large-scale loss. 233
In November 1994, as BT was shown to have failed to both fulfill its
fiduciary duties and protect the best interest of derivatives purchas-
ers,2 34 Gibson reached an out-of-court-settlement leaving the legal
227. See CHEW, supra note 65, at 47.
228. It is hard to know exactly what amount of Gibson's portfolio was damaged because BT
purposely misled Gibson about the losses. See Krawiec, supra note 211, at 29-30 (presenting a
progress of Gibson's disastrous losses from the swap transaction with BT).
229. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
230. Both cases ended via out-of-court settlement. See MOFFETr & PETITT, supra note 191, at
8.
231. See Baird et al., supra note 160, at 310 (1996) (noting Gibson alleged Bankers Trust
violated Section 4b(2)(C)(i)-(ii) of the Commodity Exchange Act).
232. See Missner, 62 S.E.C. 265, n.4 (1996), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/
337304.txt and 1996 WL 316296.
233. See CHEW, supra note 65, at 48.
234. Nagler, supra note 18, at 456 n.94. See also Rubinstein, supra note 120, at 743.
The battle over the legal relationship between the buyer and seller often focuses on the
term "fiduciary." While customers maintain that the seller was a fiduciary, the sellers
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question unanswered. 235 Unlike BT's case against P&G, BT did not
file a counterclaim alleging sufficient knowledge about derivatives
against Gibson. Of the $23 million loss and the $50 million claimed in
punitive damages, Gibson paid only $6.2 million to BT.236
In December 1994, the SEC and Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission ("CFTC") concluded that BT had violated reporting require-
ments,237 the prohibition against fraud in the Securities Exchange
Act,238 and the anti-fraud provision of the Commodities Exchange
Act 239 when it underestimated the loss Gibson would incur, causing
Gibson to report a lesser amount of loss from the transaction in deriv-
atives on its financial statements. 240 A fine of $10 million was imposed
on BT,241 and the SEC and CF-FC required BT to allow review of all
maintain that legally they are no more than a counterparty to an arms-length deriva-
tives contract. Indeed, on some level, they are both correct. It is often the case that the
seller performs a dual role in derivatives trading. On the one hand, it advises the cus-
tomer and, as customers have alleged, is engendered with the customer's utmost trust
and confidence. On the other hand, the seller is often the counter-party to the deriva-
tives contract and, thus, the seller alleges that the transaction was negotiated at arms
length.
Id.
235. Nagler, supra note 18, at 456; Rubinstein, supra note 120, at 743.
236. CHEW, supra note 65, at 37.
237. McKown & Purcell, supra note 11, at 127. "The derivative products which are the subject
of this [SEC] Order were sold to Gibson by BT Securities Corporation ("BT Securities"), a
broker-dealer registered with the Commission pursuant to Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act."
Gibson Greetings, Inc., 60 S.E.C. 1154, n.2 (1995), available at 1995 WL 597476, at *2, n.2.
238. The Commission concludes that:
[M]issner participated in providing Gibson with valuations which materially under-
stated Gibson's losses from derivatives transactions. Gibson used the values in its finan-
cial statements, and those statements materially understated the company's losses from
derivatives activities. As set forth above, Missner thus caused violations of Section
13(a) of the Exchange Act and Rules 13a-1 and 12b-20.
Missner, 62 S.E.C. 265 (1996), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/337304.txt and
1996 WL 316296.
The Treasury-Linked Swap and the Knock-Out Call Option, along with the amend-
ments to those derivatives, were securities under the federal securities laws. As set
forth above, Missner made material misrepresentations and omissions in the offer and
sale of these derivative securities to Gibson. This conduct violated Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5.
Id. "[T]he Commission finds that Missner willfully violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act
and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, and that Missner caused violations of
Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, and Rules 13a-1 and 12b-20." Id. at *5-6.
239. See generally HAZEN, supra note 2, at 807-17; see also supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
240. "The Commodity Exchange Act has specific procedures that must be followed in execut-
ing and reporting trades." Petzel, supra note 9, at 106.
241. See ALFRED STEINHERR, DERIVATIVES: THE WILD BEAST OF FINANCE 76 (2000). See
also Cohen, supra note 17, at 2015 n.119; In re BT Sec. Corp., CFTC No. 95-3, 1994 WL 711224,
at *6 (Dec. 22, 1994).
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of the derivatives it was selling outside the exchange. 242 In addition,
the SEC insisted a thorough verification procedure be followed by
sellers regarding the risks and earnings of the products containing de-
rivatives beginning with Gibson's derivatives with BT.243 In other
words, it recommended the seller of derivatives have an accurate
knowledge of the change in the value of the products according to the
possible market scenarios. Moreover, the buyer of derivatives must
also sufficiently understand the characteristics of derivatives. Finally,
assurance that the needs of the buyer and the characteristics of deriva-
tives match must exist; or, in short, the suitability of the product
("know thy customer" element) must be considered by the seller
before entering into the contract. 244
C. Implications
In 1994, there were no comprehensive and systematic accounting
stipulations for derivatives in the United States other than the custom-
ary and general practices. 245 Depending on the purpose of the use of
derivatives, the accounting treatment changed.
When derivatives were used for the purpose of trading or specula-
tion, a market evaluation must have been made; in other words, the
unrealized profit and loss must have been reflected in the profit for
the current term. In contrast, if the derivatives were used for hedging,
the profit or loss from the "hedge position"2 46 must have occurred at
the same time the profit or loss from the items subject to hedging was
realized 247 (i.e., the profit or loss from the use of derivatives for hedg-
242. See Baird et al., supra note 160, at 306.
243. This treatment was not a setting out with carefully reasoned analysis. "[Tihe SEC has
elevated the standards of OTC derivatives dealer behavior through the simple expedient of the
,security' classification." Hu, supra note 203, at 2338.
244. In the United States:
The burdens are especially heavy in the areas of risk disclosure and trading practices.
Risk disclosure rules in the United States assume that no one opening an account un-
derstands any of the risks of futures and options. In addition to meeting suitability
requirements, a prospective customer must sign a uniform, complicated set of risk dis-
closure documents that is intimidating at best.
Petzel, supra note 9, at 105.
245. See Mairiu Btethnach, US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles-Credit Derivatives,
in CREDIT DERIVATIVES: TRADING & MANAGEMENT OF CREDIT & DEFAULT RISK 502-11 (Saty-
ajit Das ed., 1998).
246. WHALEY, supra note 7, at 22 ("Hedge positions refer to selling (buying) the futures when
you hold a long (short) position in the underlying asset.").
247. See Scheerer, supra note 152, at 190.
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ing purposes could be deferred until the time the profit or loss of the
items subject to hedging was realized). 248
The basic theory of hedge accounting is premised on the matching
principle for profit and loss. As items, such as derivatives, used for
hedging purposes and items subject to hedging, such as basic assets,
are very closely linked financially, it is rational to realize the profit
and loss related to both in the same period.
Several conditions must be met for hedge accounting to be applied.
First, the items subject to hedging should, in fact, expose the company
to risk. From an accounting standpoint, a risk refers to the possibility
of change in company profit due to changes in prices, interest rates,
and exchange rates. Therefore, items with no possibility of causing a
change in the corporate profit cannot be the subject of hedge account-
ing. Second, a risk must be reduced through the hedge position. For
this, the correlation between the market value of the hedge position
and that of the item subject to hedging must be high. Third, the use of
derivatives for hedging purposes must be stipulated ex ante. In other
words, after the loss is recognized from the use of derivatives, a claim
that derivatives were used for hedging purposes to defer the loss is not
acknowledged in hedge accounting. On this point, there was confusion
due to the difference in the application of accounting rules, such as
Statements of Financial Accounting Standard ("SFAS") No. 52 verses
SFAS No. 80.249
It is normal that the interest rate swaps are done in conjunction
with a contract linked with interest rate swap contracts. 250 As previ-
ously stated, it is also rational to realize profit and loss at the same
time for linked transactions. According to this theory, it is irrational to
realize the profit and loss from only the swaps without realizing the
profit and loss in the basic assets when the value of swap contracts
change.
In case of a plain vanilla swap, this theory is reasonable. At that
time, the options on the exchange were not acknowledged as a hedge,
but as previously stated, the interest rate swaps were subject to hedge
248. See Petzel, supra note 9, at 108 ("This approach makes sense as far as it goes, but is
applicable only in the classic application of hedges as offsetting [derivatives] transactions.").
249. Robert H. Herz, Accounting, Financial Reporting, and Disclosure for Derivatives and
Synthetics, in DERIVATIVE RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE
DERIVATIVES MANAGEMENT AND DECISION MAKING 353, 364-96 (Robert A. Klein & Lederman
Jess eds., 1996) (arguing the application of each standard).
250. See Madison, supra note 5, at 300 ("A ... party.., will generally enter into an interest
rate swap agreement to hedge interest rate fluctuations. The hedging party enters into the agree-
ment with a party that assumes the interest rate risk and charges a fee for the assumption of that
risk ....").
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accounting, in which profit and loss could be deferred;251 P&G chose
the OTC swaps instead of the options on the exchange. 252 However, in
the leveraged swaps made between P&G and BT, options other than
general interest rate swaps were built in.253 These options had the role
of expanding the range of fluctuation in the interest rate change, and,
as they were not related to hedging, it was logical to evaluate them at
the market price, or, in other words, to exclude them from hedge ac-
counting. As there were no accurate stipulations on this, P&G was
able to use the leveraged interest rate swap for hedge accounting pur-
poses. However, since the incident, the accounting provisions have
been amended to exclude the leveraged interest rate swaps as the sub-
ject of hedge accounting.
In June 1998, the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB")
enacted an accounting standard for the treatment of derivatives and
hedging254 effective as of June 15, 2000.255 This standard proposed
consistent guidelines for accounting treatment of derivatives, hedging,
and disclosure problems.2 56 First of all, as to derivatives, FASB re-
quired every company to record all of its derivatives on the financial
statements as either assets or debts at their "fair values ' 257 with the
251. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
252. See Procter & Gamble, 1995 WL 17141442, at 1% 9-44.
253. The biggest problem in reporting a swap with a built-in option as a plain vanilla swap is
that the market risk related to the swap cannot be accurately understood if only the face value
amount and the coupon interest rate are available.
254. The Financial Accounting Standards Board noted:
This Statement establishes accounting and reporting standards for derivative instru-
ments, including certain derivative instruments embedded in other contracts, (collec-
tively referred to as derivatives) and for hedging activities. It requires that an entity
recognize all derivatives as either assets or liabilities in the statement of financial posi-
tion and measure those instruments at fair value. If certain conditions are met, a deriva-
tive may be specifically designated as (a) a hedge of the exposure to changes in the fair
value of a recognized asset or liability or an unrecognized firm commitment, (b) a
hedge of the exposure to variable cash flows of a forecasted transaction, or (c) a hedge
of the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation, an unrecog-
nized firm commitment, an available-for-sale security, or a foreign-currency-denomi-
nated forecasted transaction.
FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING No. 133: ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVE IN-
STRUMENTS AND HEDGING ACTIVITIES 5 (1998), http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas133.pdf [hereinafter
FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING No. 133].
255. WHALEY, supra note 7, at 206 (introducing two examples of financial statements).
256. See Susan M. Phillips, Derivatives and Risk Management: Challenges and Opportunities,
15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 239, 245 (1994).
257. "Fair values" is a legal term applied to certain transactions, where it serves as the legal
standard in cases where stock owners have different opinions on value. If the minority concerned
parties are forced to take stocks lower than the appropriate price when the reorganizing corpo-
ration is merged or sold, they are given the right to receive instead the fair value of the stock. In
other words, fair values refer to the appropriate price that serves as the legal standard.
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estimated profit and loss reflected in the profit and loss for the current
term.258
The International Accounting Standards Board ("IASB") sets the
international accounting standards and enacted IAS 39 Financial In-
struments: Recognition and Measurement in December of 1998, in
which it required that not only derivative instruments, but also finan-
cial assets and debt be evaluated at market price.259 Because derivate
instruments had been recognized as off-the-book transactions, they
generally did not appear on the balance sheet. However, the IASB
concluded it was inappropriate to treat derivative instruments as off-
the-book items, because, as with other items on the balance sheet,
they were either assets or debts.260 Moreover, when the derivatives
were used for a hedging purpose, the IASB required the estimated
profit and loss of the concerned derivatives be recognized during the
same accounting period as the items subject to hedging; it also re-
quired the company give a clear account of the hedge.261 Finally, con-
cerning disclosure, the IASB required market participants should
report their risk management polices concerning derivative
instruments.262
The seller of derivatives should base its relationship with its transac-
tion counterpart on honesty and reliability. Accordingly, the seller
must be attentive to all forms of risks and provide information to the
buyer based on the principle of good faith and fair dealing.
In December 1994, the FRB took a strong regulatory stance against
the selling of an interest rate swap contract by BT and required an
agreement calling for BT to document the policy and procedure of the
258. See FASB, DERIVATIVES IMPLEMENTATION GROUP: STATEMENT 133 IMPLEMENTATION
ISSUE No. B20: EMBEDDED DERIVATIVES: MUST THE TERMS OF A SEPARATED NON-OPTION
EMBEDDED DERIVATIVE PRODUCE A ZERO FAIR VALUE AT INCEPTION? 1 (2000), http://
www.fasb.org/derivatives/issueb20.shtml.
259. See IAS Plus, IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, http://
www.iasplus.com/standard/ias39.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2008) (summarizing the international
financial reporting standard focusing on IAS 39 financial instruments). See also Press Release,
Int'l Acct. Standards Bd., International Accounting Standards Board Issues Revised Standards
on Financial Instruments (Dec. 17, 2003), available at http://www2.financialexecutives.org/
download/IASB_1217_03.pdf.
260. See Richard C. Jones & Elizabeth K. Venuti, Accounting and Reporting for Financial In-
struments: International Developments, CPA J., Feb. 5 2005, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/
printversions/cpaj/2005/205/p30.htm.
261. Id.
262. The new amended Disclosure about Fair Value of Financial Instruments, FAS 107 recom-
mends that companies disclose the market risk of derivatives financial instruments (futures, for-
wards, swaps, options, and others) in possession.
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leveraged interest rate swap operation. 263 The principal content of the
agreement was BT should disclose more information to help increase
the client's awareness of risk.2 64 The disclosure requirements included
not only the ex ante disclosure, but also daily reporting of post-factum
values of derivatives.265
In January 1995, based on the strong correction measure taken
against BT, the FRB circulated a summary of voluntary ethical princi-
ples to participants of the OTC derivates. 266 The main focus of the
summary was disclosure of risk to transaction counterparts. 267
From the buyer's standpoint, management must be aware of why
OTC derivatives are needed and with what purpose it intend to use
them. In addition, management needs to hire professionals who can
properly cope with any situation that could ensue from OTC deriva-
tives transactions.
In early 1994, despite the advice of BT to terminate the contract
when the potential loss was anticipated, P&G amended the terms of
the contract and suffered an even bigger loss as a result.2 68 In the end,
management not only has to fully understand OTC derivative instru-
ments, but it must also ensure the company has a control system and
procedures in place to monitor the transaction operation and daily
263. See Ernest T. Patrikis, First Vice President of Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks
before the Financial Markets Conference on Transparency and Liquidity in Derivatives: Price
Transparency-A Quote is a Quote is a . . . (Feb. 24, 1996), available at http://
www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/1996/ep960224.html.
264. Id.
265. In Procter & Gamble, one commentator has noted:
Judge Feikens rejected Procter &Gamble's argument that one of the swaps was an op-
tion on a security .... [However], the court concluded that the instruments were not
securities. Had the court concluded that the instruments were securities, Bankers Trust
would have been subject to the registration and disclosure requirements imposed by
the securities laws and regulations thereunder.
Madison, supra note 5, at 302-03.
266. According to Joseph Dial:
On August 17, 1995 a coalition of several groups representing participants in the OTC
financial markets, acting under the coordination of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, issued a voluntary code of "best practices" for OTC financial markets. The docu-
ment is entitled, "Principles and Practices for Wholesale Financial Market Transac-
tions." While the principles are voluntary, "it is expected that each trade association
will recommend [this] best practices code to its members."
Joseph B. Dial, Comm'r of Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Speeches before the 18th An-
nual Commodities Law Institute and 4th Annual Financial Services Law Institute: Status Report
on Regulatory and Self-Regulatory Responses to the Barings Bankruptcy (October 19, 1995),
available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/opachic95s.htm.
267. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.. PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES FOR WHOLESALE FINAN-
CIAL MARKET TRANSACTIONS (1995), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/fxc/annualreports/
ar1995/fxar9518.html.
268. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
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positions of the derivative instruments, as well as professionals who
can manage them accordingly.
P&G insisted it had trouble estimating the market value and the
risks involved due to the complex formula of the spread in the interest
rate swap.269 However, as previously stated, it was assumed interpre-
tation of the structure of the interest rate swap was clearly possible
and estimation of the market risk was not that difficult. 270 Although
the spread presented a different formula, the result could be illus-
trated. Therefore, the large loss could have been avoided had moni-
toring on a regular basis been followed with more systematic policies
and systems for risk management in place.
IV. TRADING IN THE VOLATILITY OF SECURITIES OF LONG-TERM
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
The front-runner in the hedge fund world, Long-Term Capital Man-
agement ("LTCM"), incurred a large loss in September 1998 due to
failure of its investment strategies. 271 At that time, LTCM had entered
into complex derivative contracts with a large number of banks on
Wall Street and the situation had developed to a point where one
bank's individual disposal of the collateral could lead to a panic. 272 In
the end, with the FRB acting as the host,273 a $4 billion aid fund was
raided by the concerned creditor banks, and LTCM was able to escape
the possibility of bankruptcy at the cost of bringing the truth to
light.274 LTCM was the landmark case in which a large loss was in-
curred in the process of various investment strategies, including both
hedge funds2 75 and OTC derivative instruments. Though the OTC de-
rivatives were not the only instrument components in the investment
strategies of LTCM, they were used as a means of high-risk return. 276
269. See supra notes 202-203 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
271. See STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 88.
272. See id. at 88-89.
273. See id. at 86.
274. See id. at 89.
275. Hedge funds are not statutorily defined, but they are privately organized pooled invest-
ment vehicles. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE LESSONS
OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 1 (1999) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT].
276. One commentator has noted that:
Modern financial theory predicts that rational [investors] deciding where to invest their
money should be influenced by only two considerations: expected return, and expected
risk (meaning variation in return). The greater the return-or the lower the risk-the
more attractive the investment. Because the market participants that deal in derivatives
do so voluntarily, commentators generally assume that the derivatives markets serve
the traders' interests either by increasing their returns, or by reducing their risks. In the
[Vol. 6:29
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A. Background
In 1994, LTCM was founded by the celebrated bond trader John W.
Meriwether from Salomon Brothers, along with Nobel Prize laureates
and strategists.277 LTCM, a limited partnership, was founded in Dela-
ware and was in charge of the management of the fund; the LTCM
Fund (Long-Term Capital Portfolio) was registered in a British terri-
tory, the Cayman Islands, where the accounting standards were not
rigid and regulation was sparse.27 8 Thanks to the reputation of its
management, LTCM was able to raise a large amount of funds from
Wall Street banks and emerge as the front-runner in the hedge fund
industry.279
LTCM induced investments from wealthy individuals and corporate
investors, with a minimum investment of $10 million, no withdrawal of
capital for three years, and no release of investment strategies as its
principles. 280 It collected management fees of 2% and performance-
based fees of 25%.281 In general, management fees ranged from only
1-1.25% and performance-based fees did not exceed 20%; therefore,
the fees charged by LTCM were rather high.282 However, LTCM part-
ners included Nobel Prize laureates, central bank figures, and men of
such talent in the financial world, making it possible for LTCM to in-
duce investments from wealthy individual American investors, tax-ex-
empt annuities, Japanese investors, and corporate investors of
Europe, as well as banks and government agencies of many
countries. 283
tradition of Adam Smith's invisible hand, derivatives deals are presumed to further the
welfare of those who participate in them.
Stout, supra note 15, at 54.
277. See ERisk, Case Study: LTCM-Long-Term Capital Management, ERISK.coM, http://
www.erisk.com/Learning/CaseStudies/Long-TermCapitalManagemen.asp (last visited Feb. 10,
2008) [hereinafter ERISK CASE STUDY II.
278. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 10.
279. See id.
280. See ERISK CASE STUDY II, supra note 277, at *1-2; See also STEINHERR, supra note 241,
at 87.
281. STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 87-88.
282. Id. See also PHILIPPE JORION, RISK MANAGEMENT LESSONS FROM LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT 2 (1999) [hereinafter JORION II].
283. Funds came from government agencies such as Hong Kong Land Corporation, Singapore
Government Investment Corporation, Central Bank of Taiwan, Bangkok Bank, Kuwait State-
operated Pension, and Central Bank of Italy, as well as such large banks as Sumitomo Bank of
Japan, Dresdner Bank, Liechtenstein Global Trust, and Swiss Bank of Hulius Baer. In addition
Phil Knight, the CEO of NIKE, partners of McKinsey, and top managers at Bear Stearns in-
vested their personal assets.
2007]
72 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:29
In February 1994, the fund at management's beginning amounted to
$1.25 billion.284 By maintaining partnerships with investment banks
competitive in each field, LTCM was able to succeed on Wall
Street.285 LTCM dealt with Merrill Lynch for derivative instruments,
Goldman Sachs for junk bonds, JP Morgan for swaps, and Lehman
Brothers for real estate mortgage bonds, while Bear Stearns handled
the liquidation settlement operation. 286 Chase Manhattan offered re-
volving loans of $500 million from large-scale banks.2 87
As a hedge fund, LTCM was not obligated to be registered with
SEC,288 and without supervision, it could set the size of fund on its
own.28 9 Though CFTC was the only de jure supervisory organization
for LTCM, the hedge fund was also exempt from the supervision of
CFTC.290 Therefore, as there was only minimal supervision on LTCM,
it had a wide range of choices in both investment strategies and
methods. 291
284. See STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 87; ERIsK CASE STUDY II, supra note 277, at *2.
285. ERiSK CASE STUDY II, supra note 277, at *2.
286. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 11.
287. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPI-
TAL MANAGEMENT 88 (2000).
288. "To avoid the registration and reporting requirements of the federal securities laws,
hedge funds generally do not raise funds via public offerings of their securities, advertise
broadly, or engage in general solicitation." WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 3.
289. Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("1940 Act"), a hedge fund refers to a
pooled investment fund that is exempt from the definition of an investment company. The
pooled investment fund is divided into a private fund and a qualified purchaser fund. A private
fund is a pooled investment fund that raises investors only through the means of private funds
with the actual number of investors being fewer than one hundred. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1)
(2006). The actual investors can be natural persons, companies, trusts, and funds. 15 U.S.C. §80a-
2(a)(51) (2006). In a pooled investment fund, investors are recruited through the means of pri-
vate funds with all investors being qualified purchasers (an individual or a company with an
investment balance of over $5 million, or a corporate investor with an investment balance ex-
ceeding $25 million). ROBERT H. ROSENBLUM, INVESTMENT COMPANY DETERMINATION UNDER
THE 1940 AcT-EXEMPTIONS AND EXCEPTION 444-59 (2003). Generally hedge funds make it a
rule not to disclose the breakdown of the portfolio and have a special feature that there is no
restriction on their investment strategies. See Cohen, supra note 17, at 1999 n.27.
290. The Commodities Exchanges Act provides authority for the CFTC to monitor trading
activities of all traders on U.S. futures and commodity option exchanges. Congress had several
motives when it created the CFTC. CFIC is charged with the primary duty of oversight of new
markets. Petzel, supra note 9, at 100. "Congress also believed that futures and options were so
fraught with potential problems that the public could only be protected if the instruments were
traded on a CFTC regulated exchange." Id.
291. Rosenblum commented:
Although [hedge] funds are excepted from the definition of investment company, and
thus are not subject to requirements of the [Investment Company Act of] 1940, the
general antifraud, civil liability, and other applicable provisions of the [Securities Act]
of 1933 and [Securities Exchange Act] of 1934 still are applicable to those funds.
ROSENBLUM, supra note 289, at 442.
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B. Investment Strategies and Construction of a Portfolio
Because investment strategies of hedge funds were not regulated, a
special feature regarding use of various investment strategies ex-
isted.2 92 One of the general investment strategies used in hedge funds
was the "market-neutral investing strategy. ' 293 This strategy refers to
taking both long and short positions on the concerned products, thus
neutralizing the market risk. In other words, it converts market risk to
the risk of the relationship between long and short positions. This
strategy differs from traditional investment strategy in that the profit
is generated by anticipating the relationship between assets (i.e., the
difference in price) rather than the movement in price of a certain
asset.294
As the market-neutral investing strategy has a low correlation to
such traditional investment means, such as bonds and stocks, it is rec-
ognized as an investment strategy that can supplement the promotion
of the rate of return and reduce the risk. 295 In addition, market-neu-
tral investing generates stable profit using the inefficiency of the mar-
ket and, consequently, achieves the effect of reducing or eliminating
the inefficiency of the market price.2 96
Because the amount of probable profit is very small in market-neu-
tral investing, it is common to use leverage to increase the attractive
rate of return.297 Good examples of market-neutral investing strategy
292. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 2-3 ("There is no single market strat-
egy or approach pursued by hedge funds as a group. Rather, hedge funds exhibit a wide variety
of investment styles, some of which use highly quantitative techniques while others employ more
subjective factors.").
293. STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 88.
294. For example, profit and loss occur according to the change in the stock price of the com-
pany A when an investor buys the stock of A. However, if stock of both A and B companies are
offered at public sale, the profit and loss occurs when the prices between A and B companies
change.
295. See Douglas W. Case, Market Neutral Equity Investing: An Absolute Return Strategy,
ADVANCED INVESTMENT PARTNERS (Sept. 2002), at 3, http://www.ecwmoneymanagers.comI
whitepapers/marketneutral.pdf.
296. See generally id.
297. PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK-THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR MANAGING FINANCIAL
RISK 353 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter JORION III].
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are "fixed income arbitrage," 298 "merger arbitrage," 299 and "relative
value arbitrage. '300
Based on the investment strategies mentioned earlier, LTCM used
diverse investment strategies. 301 The strongest ability of LTCM was it
was able to accurately estimate the price disparity in the market based
on such mathematical models financial management scholars Merton
and Scholes had created. 30 2 To increase the profit from market-neutral
investing, LTCM made use of the high leverage along with a pubic
offering (a conventional investment technique of the hedge funds). 303
The LTCM fund constructed a portfolio on a large scale in various
markets, such as spots, futures, and currency exchanges. 30 4 Invest-
298. See generally LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 136-37. "Fixed income arbitrage" means
buying a relatively low-valued bond and selling a relatively high-valued bond. In general, it takes
the form of buying long and short positions on similar bonds. Though both bonds are mathemati-
cally or historically correlated, there is a chance of marginal profit in the transaction if there is a
temporary change in the relationship. In the marginal profit structure of the bond transaction,
the bond with the relatively lower price of the two that equally reacts to the change in the
interest rate is bought, and the more expensive bond of the same size is offered for sale, avoiding
the risk of change in the interest rate. As the price of a bond is determined by the yield curve,
the expected cash flow, credit rating, and the bond's option-like features, an elaborate analysis
model must be used to find the price disparity.
299. "Merger arbitrage" generally refers to the strategy of shorting the stocks of the company
subject to merger and offering the stocks of the merged company for sale in public. The price of
the company being merged is usually discounted compared to the stock price of the merged
company. It is due to the possible risk of uncertainty that the stock price declines if the merger is
called off after being announced when the merged stock price is set higher than the stock price
of the company to be merged. See WHALEY, supra note 7, at 544. The price before the merger
occurs reflects the uncertainty over the success or failure of the deal. In other words, the margi-
nal profit from the merger can be realized by the amount of difference when the price of the
stock invested is lower than the merged price. Id.
300. The "relative value arbitrage," also known as convergence trade, is spread trade strategy
using where the short and long potions on either the spots and futures or the two stocks in which
there is a temporary change in the relationship and a correlation. Rather than anticipating the
direction of the market, the overall position is neutralized by taking both short and long posi-
tions. See JORION II, supra note 282, at 2. See also HULL, supra note 46, at 4.
One of the parties to a forward contract assumes a long position and agrees to buy the
underlying asset on a certain specified future date for a certain specified price. The
other party assumes a short position and agrees to sell the asset on the same date for
the same price.
Id. The relative value arbitrage can be an upper concept inclusive of "MBS arbitrage," "converti-
ble stock arbitrage," "strategic arbitrage," "pairs trading," "option and warrant trading" and
"capital structure arbitrage." WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 10 n.13.
301. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 11 (describing LTCM fund's various
financial market participation).
302. See ERISK CASE STUDY II, supra note 277, at 2.
303. STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 88. On January 1, 1998, LTCM's equity was $125 billion
and the debt was $5 billion, making the debt-to-equity ratio 25 (debt/equity = 1,250/50 = 25).
WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 12.
304. SCor & WELLONS, supra note 5, at 1153. "Hedge funds are also diverse in their use of
different types of financial instruments. Many hedge funds trade equity or fixed income securi-
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ments were made in bond markets, such as government bonds, MBS,
corporate bonds, emerging countries' bonds, and stock markets, with
the investment proportion of government bonds in G-7 countries be-
ing high in the total portfolio, reaching 80%.305 The invested funds
were financed by many participants in the market, as well as through
repos, securities depository, and borrowing.30 6
In addition, LTCM also invested in interest rate futures and stock
index futures on various futures exchanges in the world.30 7 Moreover,
with numerous business counterparts, it entered into OTC derivative
contracts, such as options,30 8 forwards, 309 and swaps, built on stocks
and interest rates.310 By participating in a currency exchange market,
it hedged against the currency exchange risk arising from investments
in various countries. In terms of regions, it diversified investment in
different continents, such as North America, Europe, and Asia. 311
LTCM was in possession of over 60,000 short and long positions
worth $100 billion. 312 The total assets of LTCM only reached about
$125 billion,313 which thus excluded swaps and options, as well as de-
rivative instruments and repos transactions worth $1,000 billion.314 At
the end of August 1998, the futures contracts reached about $500 bil-
lion, the swap contracts about $750 billion, and the options and other
OTC derivatives about $150 billion.31 5
C. Investment Structure
By purchasing 30-year "off-the-run bonds" 31 6 with low liquidity
among the U.S. Treasury bonds and selling the "on-the-run bonds" 317
ties, taking either long or short positions, or sometimes both simultaneously. A large number of
funds also use exchange-traded futures contracts or over-the-counter ('OTC') derivatives, to
hedge their portfolios, to exploit market inefficiencies, or to take outright positions." WORKING
GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 3.
305. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 11.
306. See JORION II, supra note 282, at 2-3.
307. WORKINO GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 11.
308. WHALEY, supra note 7, at 3 ("An option is ... a contract to buy or sell an underlying
asset at some pre-specified future date at a price agreed upon today.").
309. Id. at 3-4 ("A forward is a contract to buy or sell an underlying asset at some prespecified
future date at a price agreed upon today .... A forward transaction ... is an agreement to an
exchange that will take place in the future .... The terms are formalized in a contract called a
forward.").
310. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 11.
311. WHALEY, supra note 7, at 3-4.
312. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 11.
313. JORION III, supra note 297, at 353.
314. ERIsK CASE STUDY II, supra note 277, at 2.
315. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 11-12.
316. HULL, supra note 46, at 735.
317. Id.
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of an identical size at public sale, LTCM carried out arbitraging, ob-
taining the difference in rates of return between the two bonds. 318 The
30-year, off-the-run Treasury bonds have low liquidity and can be
traded at a higher yield, but the prices of both bonds become the same
within a few months.
Clearly, the price differential between the two Treasury bonds was
insignificant, but it was possible to increase profit through leverage.319
The off-the-run bonds purchased were used as secured debts of the
funds borrowed through the repo transactions.320
Most investment banks, such as Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and
JP Morgan, considered LTCM a new financial intermediary and
loaned funds without a haircut, which applied to relatively long-term
transactions.321 Through this mechanism, LTCM was able to invest in
spreads between the Treasury bonds.
When the foundation of the European Economic and Monetary
Union ("EMU") became imminent in the mid-1990s, LTCM selected
countries with low risk, taking into consideration the ratio of the na-
tional debt, the rate of increase in the prices, and the taxation systems,
and made an intensive investment in those countries.322 England, Ger-
many, and Norway were the main subjects of investment. 323
Although the political and financial aspects were poor, an invest-
ment was also made in Italy, as the bond market continued to grow. 324
The bond market in Italy was divided into two: the floating-interest-
rate bonds and the fixed-interest-rate bonds, which were paying
higher interest rates than swap interest rates. 325
Considering the swap interest rates were about the same as those of
the private banks in the bond market, the credit rating of the Italian
318. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 10 n.13 (explaining the concept of
arbitrage).
319. To note:
Leverage allows hedge funds to magnify their exposures and, as a direct consequence,
magnify their risks. The term leverage can be defined in balance-sheet terms, in which
case it refers to the ratio of assets to net worth. Alternatively, leverage can be defined
in terms of risk, in which case it is a measure of economic risk relative to capital. Hedge
funds obtain economic leverage in various ways, such as through the use of repurchase
agreements, short positions, and derivative contracts.
WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 4-5.
320. Id. at 18 ("The LTCM Fund conducted repo and reverse repo transactions on U.S. and
other government securities with approximately seventy-five counterparties.").
321. JORION II, supra note 282, at 3.
322. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 54-55.
323. Id.
324. Dian B. Henriques & Joseph Kahn, Back From The Brink; Lesson of a Long, Hot Sum-
mer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1998.
325. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 57.
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government was considered lower than that of private banks. 326 How-
ever, believing that the default risk of the Italian government was
overestimated, LTCM invested in the Italian government bonds. 327
LTCM purchased fixed-interest-rate government bonds and sold the
fixed-interest-rate swaps. LTCM also purchased the floating-interest-
rate government bonds and sold the fixed-interest-rate swaps.328
LTCM then invested in Brazil and Japan and rapidly increased its in-
vestment in Russian government bonds.329 However, it did not dis-
close its risky investments to the investors.330
In Europe, various stocks were frequently dually listed, and it was
common they were classified as common and preferred shares and
shares of parent and subsidiary companies. For several reasons, in
paired shares, one stock is traded at a discounted price compared to
the other stock. LTCM invested mostly in Royal Dutch/Shell, the pe-
troleum consortium of Holland. 331 Royal Dutch/Shell was owned by
Royal Dutch Petroleum of Holland and Shell Transport of England. 332
Although both companies obtained revenue from the profit sharing,
the British company was traded at a price lower than the price of the
Holland company; precisely, the British company's discount was ap-
proximately 8% more than the Holland company. 333 After purchasing
an equal ratio of British company shares, LTCM sold the shares of the
Holland company, believing the difference in stock prices of the two
companies would narrow.334 The amount invested in those two com-
panies reached $2.3 billion.335
LTCM also began to participate in merger arbitrage transactions in
the early 1990s. 336 In the merger arbitrage transactions taken by
LTCM, a huge profit was possible if the investment was successful, as
the profit was much higher than the spread on the bonds. 337 LTCM
participated in some 30 merger arbitrage transactions, including the
purchase of CBS by Westinghouse and the purchase of MCI Commu-
326. Id.
327. Ezra Zask, Will Market-Neutral Strategies Survive LTCM?, DERIVATIVES STRATEGY,
Feb. 1999, http:l/www.derivativesstrategy.com/magazine/archive/1999/0299co11.asp.
328. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 11.
329. Henriques & Kahn, supra note 324.
330. Id.
331. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 99.
332. Henriques & Kahn, supra note 324.
333. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 99.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Henriques & Kahn, supra note 324.
337. Supra note 299 and accompanying text.
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nications by the British Telecom. 338 However, in most cases, LTCM
did not actually purchase the stocks, but it achieved the same effect
through equity swaps.339
For example, if LTCM were to invest $100 million in CBS stocks for
three years, LTCM could get the same profit by entering into an eq-
uity swap contract with a Swiss bank.340 LTCM paid the fixed interest
rate for $100 million and the total return on investment (dividends
and capital gains) that would have been due to it if the Swiss bank in
fact owned the stock of CBS.341 Because the Swiss bank bought the
stocks, the risk was hedged, and LTCM was able to get the same effect
as the CBS stock investment through equity swaps. The reason LTCM
was able to get a large amount of loans and make an investment in
merger arbitrage transactions was LTCM used the equity swaps in-
stead of direct investment in stocks; thus, it made avoiding Regulation
T of the FRB possible by stipulating a limit in the loan amount for
lending securities by a broker for securities investment.342
The equity volatility transactions (Stock Index Options) are an in-
vestment strategy based on an assumption of the Black-Scholes model
that equity volatility becomes stable over time.343 In the Black-Scholes
model, the expected volatility of the underlying assets is an important
factor in determining the price of an option. 344 Conversely, if the op-
tion price 345 is known, volatility is expected in the market (i.e., implied
volatility can be inferred). For example, if the volatility of the actual
underlying assets is 15%, and the implied volatility inferred from the
Black-Scholes model is 20%, the implied volatility will fall in conver-
gence with the market volatility. Although the equity volatility itself is
not a tangible subject of transaction, unlike stocks and bonds, the
identical effect is achieved by trading the option, the primary factor of
the volatility.
LTCM sold the five-year options on S&P 500 and major European
stock indices in anticipation that the stock index options would fall; it
believed the stock index options would fall, causing the volatility to
338. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 102, 148.
339. Even though, LTCM was subject to statutory regulation, also known as Regulation T, it
"entered into derivative contracts that mimicked the behavior of stocks." Id. at 102.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 102-03.
342. In Regulation T (12 CFR Part 220) of the FRB regulations, the limit on securities lending
is stipulated at 50% of the amount of the securities investment by a broker. However as Regula-
tion T only governs the securities lending amount, the funds invested in security swaps are not
subject to the regulation. LoWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 102.
343. HULL, supra note 46, at 281.
344. Id.
345. Sco-rr & WELLONS, supra note 5, at 961.
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gradually decline, because an excess implied volatility existed at the
time.346 The purchasers of the stock index options were generally
those investors wanting some safeguards against the decline in the
stock market. In addition, investment banks, such as Morgan Stanley,
JP Morgan, Salomon Brothers, and Bankers Trust, also purchased
these options to sell them back to the investors.347
As the Asian stock markets continued to fall, investors in Europe
and the United States tried to purchase options, even at a high pre-
mium, to safeguard against the collapse of the stock markets. 348 How-
ever, even including LTCM, the number of option sellers was
extremely small.349 Although the increase in the demand for the op-
tions and the limited supply had increased its prices, LTCM continued
to sell the options, believing the prices to be overvalued. 350 In the end,
LTCM had an extremely important role as an option seller on the
United States and European stock index options markets, from which
it got the nickname "central bank of volatility. ''351
However, forecasting volatility in the market was a very difficult
task, and even if LTCM's forecast was right, it could incur losses from
option trades because long-term options were not traded on the ex-
change, which made LTCM devise OTC option contracts.352 These
OTC options were sold to investment banks, such as JP Morgan and
Salomon Brothers, who intended to resell them to general inves-
tors.35 3 From its inception, not only was this market very small, but it
had an asymmetrical structure with more option buyers than option
sellers. In the long run, LTCM's forecast could be right, but, short-
turn, it could incur a loss. In other words, LTCM did not invest in the
final volatility expected in the long run, but did invest in the daily
volatility determined by the price of the options investors intended to
buy. 354
346. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 124.
347. Id. at 125.
348. Id. at 126.
349. Id. at 127.
350. Id. at 128.
351. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 123-42 (discussing market volatility and LTCM's play-
ing). See also NICHOLAS DUNBAR, INVENTING MONEY: THE STORY OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT AND THE LEGENDS BEHIND IT 178 (2000).
352. "Options contracts are either call or put options, either of which can be purchased by an
investor at a price referred to as the premium." Gibson, supra note 1, at 536. "An investor who
purchases a call option receives the right to buy a specified instrument during a designated time
period, while the purchase of a put option gives the investor the right to sell a specified instru-
ment during a designated time period." Id. at 536 n.51.
353. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 125.
354. JORION II, supra note 282, at 21.
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A swap spread refers to the difference between the fixed rate of a
swap and the interest rate of a government bond. In other words, as
the swap rate is determined by adding the spread to the interest rate
of a government bond, the swap spread is the measure of the degree
of risk on the credit of the trade counterpart in the market.
LTCM simply employed the strategy of selling swap spreads in the
United States and Germany and buying swap spreads in England.355
In anticipation of the swap spread becoming smaller in the United
States, LTCM took the short position on a swap spread worth $240
million.356 Selling the swap spreads as the risk increased resulted in an
increase in the premium received.357
In addition, in anticipation of the forward swap spread between En-
gland and Germany being zero, LTCM took a long position on the
forward swap spread of England and a short position on Germany. 358
At that time, the government of England, while borrowing little, had a
big spread (about 80bp), but the German government had a very
small spread of about 20bp due to large borrowing.359 As England's
anticipated participation in the EMU in the next 10 years became
clear, LTCM made the investment, expecting the swap spreads in both
countries to be similar.360
To reduce the tax burden created by the additional investment of
the share of the fund by the partners, Scholes and LTCM developed
the following creative structure: LTCM sells its share of the fund to a
trade counterpart, such as Union Bank of Switzerland ("UBS"). 361 At
the same time, LTCM pays a certain amount of premium to the coun-
355. According to Lowenstein:
The swap rate is, at any given moment, the fixed rate that banks, insurers, and other
investors demand to be paid in exchange for agreeing to pay the LIBOR rate, a short-
term bank rate. The twist is that the LIBOR rate floats; no one knows where it will go
in the future. Typically, swap rate in each country trade at a slight spread above the
interest rate on the country's government debt. Thus, this swap spread is a basic barom-
eter of credit market anxiety; it is the premium that investors demand for taking the
risk of being exposed to rate fluctuations in the future.
LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 136-37.
356. Id. ("[T]he size of LTCM's swap positions was unreasonably large.").
357. DAS, supra note 52, at 240 (applying the rationale to Index Amortizing Rate swaps).
358. The result reverses what was anticipated. "The spread in the United States widened ...
and so did the gap between the United Kingdom's and Germany's." LOWENSTEiN, supra note
287, at 137.
359. Id.
360. Id. ("LTCM's those swap trade were "intelligence convergence plays, though not, as his-
tory had shown, sure things.").
361. Michael Siconolfi, Anita Raghavan, Mitchell Pacelle, All Bets are off: How Salesmanship
and Brainpower Failed to Save Long-Term Capital, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1998, at Al.
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terpart, and it buys a call option to purchase the share of the fund at a
fixed price after a certain time.362
To review, the structure can be used to reduce tax. When the part-
ners make a direct investment in the fund, they have a very high tax
rate of 39.6% corresponding to the profit. However, if they trade call
options with a bank, a low tax rate of 20% is applied, as their invest-
ment is considered a long-term capital gain because the partners are
deemed to possess the options to purchase the share at a fixed price
within 7 years, as opposed to owning additional shares of fund. In
vain, LTCM offered such a structure to various investment banks, in-
cluding Merrill Lynch, and at last entered into a contract with UBS.363
UBS purchased the share of the fund for $1 billion and sold LTCM
the call option to buy $800 million of the purchased fund at a fixed
price within 7 years. 364 UBS received $320 million as the call option
premium. 365 Afterward, LTCM entered into an identical contract with
Credit Swiss. 366
D. Results of the Use of Derivative Instruments
1. Cause and Size of Loss
In February 1994, a year after the operation of the fund, LTCM
achieved a 28% profit by means of an investment strategy based on its
own model. 367 Between 1995 and 1996, LTCM's profit was close to
60%, and even with the deduction of fees, it set a rate of return of
about 40%.368 What made the profit of near 60% in 1995 was the huge
profit generated in their investment in Italian government bonds, as
well as in Europe. 369
However, the rate of return on the fund after 1997 took a nose dive
to a 20% level because LTCM's expectations regarding the market did
not come true.370 In May 1998, contrary to what LTCM anticipated, as
362. Crew described:
A call option gives the buyer the right to buy an asset (interest rates, equities, curren-
cies, commodities, precious metals) at a predetermined price, known as the strike....
The buyer of a call option, for example, will walk away if asset prices move lower than
his strike price, since he can buy the asset more cheaply on the open market.
CHEW, supra note 65, at 10.
363. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 108.
364. Id.
365. Siconolfi et al., supra note 361, at *8.
366. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 109.
367. STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 88.
368. ScoTr & WELLONS, supra note 5, at 1153.
369. STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 88.
370. GEOFFREY POITRAS, RISK MANAGEMENT, SPECULATION, AND DERIVATIVE SECURITIES
65 (2002).
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the demand for the government bonds increased, the interest rate of
the government bonds fell, thus resulting in an increase in the bond
spreads. 371 Against the government bonds, the spread of corporate
bonds changed from 99bp to 105bp, junk bonds from 224bp to 266bp,
and off-the-run government bonds from 6bp to 8bp.372 LTCM consist-
ently used a strategy of owning risky bonds and taking a short position
on government bonds, which had relatively less risk. 373 However, as
the interest rate of the government bonds declined, the price differ-
ence increased, and LTCM incurred a large loss from all
transactions. 374
Unlike what was expected, swap spreads also increased to a level
exceeding the spreads during the Great Depression.375 The origin of
the increase in spreads was due to the economic crisis in Asian re-
gions.376 When the value of Japanese yen, the central axis in the East
Asian economy, rapidly decreased and the economy went stagnant,
yields on Japanese government bonds also rapidly dropped. 377 In addi-
tion, due to the decrease in imports from Japan, the depression carried
into Indonesia and Korea.378 When the impact reached the American
and European markets, a contrary scenario took place to that antici-
pated by LTCM.379
The increase of the yield on the government bonds in Russia was
another cause of LTCM's loss. 380 Goldman Sachs, in its plan for an
IPO after 1998, sold a large quantity of Russian government bonds to
generate healthy financial statements; as a result, the yield on the Rus-
sian government bonds greatly increased.381 In particular, the yield on
the one-year maturity Russian government bond due at the end of
June 1998 increased to 90%, causing a great loss to LTCM who had a
huge investment in these bonds.382 The crash in the Russian bond
market caused the volatility of the U.S. stock market to increase, and,
consequently, stock index option prices rapidly increased, causing a
371. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 126-29.
372. Id. at 135.
373. Id. ("Treasuries [government bonds] were the basic bond that the fund sold short to
hedge the riskier bonds it owned.").
374. ERIsK CASE STUDY II, supra note 277, at 4.
375. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 137.
376. Id. at 135.
377. Id.
378. STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 85, 180.
379. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 135.
380. ERISK CASE STUDY II, supra note 277, at 3.
381. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 135-36.
382. Id. at 136.
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huge loss to LTCM who was selling a large quantity of stock index
options. 383
At last, in mid-August 1998, Russia declared a moratorium384 and
the stock markets in the world plummeted. 385 Investors increased
their investment in U.S. Treasury bonds, which were relatively safe
and increase in demand, leading tc price increases in the bonds and a
decline in their yields. Expecting that the spreads of all the bonds
against the government bonds would narrow, LTCM, who was partici-
pating in arbitrage again, incurred a large loss, which was magnified
due to the vast size of the investment and leverage. 386 In addition,
LTCM engaged in a very speculative investment, which was far from
the model in the last stage of the management of the fund.387 The
crises in both Asia and Europe were carried into the entire world,
and, as the correlation with the financial market of the world got
closer to one, the return on the diversified investment was not realized
at all.
Between January and September 1998, LTCM suffered a loss of
$430 million from its investment in Russian bonds and other bonds
from emerging countries; another $371 million was lost from its direct
investment in advanced countries.388 LTCM also sustained a loss
amounting to $1.6 billion in transactions involving paired shares, rela-
tive value arbitrage, equity swaps, and junk bond arbitrage. 38 9 The
transactions causing the most loss were OTC derivative instruments,
such as swaps and securities volatility transactions, at $1.6 billion and
$1.3 billion, respectively.390 This resulted from LTCM's blind accept-
ance of its model, which did not consider extreme scenarios, such as
the moratorium by Russia or the financial crisis in Asia.39'
383. Id.
384. Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why
the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 92, 102 (2005).
385. Scorr & WELLONS, supra note 5, at 1153-54.
386. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 139-41.
387. Including the investment in Kanawha of Norway, purchase of the MS and Dell options,
sale of the S&P 500 option, and the purchase of 15% of junk bonds issued by Starwood Hotels &
Resorts for $480 million. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 128-29.
388. Wikipedia, Long-Term Capital Management, http://en.wikipedia.orgwikilLong-Term-
Capital-Management (last visited Dec. 13, 2007).
389. See Siconolfi, supra note 361.
390. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 146-47 (summarizing the progress of LTCM collapse in
August 1998).
391. Id. at 111-12, 117, 134-36, 140-41 (describing the Asian and Russian financial markets
situation).
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2. LTCM's Collapse
As the value of LTCM's assets was reduced by over 44% and the
loss reached $1.8 billion during August 1998, LTCM came to a point
where it needed additional paid-in capital. 392
The derivative instruments owned by LTCM at that time, such as
swaps and stock index options, reached about $1.25 trillion.393 In mid-
September 1998, the size of the position increased excessively, and
numerous trade counterparts, such as Bear Stearns, required addi-
tional collateral, but it was very difficult to secure additional liquidity
at that time.394 LTCM had to reduce its position, but it had already
become so large and the market so tight that doing so was almost
impossible. Moreover, as most banks were engaged in transactions
similar to those of LTCM, the banks did not have funds available for
lending. 395 Luckily for LTCM, Goldman Sachs accepted a lending re-
quest of $1 billion in mid-September, but, as consideration, it re-
quested a right to decide the limit of the fund investment and a 50%
share of LTCM. 396
Despite the additional financing, the losses of LTCM continued to
grow rapidly on a daily basis until the company reached a point where
it needed $4 billion to settle the problem.397 Because all LTCM trans-
actions were entangled with numerous trade counterparts, if LTCM
intended to dispose of the collateral in its possession, which would
cause the value of collateral to plummet, its trade counterparts would
bear an expected $5 billion loss. 398
Bear Stearns persistently asked for additional collateral, and the
floating margin was made up with a $475 million revolving loan pro-
vided by Chase Manhattan.399 However, with financing on the private
level alone, LTCM could not cope with the pressure of liquidity. 400 At
last LTCM became insolvent due to the pressure of liquidity and con-
392. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 12.
393. See ERISK CASE STUDY II, supra note 277, at 2.
394. See JORION II, supra note 282, at 5-6.
395. Meriwether's "offers of new capital weren't forthcoming." David Shirreff, Lessons From
The Collapse Of Hedge Fund, Long- Term Capital Management: Case Setup, INT'L FIN. RISK IN-
STITUTE, http://riskinstitute.ch/146490.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
396. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 172.
397. See ERISK CASE STUDY II, supra note 277, at 2; WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note
275, at 12-13.
398. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 17. See also Shirreff, supra note 295.
399. "Margin is the cash or eligible securities that a market participant must provide to col-
lateralize its contingent obligations that flow from exchange-traded contracts under which it is
obligated." Feder, supra note 134, at 733.
400. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 18.
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tinuing reduction of capital.40 ' As the fear of LTCM's possible col-
lapse spread, the situation was aggravated and the possibility of
bankruptcy arose.40 2
The FRB decided to step in because it believed that the systemic
risk403 and the pressure of liquidity due to the bankruptcy of LTCM
would dismantle the entire financial system. 40 4 The estimated total
amount of loss the total 14 banks had to bear was between $3 and $4
billion, about $300 million per bank.405 However, what was more im-
portant was that if LTCM went bankrupt and all its creditors went for
liquidation, the market would be paralyzed, causing a bad effect on
the entire financial system.40 6 Finally on September 22, 1998, the four
major trade counterparts of LTCM looked at measures to avoid bank-
ruptcy and a planned to provide funds by means of mutual investment
through the consortium created by the major trade counterparts. 40 7
On September 28, 1998, 14 financial organizations decided to par-
ticipate in the consortium called "Oversight Partners I. '"408 Instead of
making an investment of $3.65 billion over a period of 3 years, they
were given 90% of LTCM's shares and the right of management. 40 9
Though the management of LTCM continued to manage its fund, the
breakdown of the fund use and the results had to be reported to a
supervisory committee established by the banks.410 Although new
funds were raised, and although FRB lowered the interest rate on
September 29, an additional loss of $75 million was incurred in two
weeks. 411 It was not until the interest rate was lowered again on Octo-
401. Id. at 12-14.
402. Id. at 21, 26-28.
403. Scheerer, supra note 152, at 162.
404. One commentator argued that:
Some observers believe OTC derivatives usage among dealers increases systemic risk.
Systemic risk is the risk that the whole financial system will collapse because of the
initial failure of just one or a few [market] players.... Under a doomsday scenario, one
of the derivatives contract parties fails, and then many other parties to many other
derivatives contracts also fail, in an unavoidable chain reaction that eventually col-
lapses the [entire] financial system. . . . For those who fear systemic risk, OTC deriva-
tives are ironic; the purpose of the derivatives is to manage risk at a micro level, but
their effect is to increase risk at a macro level.
Feder, supra note 134, at 729-30.
405. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 17.
406. Id.
407. JORION I, supra note 282, at 6.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Shirreff, supra note 395.
411. Id. ("In the first two weeks after the bail-out, LTCM continued to lose value, particularly
on its dollar/yen trades, according to press reports which put the loss at $200 million to $300
million.").
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ber 15, 1998 that the spreads on bonds began to narrow. 41 2 A year
after relief to LTCM began, the fund achieved a 10% return, and the
consortium was dissolved after paying back $3.65 billion.4 13
E. Implications
Because LTCM was a hedge fund, the investment strategies, as well
as the breakdown of the portfolio, were not disclosed by industry
practice. Therefore, neither the disclosure of the balance, nor the in-
come statements to trade counterparts included information related to
the risk of the portfolio. The trade counterparts of LTCM based their
investment decisions on the size of the fund and the reputation of
management rather than evaluating the credit risk of LTCM.
In addition, financial intermediaries made loans to LTCM without
applying a haircut because they did not have accurate information re-
garding LTCM's management. Because no haircut existed as a buffer,
as the value of security dropped, LTCM risked insolvency.414 It is no
exaggeration to say the LTCM case occurred due to the credit risk,
particularly the failure in management of the counterparty risk.
As LTCM was a hedge fund, the only supervisor was the market or,
in other words, its trade counterparts. 415 However, the trade counter-
parts of LTCM did not exercise proper supervision and credit risk
management, as they relied solely on the past investment performance
and the reputation of the LTCM management. Thus the LTCM case
began to steer attention to the importance of counterparty risk.416
412. More exactly, "[t]he Federal Reserve reduced interest rate on Tuesday, September 29,
the very day after the bailout [of LTCM] .... However, the Fed's action did not bring any relief
to [LTCM]." LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 221.
413. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 287, at 229. But see Shirreff, supra note 395 ("On July 6, 1999,
LTCM repaid $300 million to its original investors who had a residual stake in the fund of
around 9%. It also paid out $1 billion to the 14 consortium members. It seemed Meriwether was
bouncing back.").
414. JORION III, supra note 297, at 353.
415. "The Federal Reserve has no regulatory authority over hedge fund and no regulatory
over LTCM." ScoTr & WELLONS, supra note 5, at 792.
416. International Monetary Market President McDonough's address including the following
remark:
Based on our experience, it seems clear that the intrinsic leverage of a derivatives con-
tract improves the efficiency with which capital is used in trading activity, thereby in-
creasing turnover volume and market liquidity. This liquidity makes it easier for market
participants to reallocate risks .... Because derivatives play a prominent role in trading
activity and the reallocation of risk in the economy, by their very nature they are likely
to be on the premises when financial crises strike. Their mere presence, however, does
not make them an inherent source of risk.... The need for participants active in deriva-
tives markets to continue to improve their risk management and control capabilities is
especially important in the face of ongoing growth and innovation in the financial mar-
kets. All aspects of risk management are important, including senior management over-
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Though LTCM had internationally diversified its funds, its invest-
ment strategies were not diversified. 417 That is, LTCM invested in the
market anticipating the range of the liquidity spreads, credit spreads,
and volatility spreads would decrease. Contrary to expectations, the
spreads increased worldwide, and LTCM and its trade counterparts
incurred a loss in all of their investment strategies.
As a result of both LTCM and its trade counterparties having un-
derestimated the possibility of liquidity, credit, and volatility spreads,
the world moved in a similar direction. If only a single investment
strategy is used, should something unexpected happen, a loss may be
suffered in every subject of investment. This situation represented a
complete disregard of hedging, the basic principle of risk manage-
ment;418 when investing in a risky asset, such as OTC derivative instru-
ments, a hedging strategy requires the ability to offset a loss to a
certain extent, no matter how extreme or unlikely that situation may
be.
LTCM was a hedge fund; therefore, no regulation in terms of the
size of the fund existed, and external restraints on the amount of lev-
erage were only realized by the intentions of the fund's providers.
Therefore, the incentive (or, in other words, moral hazard) existed to
increase the leverage to maximize both fees and return on investment
for the hedge fund management. A leverage has a special feature in
that there can be much profit when the market moves in the same way
as forecasted in the model, but a large loss can occur if the market
moves in the opposite direction. Therefore, the management should
make an effort to create an investment strategy suitable for the pur-
poses of the investment and for limiting excess use of leverage.
Though it is obvious that a hedge fund makes for a highly risky and
high return investment, a regulatory problem exists when not even a
minimum disclosure requirement was required for a large-scale hedge
fund whose failure could have threatened the system. 419 However,
given the special features and economic functions of a hedge fund,
excessive regulation of the transactions may result in adverse effects.
sight, new product approval processes, due diligence for appropriateness, and effective
risk measurement and aggregation in both market risk and credit risk.
William J. McDonough, President and CEO of the Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks before
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange: Celebrating the 30th Anniversary of the International Mone-
tary Market (May 14, 2002), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2OO2/mcd02514.
html [hereinafter McDonough Address].
417. JORION III, supra note 297, at 507.
418. See JORION II, supra note 282, at 21.
419. "[H]edge funds are exempt from SEC reporting requirements, as well as from regulatory
restrictions on leverage or trading strategies." WORKiNG GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 3.
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Therefore, a countermeasure must be devised for regulation of a posi-
tion with excess exposure to risk that simultaneously secures the
soundness of the transaction and fails to interfere with the transaction
itself.
In fact, with an awareness of the problem, the U.S. House Banking
Subcommittee on Capital Markets passed The Hedge Fund Disclosure
Act 420 in March 2000 and regulatory disclosure measures against
hedge funds were prepared. The Act was adopted was due to the ac-
knowledgment that greater supervision of the markets and an in-
creased transparency were necessary to ease the inherent risk in the
hedge fund industry.4 21
The main point was disclosure requirements should be imposed on
funds not subject to the regulation of the Securities Act if the fund is
large. The funds subject to the Hedge Fund Disclosure Act are limited
to collective investment funds with net assets over $1 billion or gross
assets over $3 billion.422 The hedge funds subject to the Hedge Fund
Disclosure Act must file quarterly reports to the FRB, whose contents
will then be available to the general public.423
An exception to the automatic stay provision of the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code was acknowledged in cases involving certain financial
contracts, such as swaps or repos. 42 4 However, because LTCM was
registered in a country outside the United States, it was not subject to
the law. Under bankruptcy law, an acknowledgement of the exception
of the automatic stay provision has the function of reducing the
amount of credit exposure and preventing the domino phenomenon,
whereby insolvency in one market is carried over into another market,
thus contributing to the instability of the financial market.425
420. Hedge Fund Disclosure Act, H.R. 2924, 106th Cong. (1999), available at http://
commdocs.house.gov/committeesfbank/hba63382.000/hba633820.htm.
421. Id. at 2.
422. Id. at 10.
423. Id. at 5.
424. However:
[T]he automatic stay does not prevent a creditor from unilaterally terminating a con-
tract to loan money to a debtor firm. Generally, the stay prevents any contractual
[counterparty] from terminating ongoing ("executory") contracts with a firm that has
filed a bankruptcy petition. The debtor firm is given the exclusive right-for a limited
period-to choose whether to continue ("assume") or terminate ("reject") ongoing
contracts.
Edwards & Morrison, supra note 384, at 111.
425. Commentators have noted:
Why are derivatives contracts treated differently? If legislative history is to be credited,
Congress reasoned that special treatment of derivatives was necessary to prevent the
"insolvency of one commodity firm from spreading to other brokers or clearing agen-
cies and possibly threatening the collapse of the market." It believed that: "The prompt
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In the case of LTCM, although it had entered into financial con-
tracts in which the exception to the automatic stay provision was
mostly applicable, the exception was denied because the hedge fund
managed by LTCM was not registered in the United States. The
United States Bankruptcy Code at that time set a limit on the subjects
of exception to the provision of the "automatic stay, '' 426 so that it ap-
plied only to the hedge funds subject to U.S. law and domestic inves-
tors. Afterward, the Bankruptcy Code was amended to include both
hedge funds whose operations were based in the United States, but
were registered in another country, and foreign debtors with invest-
ments in hedge funds.427
V. DIAMOND FUND TOTAL RETURN SWAP
The Diamond Fund is an offshore fund created by three companies
in Labuan, Malaysia: SK Securities, Hannam Investment Trust, and
LG Steel. SK Securities, Hannam Investment Trust, and LG Steel in-
dividually invested in 20 billion KRW, 5 billion KRW, and 5 billion
KRW, respectively, raising $34 million denominated in South Korean
won ("KRW"). 42 8 In addition, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New
York, a subsidiary of JP Morgan, borrowed $53 million denominated
in KRW through a total return swap ("TRS") transaction,429 a new
kind of derivative instrument. 430
The Diamond Fund invested a total of $87 million denominated in
KRW in rupiah-paired bonds of Indonesia, suffering a huge loss when
the rupiah fell.431 In the course of settlement, an illegal internal trans-
action in the SK Group related to the method of preserving such a loss
liquidation of an insolvent's position is generally desirable to minimize the potentially
massive losses and chain reaction of insolvencies that could occur if the market were to
move sharply in the wrong direction." Congress, then, carved derivatives out of the
scope of the automatic stay in order to reduce the likelihood of systemic risk, i.e., the
possibility that the insolvency of a party to a derivatives contract might expose a
counterparty (such as a commercial or investment bank) and that counterparty's
counterparties (other banking institutions) to financial distress, which would destabilize
financial markets.
Id. at 97-98 (internal citations omitted).
426. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
427. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 275, at 27-28.
428. JINwoo PARK, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 464 (2003) (S. Korea).
429. See generally BOMFIM, supra note 25, at 83-97.
430. PARK, supra note 428, at 464. For convenience, the shorter form of JP Morgan will be
used to represent the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York in the rest of this Article.
431. Injune Kim & Seokjun Byun & Changhyun Yoon, Analysis of Financial Derivatives In-
struments that Applied to the Offshore Fund-Diamond Fund Case, 15(2) J. FIN. MGMT. 55, 56
(1998) (S. Korea).
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became an issue.432 The following looks at the historical background
of OTC derivative instrument transactions and discusses their specific
structure and implications.
A. Background
In the first half of 1996, the interest rate was on the decline, and the
desire to invest overseas was rapidly increasing in the Korean financial
market.433 The smooth sales of the fixed Korean Won currency foreign
investment fund encouraged an atmosphere favoring foreign invest-
ment.434 Following the trend of the time, SK Securities International
Sales Team created a foreign investment team to expand the opera-
tion of investing domestic funds in foreign investments by breaking
away from the existing sales practice of inducing foreign capital
domestically. 435
The foreign investment team handled the intermediary operations
of investing domestic funds overseas and of establishing strategies to
intermediate products of prominent overseas financial institutions; the
foreign investment team conducted these operations with the funds,
rather than with capital from large, domestic investors.436
During that time, the investment trust companies were generating
returns 3-4% higher than those of domestic securities companies
(about 12-13%) by selling beneficiary certificates with Brady Bonds
included; consequently, it was difficult to sell overseas products gener-
ating less than 16%. 43 7 Brady Bonds were the only available overseas
432. See infra Part V.C.3.
433. Kihwan Kim, Chair of the Seoul Fin. Forum, Presentation at The High-Level Seminar on
Crisis Prevention in Emerging Markets: The 1997-98 Korean Financial Crisis: Causes, Policy Re-
sponse, and Lessons (July 11-12, 2006), at 3-5, http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2006/
cpem/pdf/kihwan.pdf.
434. Id. at 6-7.
435. Robert Wade, The Asian Debt-and-Development Crisis of 1997-?: Causes and Conse-
quences, 26 WORLD DEv. 1535, 1535-53 (1998), available at http://www.wright.edu/-tdung/wade-
wd-9808.htm.
Korean banks [such as SK Securities Co. and Korea Life Insurance Co.] had borrowed
low-cost foreign funds and then invested heavily in junk bonds, with high yields and
high risks, in an essentially speculative way, always on the assumption that the ex-
change rate would hold.
Id. (emphasis added).
436. On February 2, 1998, SK Securities Co. sued Boram Bank in Seoul Central District Court
seeking temporary injunction. In the lawsuit, SK Securities alleged that Boram Bank, as guaran-
tor, shall not pay $189 million to Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. and a subsidiary of JP
Morgan because JP Morgan concealed information about the TRS transactions. For more infor-
mation, see J.P. Morgan Sues Korean Banks, Securities Firm Over Derivatives Deals, BNA Sec.
LAW DAILY, Mar. 26, 1998.
437. See infra text accompanying note 440.
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investment product; however, various structured products to prevent
the risk of insolvency were underway.438
Under these circumstances, a foreign investment bank proposed the
idea that if funds in yen with a low interest rate were borrowed and
invested in foreign products and the risks of exchange in yen(Y) and
dollar($) were hedged with Thailand baht, a steady and high return
could be realized. 439 Sensing the desire by Korea for foreign invest-
ment, Lehman Brothers introduced a bond with a hedge structure of
financing yen funds and baht currency to domestic corporate
investors.440
SK Securities wanted to have trades with more diverse overseas fi-
nancial intermediaries to supply yen as cheaply as possible and to
make the hedge of baht currency more effective. 441 After contacting
several market players, because JP Morgan was good at financing with
an interest in such a structure, SK Securities asked JP Morgan for a
product development using the structure of financing yen funds and a
438. It has been noted that:
They held large amounts of Russian bonds and Latin American "Brady" bonds. As the
[Korean] won fell, the banks began to sell foreign securities in order to boost liquidity.
Their sell-off helped to spread the financial contagion, as the holders of equivalent junk
bonds saw their value collapse with the Korean sell-off.
Wade, supra note 435, at 1535-53.
439. Bennett & Marin, supra note 163, at 37 n.153. See also David Gillen, Yoolim Lee & Bill
Austin, How JP Morgan Got Tangled in a $500 Million Derivatives Debacle, BLOOMBERG NEWS,
Jan. 24, 1999. With regard to the hedging effect, there is room for doubt whether it can clearly
sweep away the whole risk; thus one commentator insists that:
Although the purpose of a hedge is to neutralize risk, using derivatives as a hedging
tool is still risky by nature for a number of reasons: (i) the derivatives product may not
cover the targeted risk precisely or operate exactly as anticipated; (ii) the derivatives
contract counterparty itself may fail to perform; (iii) a party can enter into a derivatives
transaction to hedge anticipated risk and then not incur the risk; and (iv) a party's
hedge position might be marked-to-market, whereas the underlying [asset] may not be
(such a situation might require the hedger to deliver significant amounts of collateral if
the hedge position moves against the hedger and the underlying [asset] itself is not
acceptable as collateral).
Feder, supra note 134, at 718 (internal citations omitted).
440. According to a Bloomberg News article:
Asia was booming, and the Korean economy was a standout performer. From 1992 to
1996, Korea's gross domestic product expanded at an average annual rate of 7.3 per-
cent. The prime rate, the interest banks charge their best customers, stood at 9.5 per-
cent. Korean financial firms were in a bind. Their cost of funds was rising, and their
customers were defecting to the international capital markets, where money was
cheaper. The Korean firms asked foreign banks for help. And Morgan, which had main-
tained a liaison office in Seoul since 1986, was eager to cooperate.
Gillen et al., supra note 439.
441. This is very similar to Yen carry trading mechanism that "is to borrow Yen at virtually
zero rates, and then to purchase U.S. treasuries at about a 3% interest rate gain net." Christo-
pher Laird, Yen Carry Trade to Unwind - Market Crash Alert, SAFEHAVEN, Feb. 23, 2006, http://
www.safehaven.com/article-4660.htm.
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baht currency hedge. 442 The result was the Diamond Fund, an over-
seas investment fund with Hannam Investment Trust and LG Steel. 443
What distinguished JP Morgan's product from that of Lehman
Brothers was that JP Morgan bought stocks of Diamond Fund and
transferred the risk to the Diamond Fund through the TRS con-
tract.444 In other words, from the Diamond Fund's standpoint, it sold
the stocks, but, in fact, its act was equivalent to borrowing the funds;
from JP Morgan's standpoint, it made an investment, but the effect
was equivalent to a loan guaranteeing a certain amount of the
principal.445
At the time the TRS contract was drafted, JP Morgan had invested
in dollar-denominated bonds in Thailand by borrowing Japanese yen
and investing in Indonesian rupiah bonds.446 Because the interest rate
on yen was low, the interest rate on the Thai bonds was high, and the
baht and dollar exchange rate was stable, JP Morgan could make a
profit by borrowing yen, converting it into dollars, and investing in
Thai bonds.447 However, JP Morgan held a very high position in the
East Asian market at that time, and it was motivated to reduce its
position.448 Although hedging was possible through conventional
means, it carried out the hedge more effectively by making use of fi-
nancial firms in Korea that lacked both experience and knowledge
about OTC credit derivative instruments.449
442. See Gillen et al., supra note 439.
443. "[In early 1997, a number of Korean financial institutions entered into certain derivative
transactions with J.P. Morgan that were supposed to provide the Korean parties what was called
'synthetic low-cost yen financing."' John D. Lovi, Symposium: Total Return Swaps and Swap
Contract Litigation, 5 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 122, 126 (2000) (describing the background
of the times).
444. For a description of the TRS contract, including deal structure and function, see HULL,
supra note 46, at 515.
445. See Kim et al., supra note 431, at 56-57.
446. The TRS contract, like other derivatives, is a "bilateral agreement" that specifies terms
between the parties. BOMFIM, supra note 25, at 83.
447. Bennett & Marin, supra note 163, at 36-37.
448. In order to hedge the bank's credit risk, JP Morgan completed an "innovative synthetic
transaction" that was effectively transferred $9.722 billion credit risk to its corporate customers.
The characteristic of this scheme "differ[s] from the classical ... credit-linked note CLN in that it
transfers the pure credit risk of the underlying credit exposures without providing any financing
for JP Morgan and has no balance sheet impact." DAs, supra note 52, at 654-55 (illustrating the
specific steps entailed in the transactions).
449. According to Andre Scheerer:
The first real test for credit derivatives came in late 1997 with the Asian financial crisis,
when the first large-scale credit derivative-related losses occurred.... Between Decem-
ber 1997 and January 1998, credit derivatives allowed investors to recover at least $800
million from the Korean Development Bank and the Industrial Finance Corporation of
Thailand.
Scheerer, supra note 152, at 152.
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During the course of business, Korean financial institutions suffered
a huge loss. It was not easy to forecast currency exchange risk based
on historical data;450 however, the lack of analytical ability and knowl-
edge regarding the structure of derivative instruments was the princi-
pal cause of the failure. In the capital market, particularly the OTC
derivative market where the masters of chivalry compete, this case
served as a reminder that "only the strong can survive" and "knowl-
edge is power."'451
In the end, this case escalated into a lawsuit because the inherent
risk of the derivative instruments had not been sufficiently explained
in the agreement between the concerned parties. 452 However, in the
course of the settlement, it again was highlighted that the SK Group
was said to be related to the unjust internal transactions in connection
with the ways of sharing the loss. 453
B. Structure of Transactions
1. Total Return Swap
JP Morgan subscribed the entire shares of Diamond Fund and in-
vested $53 million in the fund.454 The Diamond Fund invested $34
million of SK investment and $53 million of JP Morgan investment in
the Indonesian rupiah ELN.455
Investment performance depended on the degree of revaluation or
devaluation of the rupiah.456 Though it will be discussed in detail later
in this Article, the investment was structured so there would be a
profit if the value of the rupiah increased and a loss if it decreased. 457
The share value of Diamond Fund was contingent upon the invest-
ment performance of the rupiah ELN at maturity, at which point JP
Morgan was to return the shares back to the fund, regardless of the
450. Bennett & Marin, supra note 163, at 39.
451. One commentator indicates that "[i]n an informal survey of bankers taken in 1992, most
admitted that they did not adequately understand derivatives' basic structure nor the possible
extent of the losses they could incur through using derivatives." John Andrew Lindholm, Finan-
cial Innovation and Derivatives Regulation-Minimizing Swap Credit Risk Under Title V of the
Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, 1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 73, 85 (1994). However, for the
last 15 years, the market situation has shown no sign of improvement. Id.
452. Edward S. Adams & David E. Runkle, The Easy Case for Derivatives Use: Advocating A
Corporate Fiduciary Duty to Use Derivatives, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 595, 628 (2000).
453. See infra Part V.C.3.
454. PARK, supra note 428, at 464.
455. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 56-57.
456. See Ian Bell & Petrina Dawson, Synthetic Securitization: Use of Derivative Technology for
Credit Transfer, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 541, 555 (2002).
457. Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation, 22 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 421, 464-65 (2001) (describing in detail derivatives transactions).
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value, and receive [0.97 x $53 million - a - /3].458 Reconsidering this
without the a and 3 terms, this was a contract that gave 0.97 x $53
million, or $51.41 million to JP Morgan. In other words, from JP Mor-
gan's standpoint, though it initially invested in the shares of Diamond
Fund, it actually entered into a contract that guaranteed a fixed
amount, regardless of the investment performance of the Diamond
Fund. In the end, from JP Morgan's standpoint, it made a loan rather
than an investment. However, from the Diamond Fund's standpoint,
it borrowed funds and had to repay [0.97 x $53 million - a - /3] at
maturity.
The contract made between the Diamond Fund and JP Morgan was
a type of emerging hybrid derivatives instrument, or TRS contract, in
which all of the economic performance, that is, the total return gener-
ated from the underlying assets, was exchanged with a fixed cash
flow.459 As opposed to a credit default swap ("CDS"),460 where the
exchange is made based on the occurrence of a credit event,461 the
payment was made between the parties to the contract regardless of
the occurrence of a credit event in the TRS.462 In this TRS contract,
JP Morgan, as the TRS payor, paid the total profit generated from the
Diamond Fund to the TRS receiver, the Diamond Fund, and received
a fixed amount of $51.41 million.463
In the TRS contract Diamond Fund entered into, the underlying
assets were the shares received for JP Morgan's lending $53 million to
458. "Total return equals interest plus fees and appreciation in market value at maturity."
Feder, supra note 134, at 711.
459. For further discussion on TRS, see BOMFIM, supra note 25, at 83-90.
460. For further discussion on CDS, see HULL, supra note 46. See also BOMFIM, supra note 25,
at 67-82.
461. According to one commentator:
A credit default swap transfers potential credit loss, usually, but not necessarily, in con-
nection with a specific reference asset. Under a typical credit default swap, the protec-
tion buyer makes a single payment or periodic payments to the protection seller as
premium, and the protection seller is obligated to pay a credit event payment to the
protection buyer if a credit event occurs.
Feder, supra note 134, at 708. Thus, the most crucial issue is what a credit event is and when it
occurs. The commonly used "Master Agreement" in the financial market, which is sponsored by
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association ("ISDA"), specifies what constitutes a
credit event and lists eight cases: (1) Failure to pay or deliver, (2) Breach of Agreement, (3)
Credit Support Default, (4) Misrepresentation, (5) Default under Specified Transaction, (6)
Cross Default, (7) Bankruptcy, and (8) Merger without Assumption. John P. Emert & Emilio
Jimenez, International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc.: Introduction to the 1992 ISDA
Master Agreement (May 7, 2007), http://www.isda.org/c-and-a/pptlE-Jimenez-JEmert.PPT.
462. See BOMFM, supra note 25, at 84 (illustrating a TRS transaction). See also Karol, supra
note 20, at 204.
463. The TRS payer is the risk avoider and the TRS receiver is the risk taker. BOMFiM, supra
note 25, at 85.
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the Diamond Fund in February 1997, with the total profit to be ex-
changed for the loan repayment amount at its maturity in February
1998.464 In fact, JP Morgan and the Diamond Fund did not directly
enter into the TRS contract.465 Instead, JP Morgan and the Korean
bank directly entered into the TRS contract, and the domestic banks
and the Diamond Fund entered into the reverse TRS contract with
Korean banks giving the security.466 To be exact, [0.97 x $53 million -
a - /3] was what the Diamond Fund received, with a as a multiple of 5
of the currency future on the Thai baht 467 and /3 as the option on the
yen.4
68
Above, a and /3 were omitted for the convenience of explanation,
but the following discusses a and /3 in detail:
a = principal x 5[(Bs-Bm)/(Bm)]
/3 = principal x Max[0, (Ym-Ys)/(Ym)]
Bs: the spots exchange rate (25.88) of the baht at the time of
contract
Bm: the spots exchange rate of the baht at maturity
Ys: the spots exchange rate (122.00) of the yen at the time of
contract
Ym: the spots exchange rate of the yen at maturity
2. Rupiah ELN
The Diamond Fund invested $87 million in the rupiah ELN of Indo-
nesia, which was issued by NatWest and Rovert Fleming as a type of
currency-linked note.469 The note was structured to pay semi-annual
coupons 470 according to the formula below, with the principal to be
paid at maturity.471 The coupon rate was 20.15%, which was quite
high considering the interest rate in Indonesia was only 12% at that
time.472 Here, Rs was the rupiah/dollar exchange rate as of late July
1997 (the first interest payday), and Rm was the rupiah/dollar ex-
change rate at maturity in January 1998.
Cs = 20.15% x (2,371)I(Rs),
464. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 56.
465. Id. at 56-57.
466. Id.
467. See Bennett & Marin, supra note 163, at 37.
468. "[A TRS] can be considered a synthetic asset transferring the total economic perform-
ance of an asset for the term of the transaction." Scheerer, supra note 152, at 158 (citation
omitted).
469. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 58.
470. All the coupon rates were expressed as a yearly rate of return.
471. See Kim et al., supra note 431, at 58.
472. Id.
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Cm = 20.15% x (2,371)/(Rm),
P = Max[O, {1 + (2,371-Rs)/(2,371) + (2,371-Rm)/(2,371)} x (2,371)/
(Rm)]4 73
To analyze this formula, first look at the coupon part. At the time of
the note purchase, the exchange rate between the rupiah and dollar
was 2,371 (i.e., 1 dollar was equal to 2,371 rupiahs). 474 If the value of
the rupiah doubled after 6 months (1 dollar = 1,186 rupiahs), the cou-
pon Cs would increase from 20.15% to 40.3%. 475 However, if the
value of the rupiah decreased by half (1 dollar = 4,742 rupiahs), the
coupon Cs would be reduced to 50% of 20.15%, or 10.08%.476 In
other words, the structure was heavily leveraged according to the
change in value of the rupiah.
Second, as to the principal part, assume the exchange rate of the
rupiah was fixed for the first 6 months and became variable later
(Rs=RM). In this case, the principal becomes P = Max[O, 3 x {(2,371)/
R - (2)/(3)}].477 In other words, if the value of the rupiah fell over
50% (1 dollar > 3,556 rupiahs) and was fixed until maturity, the princi-
pal the Diamond Fund could receive would become zero. Of course if
the value of rupiah fell less than 50% or increased (1 dollar < 3,556
rupiahs), four times the principal could be received through the three-
times leverage multiplier effect.
In summary, investment in such a structured rupiah ELN was closer
to speculation than investment. 478 Due to the sharp fall of the rupiah,
the Diamond Fund suffered a loss of about $77 million, 88% of the
total investment amount of $87 million.479 After investing $53 million,
because it was holding 60% of the Diamond Fund share, JP Morgan
also suffered a loss of $46 million.480 However, through the TRS con-
tract, JP Morgan transferred shares worth $7 million back to the Dia-
mond Fund and received $51.41 million.481 If JP Morgan had owned a
position on the rupiah, it could have transferred all of the exchange
risk 482 regarding the Diamond Fund transactions to the Diamond
Fund, while at the same time preserving its investment principal. 483
473. PARK, supra note 428, at 465. See also Kim et al., supra note 431, at 58.
474. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 58.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. See PARK, supra note 428, at 466.
479. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 59.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. "A total return swap [] transfers both credit and market risk." Feder, supra note 134, at
712.
483. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 59.
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3. Currency Futures of the Thai Baht (a)
To review the TRS contract structure between the Diamond Fund
and JP Morgan, the TRS payor, JP Morgan, transferred the invest-
ment performance of the Indonesian rupiah ELN to the Diamond
Fund and received [0.97 x $53 million - a -0].484 Here, a is the five-
multiple of the currency futures on the Thai baht and /3 refers to the
yen option. An analysis of the five-multiple of the currency futures on
the Thai baht follows:
The structure of the forward exchange transaction takes the form of
a = principal x 5[(Bs-Bm)(Bm)]. 48 5 Here, Bs is the spots exchange
rate of the baht at the time of contract, and Bm is the spots exchange
rate of the baht at maturity. From the Diamond Fund's standpoint, it
bought the futures exchange rate of baht worth 5 times the principal.
In other words, it was a contract in which $53 million would have to be
given to JP Morgan a year later, while the Diamond Fund would re-
ceive the equivalent of 5 times the principal in corresponding baht.
The forward exchange rate and the spot exchange rate of the baht
were set at 25.88 baht per dollar.48 6 Here, from the Diamond Fund's
standpoint, because a was included as a deduction item in the amount
JP Morgan was to take, if a was positive there would be a profit, and if
negative, there would be a loss.
The sign of a was determined by the devaluation and revaluation of
the baht. If the baht were revaluated, the exchange rate becomes less
than 25.88 baht/dollar at maturity and a would become positive, rep-
resenting a profit to the Diamond Fund. In contrast, if the baht were
devalued, the Diamond Fund would suffer a loss. 487 In particular due
to the leverage coefficient of 5, the range of profit or loss would be
increased by a multiple of five.488
The forward exchange inclusion in the structure of the TRS can be
interpreted as a hedge strategy by JP Morgan to reduce its position in
East Asia, as the weight of transactions in both bahts and rupiahs was
high. 48 9 Thus, JP Morgan made use of OTC derivative instruments to
reduce its East Asia position, including bahts.490 At that time, the Dia-
mond Fund was pursuing high profits, rather than hedging risks, and
lacked the professional knowledge and skill for designing the most
484. Id. at 63. Strictly speaking, this is my own deal structure analysis.
485. See id. at 64.
486. Id. at 71-72.
487. See PARK, supra note 428, at 465.
488. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 71.
489. Id. at 64.
490. Id. at 64 n.4.
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optimal structure of the OTC derivative instruments for the trade sub-
ject.491 By entering into a TRS contract with the Diamond Fund and
including the forward exchange structure, JP Morgan was able to
hedge their position on East Asia more efficiently.492
From the standpoint of securities structural planning, the biggest
problem with the structure of the forward exchange lied in its asym-
metry. In this structure, if the baht was revaluated, the Diamond Fund
had a profit and JP Morgan a loss, and vice versa for a devaluation;
however, there was a cap in the amount of the Diamond Fund's prof-
its, but not in its losses.493 In other words, $53 million was the limit of
the loss of JP Morgan and the maximum profit of Diamond Fund.
Financial institutions offer this kind of cap as a popular interest rate
option in OTC financial markets.494
The exchange rate when the profit of the Diamond Fund reached
$53 million was 21.56 baht per dollar.495 This was about 20% of the
revaluated level compared to the spots exchange rate of 25.88 baht
per dollar.496 Even if the revaluation exceeded this level, the profit of
the Diamond Fund or the loss of JP Morgan was fixed.497 On the
other hand, there was no limit in the size of loss to the Diamond Fund
when the value of the baht dropped. 498
From a securities planning standpoint, this was equal to the Dia-
mond Fund selling a call option at the strike price of 21.56 baht per
dollar.499 As the exchange rate at the time of contract was 25.88 baht
per dollar, it was an out-of-money option.5°° That being the case, did
the Diamond Fund sell the call option at a reasonable price? In fact,
the Diamond Fund did not receive any special consideration, but, con-
491. "Hedgers typically use derivatives [vehicles] to reduce financial risks associated with
their existing asset/liability portfolios. A hedger in the derivatives market protects itself by
purchasing a derivative instrument that is expected to change in value in the opposite direction
of the hedger's asset or liability." Gibson, supra note 1, at 540. "Market participants use deriva-
tives to hedge against adverse changes in the value of assets or liabilities that result from fluctua-
tions in an interest rate, or exchange rate, or the price of stock, commodity or index." Id. at 540
n.79.
492. This hedging program became a factor in the exchange currency crisis as many Korean
financial institutions participated in the program and lost astronomical amounts of cash. ScoTr
& WELLONS, supra note 5, at 1309-15.
493. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 65. For a discussion of cap structure, see CHEW, supra note
65 at 11-12. See also Feder, supra note 134, at 697.
494. Gibson, supra note 1, at 537 n.55.
495. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 65.
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 65.
[Vol. 6:29
LESSONS FROM MODERN DEBACLES
sidering the time the contract was entered into, the volatility of the
exchange rate in the past five years was only 0.0284.501 Therefore, be-
cause the strike price was about 20% below the spot price (an out-of-
money option), the value was close to zero; selling such an option
without special consideration was acceptable. 50 2
The problem was that a provision should have been added that lim-
ited the loss of the Diamond Fund and, in short, the profit of JP Mor-
gan. In other words, the Diamond Fund should have purchased a put
option.50 3 Selling a call option and buying a put option takes the struc-
ture of a collar. 50 4 To balance the call option that JP Morgan pur-
chased, purchase of a put option would limit the loss if the baht was
devaluated over 20%. In this case, a put option with strike price of
32.35 bahts per dollar was needed. 50 5 From the "put-call parity"50 6
standpoint, the value of the option was also close to zero. 50 7 In other
words, as mentioned earlier, given the historical volatility of the baht
at that time, the value was close to zero, as it was an out-of-money
option exceeding 20% compared to the price of spots. 50 8 Therefore,
there would have been almost no cost for the put option. If such a put
option had been included in the transaction structure, the maximum
loss would have been limited to $53 million. 50 9
Although the size of the risk could have been reduced without
much cost by means of a collar structure,510 this was not reflected in
the planning. If the Diamond Fund had asked for the purchase of a
put option, JP Morgan would have had to accept its proposal because
the structure was very abnormal according to OTC derivative instru-
ments transactional practice. In fact, an asymmetrical structure in the
transactions of OTC derivative instruments can cause an enormous
loss to the other party.
501. See id.
502. Id.
503. "A put option gives the buyer the right to sell the asset at the strike." CHEW, supra note
65, at 10.
504. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 65. Also, "[a] collar is the contemporaneous purchase of a
cap and the sell of a floor used with interest rates .... Collars can be used as a means of holding
interest rates at a desired level." Gibson, supra note 1. at 537 n.56, 57.
505. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 65-66.
506. HULL, supra note 46, at 621.
507. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 66. See also ScoTr & WELLONS, supra note 5, at 944 ("Put-
call parity says that the current value of a call on a stock equals the current value of an associ-
ated put plus the current market price of the stock less the present value of the strike price.").
508. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 66.
509. See id.
510. For discussion of the collar structure, see CHEW, supra note 65, at 11-12.
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4. Yen Option (p3)
Other than the baht forward exchange explained earlier, the Dia-
mond Fund also had an option for yen, which was structured in the
form of P3 = principal x Max [0, (Ym-Ys)/(Ym)].5 11 Here, Ys is the
spots exchange rate of the yen against the dollar at the time the con-
tract was entered, and Ym is the spots exchange rate of the yen
against the dollar at maturity. 512 This can be understood as a call and
put option on the dollar, with a strike price of 122 yen.513 When the
yen is devalued, the profit paid in yen is exchanged into dollars using
the spots exchange rate at maturity.
A yen put option refers to the purchase of a right to sell yen at the
basis exchange rate of Ys = 122.00 at maturity.514 At maturity, if the
yen exchange rate becomes bigger than the basis exchange rate of Ys
= 122.00 (i.e., if the yen is devalued), the put option will be exercised
and a profit equal to the difference in exchange rates will be taken. At
maturity, if the yen exchange rate is lower than the basis exchange
rate of Ys = 122.00 (i.e., if the yen is revalued), the put option is not
exercised as there is no actual profit. In short, when the yen is deval-
ued, P3 will be greater than zero, and, in the case of the TRS contract,
the payment JP Morgan receives will be lessened by the amount of P3.
In this case, it was advantageous for the Diamond Fund, as the
amount of payment was reduced. In contrast, if the yen is revalued, P3
will be less than zero and the amount JP Morgan receives will increase
by the size of /3.515
Why was this option on the yen added? Rather than being impor-
tant as an option on the yen itself, this option can be interpreted to
function as a sweetener to include the option on forward exchange
explained earlier in the structure of the TRS.516 The Diamond Fund,
in fact, borrowed the capital in dollars. However, pursuant to the
terms of the put-call parity, when the borrowing of dollars is inte-
grated with a put option on yen, it becomes identical to the borrowing
of yen integrated, with a call option on yen. Therefore, such a struc-
511. See PARK, supra note 428, at 464. See also Kim et al., supra note 431, at 66.
512. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 66-68.
513. A call option (put option) on the dollar is equivalent to the put option (call option) on
the yen. This is because due to its nature, in the case of buying a certain currency (e.g., dollars),
the currency option pays another currency (e.g., yen); in contrast, when selling a certain currency
(e.g., dollars), the payment is made in another currency (e.g., yen). Therefore, a currency call
option that indicates the right to buy a certain currency is equal to the put option (e.g., yen put
option) on another currency of the payee.
514. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 66.
515. See PARK, supra note 428, at 465.
516. See Kim et al., supra note 431, at 67.
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ture may have been devised to obtain the same effect as financing in
yen at a low interest rate. 517
An option premium must be paid to buy an option. However, be-
cause the Diamond Fund entered into an exchange rate forward con-
tract without a premium by the spots exchange rate regarding the
baht, it suffered a loss by the amount of the forward exchange pre-
mium. 518 JP Morgan may have claimed the Diamond Fund made it
possible to purchase the yen option without the option premium, thus,
maintaining the loss concerning the baht forward exchange contract.
The baht forward exchange used a forward exchange rate 4%
higher than the reasonable price. 519 Because the baht forward ex-
change targeted five times the principal amount, it entered into a for-
ward exchange contract from which a 20% loss was generated by the
principal standard. 520 Of this 20%, some may have been used in plan-
ning the negative funding structure and writing off the principal at
3%, and another part may have been used for the option premium.521
As the yen exchange rate was 123.17 yen per dollar at maturity, the
Diamond Fund exercised the put option as the yen was devalued as
compared to the time of contract. From the put option on the yen,
about $500,000 in profit was realized. The profit from negative fund-
ing, which was equal to 3% of $53 million, was about $1.59 million.
However, it suffered a loss of over $130 million from the baht forward
exchange .522
Considering the baht forward exchange and the put option on the
yen together, it can be interpreted that borrowing $53 million to buy
the put option on yen and, at the same time, purchasing the baht for-
ward exchange, which was five times $53 million, minimized the risk
of volatility of the baht.523 Based on historical data regarding the rela-
tionship between baht and yen, JP Morgan may have persuaded the
517. See id. at 66-67.
518. According to Lillian Chew:
[A] forward contract enables its buyer to lock in today the future price of an asset, be it
a currency, an interest rate, an equity or a commodity. The buyer has to pay this pre-
agreed price on the settlement date whether or not the asset has moved in his favour;
equally, the seller has to deliver the asset on the settlement date irregardless of the
price in the spot market.
CHEW, supra note 65, at 6 (emphasis in original).
519. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 65-67.
520. Id.
521. Id. at 57, 68.
522. Id. at 67.
523. Id. at 71.
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Diamond Fund the baht risk could be offset through the put option on
yen due to the high correlation between the two currencies. 524
This has become a very subjective issue when focusing on the prob-
lem of forecasting the volatility of exchange rates. In this case, JP
Morgan's sole concern was whether it complied with the principle of
fiduciary duty.525 If JP Morgan stuck to the issue of the volatility of
the exchange rate differing from the past, the issue could become
blurred. However, even when the situation is looked at from the doc-
trine of a seller's fiduciary duty, if the historical relationship between
yen and baht was not maintained, the risk inherent in the structure of
a TRS should have been sufficiently explained to the Diamond
Fund.
5 2 6
In summary, it may be logical to conclude that a put option on yen
was used as a means of marketing to include the forward exchange
structure in the TRS structure. By adding yen-put options, dollar-call
options, and the baht forward exchange to the TRS structure, JP Mor-
gan was able to sell the baht forward exchange on a large scale-not
on the exchange, but through OTC trading. In the previously ex-
plained structure of forward exchange, the asymmetrical structure was
a problem, but in the yen option structure, whether the yen option
was appropriate as a means of hedging the risk of the baht (i.e.,
whether the possibility of an appropriate hedge unrealized was suffi-
ciently manifested) became the main issue.527
524. Bennett & Marin, supra note 163, at 39 ("Since the Thai baht had never previously de-
preciated at such a rapid rate against the U.S. dollar, it is unlikely that any scenario analysis
based on historical volatility prepared as disclosure for those transactions would have taken into
account such a dramatic a level of Thai baht depreciation.").
525. However, one practicing expert advised that:
Under a fiduciary duty theory, the customer asserts that, as a fiduciary, the seller had
the responsibility to determine that the [derivatives] product sold was inappropriate
and unsuitable for the customer. This can be the result of the size, risk, and leverage of
the product, a lack of relationship to the customer's core business or the customer's
legitimate business needs, or simply because the product did not accomplish what the
customer was trying to accomplish. The better equipped the customer is to make that
determination for itself, the less likely it is that a fiduciary relationship will be created.
Such a relationship is often the result of an imbalance of knowledge, ability, sophistica-
tion, and the like. The greater the imbalance, the greater the chance that a fiduciary
relationship exists.
Rubinstein, supra note 120, at 743-44.
526. Of course, the seller's "responsibility for determining suitability should continue to de-
pend on the nature of the relationship between the parties to a derivative transaction .... This is
especially true when the transaction is arms-length, and not the product of a preexisting advisor-
dlient relationship." Sienko, supra note 121, at 128.
527. See Lovi, supra note 443, at 127 (describing the key issue of the deal).
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C. Result of Use of Derivative Instruments
1. Devaluing of the Baht and Catastrophic Loss
Due to the economic crisis in East Asia, the Diamond Fund found
itself in the worst situation. As the government of Thailand adopted
the basket exchange rate method, in the case of baht devaluation due
to the deficit in trade balance, the foreign exchange reserves could
have been used to buy dollars, artificially linking the baht exchange
rate to that of the yen.528 However, in May 1997, as it became difficult
to maintain the basket currency method due to the rapid revaluation
of the yen and the deficit in the foreign exchange reserves, Thailand
converted to the managed currency system. 529
Even though the Diamond Fund obtained a little profit as the yen
was devalued, the range of baht devaluation was far greater, causing
an approximate $130 million loss to the Diamond Fund.5 30 In addition,
due to the rapid devaluation of the rupiah during its investment pe-
riod in the rupiah ELN in Indonesia, the Diamond Fund also suffered
a loss of about $75.9 million.531 Because of the derivative instruments
included in the formula for the redemption at maturity, which resulted
in the leverage, a loss more than twice the investment in the general
bonds of Indonesia occurred.
In the end, the Diamond Fund suffered a total loss of $186.14 mil-
lion from both borrowing and investing due to the currency exchange
risk in Asia.532 Compared to the initial capital amount of $34.4 mil-
lion, the size of the loss reached 541%.533 In addition, from the OTC
derivative instruments in the Korean offshore funds entered into with
JP Morgan, the Diamond Fund suffered a loss reaching about $800
million.534
In case of the offshore funds, since payment guarantees were made
by the Korean banks even if the parties in the trade went bankrupt,
the loss in the offshore funds functioned as a cause of increase in the
528. See Partnoy, supra note 457, at 464-65.
529. PARK, supra note 428, at 465.
530. As John D. Lovi stated:
[I]t is obvious from the transaction formula that if the baht ceased to be a managed
currency, the baht forward leg of the transaction would not operate as a hedge. In fact,
the baht leg of the transaction would start generating huge losses for the Korean par-
ties, the exact opposite of a hedge.
Lovi, supra note 443, at 126-27.
531. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 59.
532. PARK, supra note 428, at 465-66.
533. Id.
534. Bennett & Marin, supra note 163, at 37 n.151.
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bad loans.535 In other words, because the offshore funds made inap-
propriate use of derivative instruments, the insolvency of Korean fi-
nancial institutions deepened.
2. Litigation
Of the financial institutions in which the Diamond Fund invested,
SK Securities filed a suit against JP Morgan 536 claiming unfairness,
violation of the duty to disclose material facts,537 violation of the prin-
ciple of fiduciary duty, and violation of prohibition of the abuse of
power.538 The unfairness in transactions was based on the asymmetri-
cal aspect of the baht forward exchange contract included in the TRS
contract and the imbalance of information and bargaining power as a
trade counterpart.
The disclosure of material facts requirement was also an issue in the
litigation of Procter & Gamble v. Bankers Trust Co. 539 and Gibson
Greetings,540 as analyzed in Part Three. The court ruled tables showing
both the sensitivity of variables influencing the value of the concerned
swaps and the volatility of such variables should have been made
available. 541 In addition, according to New York case law, the court
held if one party to a contract had far superior information and
knowledge, was aware that the other party could not easily access that
information, and the other party was basing its decision on erroneous
information and knowledge, the party had an implied duty to inform
the other party of important information.542
However, the lawsuit between SK and JP Morgan was settled
before going to trial. 543 The settlement called for JP Morgan to par-
ticipate in SK's new shares issued, but unfair inside trading of SK sub-
535. Kim et al., supra note 431, at 57.
536. See David Gillen, How J.P. Morgan Got Tangled in a $500 Million Derivatives Debacle,
BLOOMBERo NEWS, Jan. 24, 1999. See also Partnoy, supra note 457, at 466.
537. The P&G court held that under New York law, a bank and its broker-dealer subsidiary,
by virtue of their superior knowledge of interest rate swap transactions, "had a duty to disclose
material information to plaintiff both before the parties entered into the [interest rate] swap
transactions and in their performance, and also a duty to deal fairly and in good faith during the
performance of the swap transactions." Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F.
Supp. 1270, 1275 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
538. See Kim et al., supra note 431, at 73.
539. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
540. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
541. Procter & Gamble, 925 F. Supp. at 1290.
542. Id. (citing Banque Arabe et Internationale D'Investissement v. Md. Nat'l Bank, 57 F.3d
146 (2d Cir. 1995)).
543. Bennett & Main, supra note 163, at 38 n.160.
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sidiary companies became a problem.544 This is reviewed in detail
below.
3. Settlement
In October 1999, while SK Securities was preparing for a lawsuit
against JP Morgan, JP Morgan participated in the issuance of new
shares for the third parties held by SK Securities.5 45 Along with partic-
ipating in the new shares issuance, JP Morgan also entered into a put
option contract to sell shares of SK Securities at a fixed price to two
foreign local subsidiaries of SK Global. 546 In addition, SK Securities
entered into a new derivative instrument contract by buying an $85
million note from a subsidiary of JP Morgan with the guarantee of
performance attached to secure the fulfillment of the debt of 123.8
billion KRW SK Global Pacific owed JP Morgan. 547 However, in Oc-
tober 2002, as the maturity of the option transaction with JP Morgan
arrived and concerns arose regarding the disclosure of the secret op-
tion contract, SK Group began negotiations with JP Morgan, sug-
gesting an agreement in which the foreign local subsidiary was to keep
the difference between the strike price on the option and the purchase
price of the entire shares on the exchange by SK Securities in cash.548
The 24.05 million shares of SK Securities owned by Morgan Guaranty,
a subsidiary of JP Morgan, were taken over by SK Capital and Shera-
ton Grande Walkerhill through block trading in after-hours trading.5 49
D. Implications
The biggest problem in the structure of the baht forward exchange
(a) was its asymmetry. If the baht was revalued, the Diamond Fund
would make a profit, and JP Morgan would take a loss; if the baht was
devalued, vice versa. The cap, interest-rate product 550 and call options
in the portfolio,551 would only play a role if the Diamond Fund made a
profit. In other words, even when the baht were revalued, the Dia-
mond Fund's profit (i.e., the loss of JP Morgan) was fixed. On the
544. Id.
545. Bloomberg News, J.P. Morgan To Take Korean Brokerage Stake, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
1999, at C4.
546. See generally Don Kirk, Korea Indicts 10 Executives of SK Group In Stock Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at W1.
547. See generally id.
548. Kim Yon-Se, SK Securities Fined WIJ.1 BiL for Illegal Trading, KOREA TIMES, Dec. 13.
2002.
549. Kim Yon-se, Chaebol Abuse Unlisted Units for Insider Trading, KOREA TIMES, Feb. 19,
2003.
550. See Cohen, supra note 17, at 2001 n.41.
551. See Gibson, supra note 1, at 537 n.55.
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other hand, if the baht were devalued, there was no limit to the size of
loss to the Diamond Fund.
In the general transaction practice of OTC derivative instruments,
limiting one party's risk to a certain extent and leaving the other
party's size of loss unlimited is extremely abnormal because such an
asymmetrical structure in the transactions of OTC derivative instru-
ments can cause a large loss to one party. It is believed the Diamond
Fund did not fully understand the inherent derivative instruments at
the time it entered into the contract with JP Morgan.552 The part
played by the baht forward exchange among the terms of financing of
the funds through the TRS contract was very disadvantageous to the
Diamond Fund, but the intention of the JP Morgan proposal was not
understood. In other words, the Diamond Fund's lack of analytical
ability and knowledge regarding the structure of derivative instru-
ments was the cause of the failure.55 3
OTC derivative instruments used without a hedge are, in fact, very
dangerous transactions. After 2002, the time securities companies be-
came allowed to use OTC derivative instruments in dealing in Korea,
the use of OTC derivative instruments has been on the rise because
foreign financial institutions with superior capabilities are expanding
their market share. However, this should go hand-in-hand with pro-
motion of analytical ability and understanding on the derivative in-
struments by the main end-users.
Similar to the case of BT, the general trade practice of the sellers of
derivative instruments was also an issue of suitability in the case of
Diamond Fund.5 54 The sellers of derivatives should have constructed a
relationship with the other parties based on good faith and fair deal-
ing. In other words, if one party had far superior knowledge, that
party had the implied duty to give the other party that material infor-
mation.555 As a market player, the securities companies and invest-
ment banks should be aware of this point when they engage in
552. However, in Korea Life Ins. Co. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N. Y., a New York federal
court found that Korea Life Insurance fully understood the nature of the TRS transaction. Korea
Life Ins. Co. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 269 F. Supp. 2d 424, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Plaintiff Korean Life Insurance was one of JP Morgan's counterparts in the TRS transaction in
1997. Id.
553. See Kim et al., supra note 431, at 73.
554. Bennett & Marin, supra note 163, at 36.
555. If the protection seller violates this obligation, the protection buyer can bring suit alleg-
ing negligent misrepresentation. In the lawsuit, plaintiff-protection buyer:
[M]ust show that (1) the defendant had a duty, as a result of a special relationship, to
give correct information; (2) the defendant made a false representation that it should
have known was incorrect; (3) the information supplied in the representation was
known by the defendant to be desired by the plaintiffs for a serious purpose; (4) the
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derivative instrument transactions with unsophisticated counterparties
lacking knowledge and information. 556
VI. COMMODITY FUTURES STACK HEDGE OF MGRM
Metallgesellschaft Refining and Marketing ("MGRM"), an Ameri-
can subsidiary in the energy field of the international chemical manu-
facturing group Metallgesellschaft AG ("MG"), suffered a loss
amounting to $1.5 billion from a derivative transaction in December
of 1993.557 MGRM's huge financial losses are attributable to the fail-
ure of its hedging program, which ignited debate on the issue of what
the firm's proper hedging strategies should be.55 8 "The MGRM case
illustrates such charges can be enormous and can constitute a serious
complication when designing certain hedging programs." 559
A. Background
As a company supplying oil to gas stations and suppliers of oil for
hearing, MGRM set up an aggressive marketing strategy to secure its
competitiveness in the U.S. market in 1992.560 MGRM entered into a
long-term commitment to supply diesel, heating oil, and gasoline in
the amount of 180 million barrels for the next 10 years.561
There were many types of long-term commitment derivatives con-
tracts,562 but the following two were the most typical: the firm-fixed
contract, in which a certain amount was supplied at a fixed price, and
the firm-flexible contract, in which the price of supply and the total
plaintiffs intended to rely and act upon that representation; and (5) the plaintiffs rea-
sonably relied on it to their detriment.
Korea Life Ins., 269 F. Supp. 2d at 436 (internal citations omitted).
556. According to Bennett & Marin:
[T]he issue that is central to most suitability claims related to financial derivatives is
how broad a duty a seller of a derivative instrument owes to a buyer to explain the
operation, terms, and effect of the instrument. In a typical derivatives dispute involving
questions of suitability, the buyer will argue that the seller has a fiduciary duty to en-
sure that the derivative is appropriate for, and fully understood by, the buyer.
Bennett & Marin, supra note 163, at 38 (internal citations omitted).
557. See John Digenan et al., Metallgesellschaft AG: A Case Study, PRIMA.ORG, Sept. 2, 2004,
at 1, available at http://www.prmia.org/pdf/CaseStudies/MG-IIT.pdf [hereinafter Digenan et al.
Case Study].
558. See id. at 2.
559. POITRAS, supra note 370, at 302.
560. See JORION III, supra note 297, at 38.
561. Id. at 39.
562. "Derivatives contracts are bilateral agreements that derive their value from some under-
lying asset, such as stocks, commodities, or currency holdings, or from the value of some under-
lying reference or index rate, such as interest rates, exchange rates, or indices." Gibson, supra
note 1, at 532.
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amount of quantity were limited, -but the right to decide the supply
schedule was given to the consumers.5 63 MGRM entered into con-
tracts to supply 160 million barrels of petroleum products at a fixed
price until September 1993 with the maturities of most contracts being
10 years. 564
Most of MGRM's supply contracts were made in summer of 1993
when the supply price was $3 to $5 higher than the price of crude oil,
which, at that time, was relatively low compared to past prices and
was still declining.5 65 Unless the price of crude oil plummeted,
MGRM could profit from this contract. 566 However, if the price of
crude oil increased greatly, it would suffer a large loss. 567
The risk of crude oil going up could have been avoided by purchas-
ing a futures contract on crude oil with a maturity date that corre-
sponded to the long-term commitment. 568 In other words, if the price
of crude oil increased, there would be a loss on the spot position, but
because there would be a gain on the futures, the risk of increasing
price would be hedged. However, because MGRM had no long-term
commitment on crude oil, it chose to hedge continuously in the short-
term futures market.569 At the end of 1993, as the price of crude oil
dropped greatly, there was a risk of liquidity due to a large number of
margin calls worth $1 billion in the transactions of futures for the
hedge.570 The holding company, MG, did not have sufficient cash and
faced bankruptcy.5 71
B. Structure of Derivative Transactions
MGRM proposed a new way to either eliminate or transfer the risk
to its customers of crude oil price changes. The plan was a contracted
supply of 180 million barrels of petroleum products at a fixed price for
563. See Anatoli Kuprianov, Derivatives Debacles, Case Study of Large Losses in Derivatives
Markets, 81(4) FED. REs. BANK OF RICH. ECON. Q. 5 (1995).
564. POITRAS, supra note 370, at 59.
565. STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 63. See also POITRAS, supra note 370, at 59; Kuprianov,
supra note 563, at 6.
566. See ERisk, Case Study: Metallgesellschaft, ERISK.COM, http://www.erisk.com/Learning/
CaseStudies/MG.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
567. As seen in this example, futures contracts sometimes seemed more like a method of
gambling than just normal business trading to avoid uncertain risk. See Karol, supra note 20, at
202 n.14.
568. See POITRAS, supra note 370, at 59.
569. See id.
570. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 4-5.
571. Id. at 5.
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10 years beginning in 1993.572 However, 180 million barrels were equal
to 85 days of crude oil production in Kuwait, which exceeded the
amount MGRM had in long-term reserves;573 therefore, MGRM tried
to secure the shortage through the crude oil spots market. 574 Unique
to MGRM's contract was an option for early termination.5 75 The con-
sumers had the right to settle the remaining portion of the contract if
the futures price in the past month was higher than the contract price.
If the option was exercised, MGRM was to pay in cash [1/2 (the fu-
tures price - the supply price) x the amount remaining] on the con-
tract. This option was attractive to buyers who were in financial
trouble or who were no longer in need of petroleum products.
576
MGRM could have reaped a large profit if the price of crude oil
dropped, but it could have suffered a large loss if the price in-
creased. 577 Therefore, it had to devise a plan to hedge the risk result-
ing from the increase in the price of crude oil. From MGRM's
standpoint, it could have purchased petroleum products with delivery
by a certain time and kept them in reserve until the date of delivery.
578
However, for physical storage, there are costs of financing, carrying,
and preserving the purchase. 579 To avoid these costs, futures or for-
wards contracts could be used.5 80 However, the crude oil futures mar-
ket is generally matures in less than 3 years, and the liquidity tends to
decrease after 18 months.581 Therefore, no futures market was in exis-
tence that corresponded to the maturity of the long-term commitment
of MGRM. Consequently, MGRM chose the strategy of the stack
hedge method.5 82
A stack hedge refers to a method in which a large-scale, long posi-
tion on the short-term futures contracts is taken, sold, and then the
deferred-month futures contract is purchased again, rolling over the
572. Id. ("MGRM had committed to sell forward the equivalent of over 150 million barrels of
oil for delivery at fixed prices, with most contracts for terms of ten years."). See also Digenan et
al. Case Study, supra note 557, at 3.
573. Joruor III, supra note 297, at 39.
574. CHEW, supra note 65, at 119.
575. See Digenan et al. Case Study, supra note 557, at 1.
576. Id.
577. STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 63.
578. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 9.
579. Id.
580. Privately negotiated and customized forwards contracts are usually between two or more
institutional parties, one of which assumes a "long position" by agreeing to buy some underlying
asset at some future date for a specified price. The other party to the contract assumes a "short
position" by agreeing to sell the underlying asset at the time and price agreed upon by the two
parties. HULL, suprii note 46, at 4.
581. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 8.
582. Id. at 6. See also Digenan et al. Case Study, supra note 557, at 2.
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maturity.583 Since the short-term crude oil futures market was showing
historical backwardation, the stack hedge method could have been a
plan to reduce the cost of carry.584
Specifically, backwardation refers to a phenomenon where the price
of near-month futures is higher than that of the deferred-month fu-
tures due to a temporary imbalance in demand and supply.58 5 In other
words, because the deferred-month future was traded at a cheaper
price, an effective strategy in terms of cost was selling the near-month
futures before maturity and buying deferred-month futures.586 The
profit from the stack hedge for 10 years was reflected in the profit
from buying a 10-year-to-maturity forward contract and holding it to
maturity.587
The futures MGRM used in the hedge were unleaded gasoline and
No. 2 heating oil.588 At the same time it bought the futures contracts,
MGRM entered into a swap contract for short-term energy whereby
MGRM paid a fixed price for the energy and received the variable
price for the energy.589 According to the New York Mercantile Ex-
change ("NYMEX"), MGRM was in possession of futures on 55 mil-
lion barrels of gasoline and heating oil.590 However, the size of energy
swap position needed to completely hedge the future contract was es-
timated to be 111 million barrels.591
C. Result of the Use of Derivative Instruments
There was a risk of liquidity due to the decline in the price of crude
oil.592 As some of the member countries of the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") were producing oil in excess of
the daily petroleum quota until mid-1993, the price of crude oil
dropped from $20 to $15 per barrel, the lowest level in 5 years. 593 The
rapid decline in the price of crude oil combined with the rollover
losses caused a risk of liquidity to MGRM. 594 As futures contracts
were settled daily, MGRM had to take a loss from the futures immedi-
583. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 11.
584. Id.
585. CHEW, supra note 65, at 120.
586. STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 64.
587. JORION III, supra note 297, at 39.
588. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 5. See also Digenan et al. Case Study, supra note 557, at 2.
589. "A swap is [a binding] agreement between two parties to exchange cashflows throughout
the life of the contract-in effect, a series of forwards." CHEW, supra note 65, at 7.
590. Digenan et al. Case Study, supra note 557, at 2.
591. Id.
592. Id.
593. STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 64.
594. POITRAS, supra note 370, at 60.
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ately, which led to a large margin call reaching approximately $1 bil-
lion.595 Although the profit from the long-term commitment due to
the decline in the price of crude oil was realized over an extended
time, the loss realized in connection with the hedge position in the
short term increased almost to the point of exceeding the profit from
the long-term commitment of MGRM.596
In other words, MGRM overlooked the fact that when the price of
crude oil declined, the profit from the crude oil supply contract would
be realized over a long time at each delivery of the month, but the loss
from the crude oil futures would be realized immediately due to the
margin call.597 As MGRM's situation became a matter of public de-
bate, the NYMEX tightened the conditions on the deposit of money
by MGRM and worsened the risk of liquidity for MGRM.5 98
Also, an increase in the cost of rollover existed due to the contango
phenomenon in the market. 599 In the process of using a stack hedge,
MGRM was exposed to the risk of its large-scale position on the
short-term crude oil futures deviating from its long-term forward com-
mitment, which was the basis risk.600 Historically different from the
short-term crude oil futures market showing backwardation, the spots
and the prices of short-term futures dropped much more than the
prices of the long-term forward commitment in 1993, and, as a result,
the deferred-month market had more premiums than the near-month
market, showing the contango phenomenon. 60 1 As the short-term en-
ergy futures market showed contango, MGRM fell into a situation
where it had to pay premiums to roll over the short-term futures con-
tracts. 602 However, the marketing and hedging programs of MGRM
were made based on the presumption that backwardation in the en-
ergy futures market would persist.603 In the case of the market re-
maining in the state of contango, MGRM was bound to suffer
595. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 5. See also Digenan et al. Case Study, supra note 557, at 3.
596. CHEW, supra note 65, at 123.
597. STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 64.
598. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 7.
599. STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 64.
600. HULL, supra note 46, at 53; CHEW, supra note 65, at 118-26.
601. WHALEY, supra note 7, at 750; HULL, supra note 46, at 121; STEINHERR, supra note 241,
at 64. "Backwardation and contango [phenomenon] tend to be associated with commodities
rather than financial assets." CHEW, supra note 65, at 122.
602. Rollover arises from a "mispricing of a futures contract" at the time an old position is
closed and a new one open. See generally WHALEY, supra note 7, at 750-51; CHEW, supra note 65,
at 121.
603. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 9-13. The backwardation phenomenon defined as follows:
The convenience yield for an item can be measured by computing the difference be-
tween the benchmark forward price (the sum of the current spot price and the cost of
carry) and the prevailing market-determined forward price. (Convenience Yield = Spot
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continuous losses from the rollover. The contango phenomenon ad-
ded to the loss by requiring payment of the premium to purchase the
deferred-month futures, in addition to the margin call loss. 60 4
Losses resulted from the hedge position and liquidation of the long-
term supply contract. 605 The supervisory committee of MG, the hold-
ing company of MGRM, and retired MGRM's management dis-
patched a new management team from Europe.606 Judging that the
holding company MG had no ability to pay back the deposit and the
cost of rollover, after immediately liquidating MGRM's hedge posi-
tion, the new management began negotiations to reduce the long-term
supply contract. 60 7
The standard of accounting treatment in Germany also added to
MG's problems.608 As the lower of cost or market was adopted in
Germany, the holding company MG was subject to the lower of cost
or market, while the U.S. subsidiary MGRM was subject to hedge ac-
counting.60 9 If the futures contract was considered a hedge, the profit
and loss would be deferred and MGRM would report only the profit
from the long-term supply contract on its income statement.610 How-
ever, applying the lower of cost or market, MG did not recognize the
profit from the long-term supply contract until it was actually realized
and only the current loss was added. 611
Because netting of the position was not permitted under Germany's
standard of accounting, MG reported an enormous loss on its income
statement. 612 Consequently, the credit rating of MG dropped and the
swap trading counterparties began to terminate the contracts. 613 Trad-
ing counterparties whose contracts were not terminated asked for the
security to be locked up on the fulfillment of the contracts. 614
NYMEX also increased the terms of deposits for MGRM. 615 Had the
hedge accounting treatment been adopted in Germany, the position of
Price + Cost of Carry - Actual Forward Price). Sometimes the convenience yield is high
enough to offset the cost of carry, causing forward prices to be lower than spot prices.
Id.
604. Id.
605. Id. at 6, 13.
606. Digenan et al. Case Study, supra note 557, at 5.
607. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 15.
608. STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 67.
609. Digenan et al. Case Study, supra note 557, at 4.
610. Id..
611. Id.
612. Id.
613. Id.
614. Digenan et al. Case Study, supra note 557, at 4.
615. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 7.
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MGRM would have been reduced in OTC without stirring up the
market. 616
The creditors of MGRM and Deutsche Bank, the leading party,
supported funds reaching $1.9 billion and converted most of the debts
into equity warranties.617 In the end, the share price of MG dropped
from 64 marks to 24 marks, while the total market value of MG de-
clined more than 50%.618
The auditor committee of MG did not understand the features of
derivative instruments and the loss from the decline in the price of
crude oil over time, but it was blamed for causing the loss. 619 In addi-
tion, there was doubt whether MGRM had actually hedged or partici-
pated in speculative transactions. 620 If it had hedged, one opinion was
a loss reaching $1.5 billion would not have been incurred. 621 Some
also argued there was a fatal defect in the hedging program of MGRM
itself.622 Others believed there was no problem with the hedging pro-
gram, but criticized the management of MG as deepening the loss by
terminating the contracts early.623
In July 1995, CFTC imposed a penalty on MGRM and MG Futures
Inc. ("MGFI"), the operation division for futures at MG, for the de-
fects in the internal control system in connection with the activities of
MGRM in the energy futures market.624 In addition, CFTC imposed a
penalty on MGFI for not reporting the significant defect found in the
internal control system.625 MGRM was fined for selling an illegal, off-
exchange futures contract.626 MGRM and MGFI paid penalties
amounting to $2.5 million and accepted recommendations to modify
the internal control system, including the risk management procedure,
and to comply with CFTC regulations.627 In an administrative pro-
616. Digenan et al. Case Study, supra note 557, at 4.
617. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 5, 16.
618. JORION III, supra note 297, at 40.
619. Digenan et al. Case Study, supra note 557, at 5.
620. See Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 14 (explaining that some commentators argue that
MGRM's hedging strategy was "speculative in its design and intent").
621. Digenan et al. Case Study, supra note 557, at 5.
622. See Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 15 (showing there are counter arguments that "most of
MG's reported losses were attributable to the manner in which its new management chose to
terminate its subsidiary's marketing program, not to defects in its hedging strategy").
623. Digenan et al. Case Study, supra note 557, at 1, 5.
624. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 18.
625. Id.
626. "All products developed by a registered exchange receive full coverage of CFTC regula-
tions. Off-exchange, virtually identical products take root outside the CFTC's view, and when
they reach critical mass there is tremendous pressure to preserve their unregulated status ... 
Petzel, supra note 9, at 104.
627. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 18.
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ceeding, CFTC ruled that the firm-fixed derivatives contract of
MGRM was illegal and nullified it, thus putting the remaining con-
tracts at legal risk. 62 8
D. Implications
The most important cause of MGRM's loss was the size of its posi-
tion.629 While the daily average trading amount of futures contracts
for heating oil and unleaded gasoline was 15,000 to 30,000 barrels,
MGRM was taking a long position of 55,000 barrels.630 When a posi-
tion becomes large, the company may be subject to temporary risk of
liquidity, particularly the funding risk.631 However, the supervisory
committee of MG was not even aware of the size of the hedge posi-
tion, nor the forward position of MGRM. 632 In addition, management
did not understand the features of basis risk 633 and the possibility of
temporarily risking liquidity. At last, the supervisory committee of
MG terminated the contract; it could not grasp the features of the
hedging program of MGRM's subsidiary, which resulted in a loss that
could have been offset over time.634
Thus MGRM's loss is ascribed to the lack of management ability. In
other words, the causes of the loss were the operational risk of an
inappropriate system, the failure of control, and the failure of man-
agement; the market risk was not a cause.635 Therefore, the executive
of a company dealing in derivative instruments should build a proper
internal control system and have a thorough knowledge of the charac-
teristics of risk of the position on derivative instruments and the con-
sequences of any change in the market.
In short, MGRM failed to properly hedge the related risks. When
the price of crude oil dropped, there was a loss in the hedge position,
but a profit was realized in the long-term supply contract. During this
course, MGRM was exposed to the risk of liquidity, particularly the
funding risk. In other words, MGRM did not accurately understand
628. Id.
629. Digenan et al. Case Study, supra note 557, at 5.
630. Id.
631. Id.
632. Id.
633. The simplest meaning of "basis risk" is the price difference between the forward and spot
price. CHEW, supra note 65, at 118.
634. Digenan et al. Case Study, supra note 557, at 5.
635. See Scheerer, supra note 152, at 170-71 (defining operational risk and market risk). "Op-
erational risk is the possibility that a derivatives consumer's internal systems will fail to measure
adequately, monitor effectively, or control intelligently the risks to which the consumer is ex-
posed." Feder, supra note 134, at 727.
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the correlation between market risk, liquidity risk,636 and basis risk
from a financial risk perspective. It did not have specialists for deriva-
tive instruments. Because an enormous loss can result if the derivative
instruments are not properly used, building a risk control system,
along with securing specialists for derivative instruments, should be
basic premises.
The accounting treatment in Germany was a factor aggravating the
problem of holding company MG.637 While MG, the holding company
in Germany, was subject to the lower of cost or market, the United
States subsidiary company, MGRM, was subject to hedge account-
ing.638 In other words, MGRM reported only the profit from the long-
term supply contract, as the futures contract was recognized as a
hedge in which the loss was deferred; however, because MG was sub-
ject to the lower of cost or market, it only added to the current loss. In
addition, because netting was not permitted under the German ac-
counting standard, MG had to report an enormous loss. 639 If hedge
accounting treatment and netting640 had been permitted in Germany,
MG could have settled the loss of MGRM more rationally. This case
exemplifies the importance of maintaining systematic infra, such as
netting and standard of accounting treatment for the development of
the derivatives market. 641
636. Including market liquidity and funding liquidity risk, "Liquidity risk is 'the risk to earn-
ings or capital arising from a [firm's] inability to meet its obligations when they come due."'
Scheerer, supra note 152, at 167 (quoting the guidelines for national banks).
637. POITRAS, supra note 370, at 60 ("German accounting principles, which were applicable to
the parent corporation, required the classification of these variation margin payments as
losses.").
638. Digenan et al. Case Study, supra note 557, at 4.
639. Id.
640. According to Oliver Ireland, Associate General Counsel for the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System:
Netting refers to the right to set off, or net, claims between two or more parties to
arrive at a single obligation between the parties. In financial market transactions, net-
ting can serve to reduce the credit exposure of counterparties to a failed debtor and
thereby to limit "domino failures" and systemic risks. As an incident to limiting credit
exposure, the ability to net contributes to market liquidity by permitting more activity
between counterparties within prudent credit limits. This liquidity can be important in
minimizing market disruptions due to the failure of a market participant.
Proposed Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 123 (1999) (statement of Oliver
Ireland, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/testimony/1999/19990318.htm.
641. "[N]etting is generally not allowed under the Bankruptcy Code. [It] is possible in limited
cases subject to the judge-made doctrine of 'recoupment,' which permits a creditor to net two
contracts if they arise from the same transaction or occurrence." Edwards & Morrison, supra
note 384 at 117, n.101 (internal citations omitted).
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VII. BARINGS BANK STRADDLES AND ARBITRAGE OF STOCK
INDEX FUTURES TRANSACTIONS
In 1995, an incident occurred involving a British commercial bank,
Barings, that went bankrupt due to a huge loss from a derivative in-
strument transaction.642 Barings is representative of a situation where
the loss from derivative instruments was caused by a rogue trader.643
The following examines the strategy of derivative instruments sug-
gested by Nicholas Leeson and the process of concealing a loss, with a
focus on bureaucratic and organizational issues.
A. Background
Barings, which had earned a reputation for its conservative manage-
ment strategy and for being a trading bank of the British Royalty,
founded a subsidiary, Barings Futures Singapore ("BFS"), to branch
out into the futures market in Asia.644 In March of 1992, Nicholas
Leeson of the London branch was sent to BFS in Singapore as the
senior trader for the futures trading department. 645
Leeson was in charge of arbitrage using the price differences in Nik-
kei225 futures, dual listed on the Osaka Securities Exchange ("OSE")
and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange ("SIMEX"). 646
Generally, it was understood that the profit was low in the case of
arbitrage between exchanges due to the low risk, but Leeson was re-
porting a very high profit, which represented a very large proportion
of the total profit of Barings. 647 Thanks to the profit generated by
Leeson, the management of Barings enjoyed very high bonuses.648
As his reputation rose within the company, Leeson sold the large
scale Nikkei225 futures option by taking advantage of a blind point in
the internal control system.649 However, differing from Leeson's ex-
pectation, an earthquake hit Kobe, Japan in January of 1995 causing
the price index of stocks fell.650 As a result, a huge loss was expected,
with the position being increased to make up for the loss. 651 At last,
642. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 20.
643. See WHALEY, supra note 7, at 509.
644. STEPHEN FAY, THE COLLAPSE OF BARINOS 80 (1996).
645. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 21.
646. WHALEY, supra note 7, at 507.
647. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 22.
648. Id. at 25.
649. Id. at 22.
650. Id. at 24.
651. JORION III, supra note 297, at 37.
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Leeson's trade loss completely ate away the entire equity capital of
the Barings Group, leading to bankruptcy. 652
B. Arbitrage Transactions in Stock Index Futures and
Sale of Straddles
Leeson was in charge of the accounts settlement division of Barings,
where, after he was sent to BFS, he achieved a high profit by engaging
in arbitrage transactions653 on the Nikkei225 futures dual-listed on
OSE and SIMEX.654
[BFS], where ... Leeson conducted his unauthorized trading activ-
ity, had significantly contributed to Barings' overall profitability in
the years prior to its collapse. . . . [He] enhanced these traders' per-
formance through his 'switching activities'[,] .... [which] involved
inter-exchange arbitrage to improve the futures hedging positions of
Barings' Japanese traders.655
Here, the term switching "refers to Barings's specialized arbitrage ac-
tivity that 'involved the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same
futures contracts on different futures exchanges.' ",656
In arbitrage transactions, it is usual to expand the position to create
profits, as the profit per unit is very low. 657 Leeson's futures position
on both OSE and SIMEX was almost $7 billion.658 "Variations in the
trading systems enabled Leeson to perceive arbitrage opportunities
and to exploit their profitability, as well as to employ creative financ-
ing schemes, and evade regulatory agencies. ' 659
In July of 1992, due to a request by a trader in the London branch,
an 88888 account was opened to record all the trading errors.660 The
errors added up in the account in late 1992 covered 30 contracts in
total, with this loss being concealed by taking deductions from the
652. Id.
653. FAY, supra note 644, at 122 ("[I]t was known at Barings as the switching business."). See
also Vincent Presti, Barings Bar None: The Financial Service Agreement of the GATS and Its
Potential Impact on Derivatives Trading, 21 MD. J, INT'L L. & TRADE 145, 168 (1997) ("Usually,
an exchange member uses a cross trade to match buy and sell orders for the same contract at the
same price for two different customer accounts.").
654. In this transaction, "[a] trader follows prices on the two exchanges, seeking to purchase a
lower priced contract on one exchange while 'simultaneously' selling an otherwise identical
higher priced contract on the other exchange." POrrRAS, supra note 370, at 61.
655. Presti, supra note 653, at 164-66.
656. Id. at 166 n.145.
657. See Sco-rr & WELLONS, supra note 5, at 960.
658. Id. at 960.
659. Presti, supra note 653, at 166.
660. CHEW, supra note 65, at 232; The 88888 is a dummy account specially designed for client
support or for a financial company to settle trading errors. See WHALEY, supra note 7, at 506.
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fees. 661 However, as the number of trading errors increased beginning
in 1993 and became 420 contracts by mid-March, the loss amounted to
150,000 pounds.662 Both incompetent trading and raiding of his 88888
account made it possible for Leeson create this loss. 663
From 1994 on, Leeson continually asked for funds from headquar-
ters to settle the dummy account and finance the deposit on the fu-
tures position.664 In addition, he began to sell "straddles" 665 against
the Nikkei225 futures.
A major part of Leeson's trading strategy involved the sale of op-
tions on Nikkei-225 futures contracts . . . . The seller of an option
earns a premium in return for accepting the obligation to buy or sell
the underlying item at a stipulated strike price. If the option expires
"out-of-the-money," the option premium becomes the seller's
profit. If prices turn out to be more volatile than expected, however,
an option seller's potential losses are virtually unlimited.666
A short straddle is a strategy of writing both call options and put
options whose strike prices are the same; it is used when the price of
the underlying assets is expected to be stable.667 As the price of an
option reflects the expectations of the market on the price volatility of
661. "The Bank of England calculated that the cumulative loss on the secret 88888 account
from July 1992 to 6 February, 1995 amounted to £253 million." FAY, supra note 644, at 183.
662. "By the end of August [1992], the loss had built up to £320,000." FAY, supra note 644, at
92.
663. To note:
The unauthorised trading was concealed by a number of devices. These included the
suppression of account '88888' from Barings in London (which account was mentioned
only in the margin files and did not attract the attention of Barings in London); the
submission of falsified reports to London; the misrepresentation of the profitability of
BFS's trading; and a number of false trading transactions and accounting entries.
Bank of England, REPORT INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS: How
WERE THE MASSIVE LOSSES INCURRED? 2 (1995), http://www.numa.com/ref/baringslbar02.htm.
See also FAY, supra note 644, at 122-23; POITRAS, supra note 370, at 61.
664. FAY, supra note 644, at 98-99.
665. "A straddle is constructed by selling a call option and a put option with the same strike
price." STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 70; HULL, supra note 46, at 234.
666. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 22.
667. One advisor warned:
If a [derivatives] trader writes a straddle with a strike price of $25 and the price of the
stock jumps up to $50, the trader would be obligated to sell the stock for $25. If the
investor did not hold the underlying stock, he or she would be forced to buy it on the
market for $50 and sell it for $25 [under the agreement]. The short straddle is a very
risky strategy an investor uses when he or she believes that a stock's price will not move
up or down significantly. Because of its riskiness, the short straddle should be employed
only by advanced traders due to the unlimited amount of risk associated with a very
large move up or down.
Investopedia, Short Straddle, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortstraddle.asp (last visited
Feb. 10, 2008).
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the underlying assets,668 the buyers of straddles can earn a profit only
when the actual volatility of the market is less than the estimated fig-
ure in the option price. 669
When there is not much change in the price of underlying assets, the
straddle sellers take the premiums of both the put- and call-option at
the same time. In other words, Leeson attempted to make up for the
trade loss with the premiums by selling straddles. While the profit in
Leeson's strategy was limited to the sum of premiums of call- and put-
options if the stock market in Japan was stable, there was no loss in
case the volatility in the stock market increased greatly. By the end of
1994, Leeson had sold about 30,000 straddles, 670 but as a seller of
short straddles, for some reason, he had the wrong direction in the
market.671
C. Results of Use of Derivative Instruments
The stock market in Japan declined deeply when the earthquake
occurred in Kobe, Japan on January 17, 1995.672 For the next five days,
the Nikkei225 index dropped 1,500 points, and Leeson's option posi-
tion incurred a loss of 68 million pounds. 673 To make up for the loss,
Leeson purchased a large quantity of Nikkei225 futures while simulta-
neously selling a large number of futures on the Japanese government
bonds in anticipation of a rise in the interest rate in Japan.674 This
strategy was effective for the short term. The Japanese stock market
recovered over 1,000 points by February 6, and Leeson thereafter
seemed to benefit.675 As of February 6, Leeson's loss amounted to 253
million pounds, which, compared to the early loss in 1995, represented
a 20% increase. 676 However, the stock market began to decline again
and Leeson's loss also diminished.677
Despite the decline in the stock market, Leeson continued to in-
crease the size of his positions to make up for the loss. 678 As of Febru-
ary 23, he was in possession of approximately 61,000 Nikkei225
futures long positions679 and 26,000 short positions on Japanese gov-
668. See Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 24.
669. Id.
670. Id. See also POITRAS, supra note 370, at 62.
671. FAY, supra note 644, at 143.
672. Id. at 153-154.
673. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 24. See also FAY, supra note 644, at 154.
674. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 24.
675. Id.
676. Id.
677. Id.
678. Id.
679. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 24.
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ernment bonds.680 In 1995, Leeson's futures positions were 49% of the
incomplete Nikkei225 futures contracts for March, 24% of the incom-
plete contracts for June, and as much as 88% of the incomplete fu-
tures contracts on the government bonds. 681
The decline of the stock index was linked to the high degree of li-
quidity risk that required further funding to transact.682 To settle the
margin call on the large scale futures positions, Leeson kept asking for
funds from the Barings's headquarters in London. 683 As the sizes of
the requests became abnormally large, the headquarters began to look
into the accounts of BFS. 684 During the month of February, Barings
supplied a total of 742 million pounds at Leeson's request, but it did
not even get a report on the use of the funds-just an automatically
remitted sum. 685
The investigation revealed that the funds were being used to make
up for the variation margin of Leeson's fraudulent transactions.686
Aware of Barings's inability to satisfy the margin call, OSE and
SIMEX began to control all the incomplete contracts of BFS.687 Par-
ticipants in the market began to sense the exchanges would liquidate a
large-scale position, which would further decrease the stock index.
Barings's loss had already consumed its equity capital and the bank
went bankrupt. 688
The Bank of England's Board of Banking Supervision stepped for-
ward to investigate Barings's unanticipated loss. 689 The total loss re-
sulting from Leeson's transactions was 927 million pounds
(approximately $1.4 billion), which was more than twice the equity
capital of Barings (440 million pounds). 690 Barings had experienced
such a risk before from its millions of loans in Argentina in the 1890s,
but it had gotten out of trouble thanks to a consortium led by the
Bank of England.691 However, as there was no investor showing an
680. Id.
681. Id.
682. Feder, supra note 134, at 725 ("Liquidity risk is the risk that a party will be unable to
transact without extraordinary cost or loss due to a lack of immediately available resources or
prospects.").
683. FAY, supra note 644, at 184.
684. See McKown & Purcell, supra note 11, at 123.
685. CHEW, supra note 65, at 239.
686. FAY, supra note 644, at 184.
687. Id. at 156-58.
688. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 25.
689. Id. at 25.
690. Id.
691. Id. at 20.
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intention to purchase Barings immediately, the Bank of England de-
cided not to provide financial support.692
At last on February 26, 1995, Barings entered into a liquidation pro-
cedure similar to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.693 The
creditors of Barings received 5 cents on the dollar and the sharehold-
ers ended up bearing all the loss. 694 Part of the additional loss was
borne by ING of Netherlands who assumed it in buying Barings for
one pound.695 For offering false information that could be injurious to
the reputation of inspectors of Barings and continuously deceiving the
SIMEX, Leeson was sentenced to 6 years and 6 months in prison.696
D. Implications
The first reason for this failure was the management issue. Not only
did the Barings's management have very superficial knowledge re-
garding derivative instruments, it did not even show an interest in the
details of transactions. 697 It was totally unaware of how Leeson had
made such a huge profit,698 how the astronomical funds were being
used, or how the risk was related to Barings. 699 Instead, the manage-
ment wanted only to share in the profit Leeson made. In other words,
in the case of Barings, the primary cause of failure can be traced to the
moral hazard of management. 700
In 1994, the profit from Leeson's investment was 20% of the total
profit of Barings,7 1 which made it possible for the management and
Leeson to enjoy high bonuses. The management continued to expect
high bonuses and put no restraints on Leeson's investment activi-
ties. 702 In addition, in supplying the requested funds, management at
headquarters did not ask for details regarding the use of the funds
despite the fact that no specific information was provided except for
692. Id.
693. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 20-21.
694. Of course, these amounts are notional upon the accounting result. Subsequently, "ING
Bank acquired Barings for a nominal sum, thus ensuring that all depositors and trade creditors
were fully protected." TONY LATTER, THE CAUSES AND MANAGEMENT OF BANKING CRISES 38
(1997).
695. JORION III, supra note 297, at 38.
696. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 26. See also JORION III, supra note 297, at 38 ("[He] spent
43 months in a Singapore jail and was released in 1999.").
697. McKown & Purcell, supra note 11, at 122.
698. WHALEY, supra note 7, at 509.
699. See ERisk, Case Study: Barings, ERIsK.coM, http://www.erisk.com/Learning/CaseS-
tudies.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
700. JORION III, supra note 297, at 38.
701. FAY, supra note 644, at 123. "In the first six months of 1994, [BFS] swelled the profits of
Baring Securities in London by £6.7 million." Id.
702. McKown & Purcell, supra note 11, at 122.
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the reports showing funds related to clients' accounts. 70 3 However, in
February of 1995, on the internal and external audit report, the ac-
count of BFS reported an abnormal position amounting to 50 million
pounds. 70 4 Even at that time, management took no measures. 70 5 In
other words, the management personnel of Barings pursued only their
own interests, failing to supervise. 70 6
In addition, Barings made people aware of the importance of an
internal control system.70 7 In 1992, Barings had a new internal control
system, and, by 1995, the system was completely established and in
full force.70 8 Nonetheless, while engaged in transactional duties,
Leeson also took part in back office work.70 9 Generally, transaction
work and settlement work are separated, and the settlement depart-
ment undertakes an independent review of the records of transac-
tions. 710 However, due to Barings's inappropriate internal control
system, Leeson not only was able to seize an opportunity beyond his
vested power, but he also was able to continue to increase his posi-
tion.711 The problem with the internal control system was reported
once on the internal audit report of BFS in 1994.712 In January of
1995, rumor spread in the OSE that the BFS position was excessive,
which BFS confirmed, but, again, management failed to take any ap-
propriate measures. 713
To avoid a claim for breach of duty, management should have
grasped the details of transactions for the derivative instruments the
company managed, established an effective internal control system,
and constantly monitored it.714 Such an internal control system should
have clearly stipulated both the scope of work and to whom responsi-
bility belonged. If there were vulnerable points in the internal control
system or problems in the transactions of derivative instruments, top
703. FAY, supra note 644, at 184.
704. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 32.
705. WHALEY, supra note 7, at 510.
706. CHEW, supra note 65, at 234-35, 244.
707. JORION III, supra note 297, at 37; STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 73.
708. FAY, supra note 644, at 123-24.
709. Id. at 131.
710. CHEW, supra note 65, at 232.
711. McKown & Purcell, supra note 11, at 123.
712. Scorr & WELLONS, supra note 5, at 993; CHEW, supra note 65 at 233 ("[Leeson's] dual
responsibility for both the front and back offices was 'an excessive concentration of powers'[:
t]he report warned that there was a significant general risk that the controls could be overridden
by [him].").
713. CHEW, supra note 65, at 235.
714. See id. at 234 ("Barings' [sic] senior management had a very superficial knowledge of
derivatives and did not want to probe too deeply into an area that was bringing in the profits.").
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management and the supervisory committee should have stepped in
quickly to cope with the situation.
A second issue was the problems of exchanges. Generally speaking,
on the exchange for derivative instruments, strict restrictions are in
place regarding the size of the positions to prevent a large-scale
loss.715 However, the SIMEX eased the position limit for Barings in
consideration of Barings's international reputation. 716 Although it was
very unusual for an exchange to offer such a preferential treatment,
there was a reason the SIMEX did so. 717 As the SIMEX listed both
Nikkei225 futures and the Japanese government bonds after they were
listed on the OSE, the SIMEX was in direct competition with the
OSE.718 In the 1990s, as Barings was expanding its regions in the capi-
tal market of East Asia, from the standpoint of the SIMEX, Barings
was an attractive investment to encourage, even with the cost of eas-
ing the risk control regulations. 719 However, after Barings's bank-
ruptcy, the SIMEX was criticized for its lack of compliance with the
standard of risk control on the exchange. 720
In addition, the disclosure system on the exchanges and communi-
cation between exchanges were also problematic. 72' While the OSE
disclosed the details of transactions by the major traders, the SIMEX
did not make such a disclosure. 722 The OSE had a rule that investors
maintaining a large position must disclose the details of other transac-
tions that could offset the risk.723 Though Leeson claimed he was en-
gaged in transactions that could offset the exposure of positions on the
SIMEX, because the SIMEX did not disclose the details of the trans-
actions, there was no way anyone could have known. By having taken
advantage of this blind point in the disclosure system on the exchange,
Leeson was able to maintain large positions on both exchanges.
715. See JORION III, supra note 297, at 37.
716. See, e.g., FAY, supra note 644, at 180.
717. Id. at 133-34.
718. Id.
719. Id. at 80. Fay continues:
Baring Securities had been operating in Singapore since 1987, with its activities cen-
tered on the stock exchange,... [but] it did not conduct business on SIMEX. By 1992,
the volume of futures-and-options business was growing fast, and it seemed profligate
to pay commission to a competitor. Baring therefore applied in February for clearing
membership of SIMEX.
Id.
720. Id. at 275 ("SIMEX turned a blind eye to Leeson's cross-trades until February 1995, and
even then intervened only after other traders had complained that Leeson was breaking the
rules.").
721. See STEINHERR, supra note 241, at 74.
722. See, e.g., FAY, supra note 644, at 92 (introducing a rule application).
723. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 28.
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Recently, the major stock exchanges in the world have faced large
changes, thus intensifying competition.724 Such a phenomenon has be-
come a sufficient motive for every exchange to ease risk control stan-
dards such as increasing its position and relaxing its disclosure
requirements to secure the upper hand.725 However, exchanges should
strictly comply with the risk control standards to prevent obstruction
of a transparent stock market; at the same time, exchanges should
maintain competitiveness. In the case of stock index futures or options
of an emerging market traded on an exchange-base in other countries
or overseas exchanges products listed and being traded on the domes-
tic exchange, it is necessary to systematically establish the channel of
communication between exchanges to share information and cope
with speculative transactions.
The third implication is the problem of supervision. In the British
banking supervision system, banks engaged in risky transactions with
a possibility of loss corresponding to over 25% of the bank's capital
are required to make a report to the Bank of England in advance. 726
However, in the Barings's situation, some administrators at the Bank
of England did not report to the superior office and unofficially gave
Barings the power to expand the transactions exceeding the limit on
both the OSE and SIMEX.727 While 25% of Barings's capital was
about 100 million pounds, the size of the error account of Leeson al-
ready exceeded 127 million pounds.728 The exemption granted by the
Bank of England allowed Leeson to continue making unlawful trans-
actions. Because of Barings, a restructuring of the banking supervision
system by the Bank of England was proposed.729
In addition, Barings became the start of the recognition of the need
for a revolution in the transactions of derivative instruments, particu-
larly futures transactions, by the regulatory authorities and partici-
pants in the market. In May 1995, the representatives of regulatory
authorities from 16 countries attended a meeting for revising the law
concerning futures transactions and announced the Windsor Declara-
724. Randy Grossman, The Inevitable Exchange Consolidation, FINANCE TECH, at *1-2 (JUN.
16, 2006), http://www.financetech.com/featured/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=189401900.
725. See Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 1263-64.
726. Kuprianov, supra note 563, at 33. See also Bank of England, Supervision by the Bank,
INT'L FIN. RISK INSTITUTE $ 13.62, available at http://riskinstitute.ch/135290.htm (last visited Feb.
10, 2008).
727. FAY, supra note 644, at 109-113.
728. This error account cannot be reconciled immediately if it has only just been set up.
CHEW, supra note 65, at 232, 238.
729. Betty M. Ho, Rethinking the System of Sanctions in the Corporate and Securities Law of
Hong Kong, 42 McGILL L.J. 603, 630 (1997).
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tion.730 This Declaration called for getting the regulations ready to al-
low for quick liquidation of positions by the regulatory authorities and
promotion of communication plans between each country's regulatory
authorities.731
The Futures Industry Association had a discussion on the risk con-
trol practices by the exchanges for derivative instruments and the
problems of protecting customers, 732 insisting the bankruptcy law in
each country be reviewed and the areas of conflicts be adjusted. 733
Moreover, to facilitate communication between exchanges, the impor-
tance of regular monitoring of the "clearinghouse" members and the
need of accumulation of integrated transactions data were also
pointed out. 734
VIII. INTEREST RATE OPTIONS AND SWAPTIONS OF NATWEST
NatWest Capital Markets ("NatWest") was a subsidiary of the Na-
tional Westminster Bank, one of the top four banks in England for
corporate financing and investment banking.735 It was disclosed that
NatWest lost 90 million pounds from the transactions of interest rate
swaps and swaptions736 in February 1997.7 37 NatWest's scandal began
with a "systematic mispricing of various options and swaptions by
traders in its risk management department. ' 738 This case, which oc-
curred while supervision on derivative instruments was being tight-
ened after Barings, further emphasized the importance of supervision
of derivative instruments.
730. See AUTHORITIES, WINDSOR DECLARATION, available at http://www.cftc.gov/interna-
tional/currentinternationalinitiatives/oiawindsordeclaration.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
731. CHEW, supra note 65, at 232, 238.
732. FIA GLOBAL TASK FORCE ON FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CUS-
TOMERS 1-3 (2005), available at http://www.futuresindustry.org/downloads/globtf-rec4cust.pdf.
733. FIA GLOBAL TASK FORCE ON FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGU-
LATORS, EXCHANGES AND CLEARINGHOUSES 4, available at http://www.futuresindustry.org/
downloads/globtf-rec4reg.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
734. "The role of a clearinghouse is to stand between the buyer and the seller and guarantee
the transaction of each party." WHALEY, supra note 7, at 21.
735. Eric Wolfe, Case Study: NatWest Markets, ERISK.COM, Oct. 2001, http://www.erisk.com/
Learning/CaseStudiesNatWestCaseStudy.pdf.
736. See Gibson, supra note 1, at 537 ("[Slwaptions are options on swaps that give a buyer the
right, but not the obligation, to purchase a swap contract at a specified date."); HULL, supra note
41, at 625 (describing the use of swaptions).
737. Wolfe, supra note 735, at 2.
738. Id. at 1.
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A. Background
In the 1990s, NatWest, like other banks, was looking to find growth
in the derivatives market, particularly in the interest rate options mar-
ket to transform itself into an investment bank.7 39 The root problem
of the failure of NatWest was ascribed to its mismarking of exchange-
traded options price and swaptions by the risk control department. 740
Kyriacos Papouis, the trader in the risk control department, was in
charge of options and swaptions transactions regarding Dutch marks
("DEM") and British sterling ("GBP").7 41 To conceal the loss from
these transactions, he added overvalued prices of option positions on
the bank account. 742 Papouis's supervisor, Neil Dodgson, who was in
charge of sterling interest rate options and swaptions, also erroneously
recorded the value of option positions. 743 The loss due to these two
wrong additions of option prices reached 90 million pounds.744
B. Structure of Derivative Instruments
Implied volatility curves and determination of the option prices
were the first issues in this case.745 One of the major parameters for
determining option prices was the implied volatility of the underlying
assets. Implied volatility reflects the expectation of the market partici-
pants as to the volatility of the underlying assets during the option
period. Unlike other determinants used for valuing an option, such as
strike price, risk-free interest rate, maturity, or the price of the under-
lying assets, the underlying assets need to be estimated because the
implied volatility cannot be observed; thus, it bears an inherent risk of
manipulation or erroneous calculation.
The Black-Scholes model, which is a classical option pricing model,
assumes implied volatility is the same for various options with identi-
cal underlying assets.7 46 In other words, the prices of options with dif-
ferent maturities and strike prices will be determined under the same
739. Id.
740. Securities and Futures Authority, Board Notice 545, FAS.GOV.UK, May 18, 2000, at 3,
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/additional/545.pdf [hereinafter SFA Board Notice].
741. Id. at 1. See also Cohen, supra note 17, at 2001 n.40 ("The swaption[,] an option on a
swap, combines the characteristics of a swap and an option, giving a party the right to enter into
a swap if it chooses to, without forcing an immediate design.").
742. JORION III, supra note 297, at 494.
743. SFA Board Notice, supra note 740, at 1.
744. Id. at 2.
745. See David Shirreff, Lessons from NatWest, EUROMONEY, May, 1997, at 42 (reporting
NatWest's announcement).
746. Saikat Nandi & Daniel F. Waggoner, Issues in Hedging Options Positions, ECONOMIC
REVIEW, Jan. 1, 2000, at *1-3, available at http://www.encyclopedia.com/printable.aspxid=lGl:
63503197.
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implied volatility if the underlying assets are the same. However, on
the actual markets, the implied volatility changes according to the
strike prices of the options.747 Depending on the level of at-the-money
("ATM"), in-the-money ("ITM"), and out-of-the-money ("OTM"),
option investors apply different implied volatilities 748 due to the dif-
ferent expectations of investors participating in the option markets.749
For example, if the stock market is likely to decline rapidly, the im-
plied volatility of the OTM put-option will be higher than those of
ATM or ITM.75° Therefore, option traders and risk managers must
clearly grasp the implied volatility curves and reflect them in evaluat-
ing the options.
If a price corresponding to the implied volatility curve in the market
is not offered, the option price may be erroneously fixed.7 5' For exam-
ple, consider a case where the average implied volatility is applied to
all the strike prices without taking the implied volatility curve into
consideration. There is a positive correlation between the price of an
option and the implied volatility. Therefore, if the actual volatility of
OTM is higher than that of ATM, the value of OTM determined
based on the average implied volatility would be too low and the
value of ATM would be too high.752
The manipulation of volatility and exchange of accounts for con-
cealing the loss in option transactions were the next issues. Securities
and Futures Authority ("SFA")753 stipulated that the trading positions
of derivative instruments should be evaluated every day.754 Accord-
747. "This is the tendency, empirically observed in the market, for options that move in or out
of the money to go through more violent price fluctuations at the extremes than the theoretical
Black-Scholes models predict." Shirreff, supra note 395, at 42.
748. See HULL, supra note 46, at 188; CHEW, supra note 65, at 16.
749. "To allow the investor to shift that loss is akin to compensating a gambler who loses a bet
after the gambler has had full opportunity to negotiate the terms of the wager consistent with his
or her goals." Gibson, supra note 1, at 531. "Just as a gambler must assume his or her losses as
part of the wager, an investor who trades derivatives must assume responsibility for the transac-
tion he or she chooses to enter." Id.
750. See Gurdip Bakshi, Charles Cao, Zhiwu Chen, Do Call Prices and the Underlying Stock
Always Move in the Same Direction? 13 THE REV. OF FIN. STUD. 549, 565 (2000).
751. Wolfe, supra note 735, at 2.
752. Id.
753. Note:
SFA is the regulatory organization established under the Financial Services Act of 1986
with responsibility for regulating members of the organized City investment markets,
i.e. the stock market, eurobond, financial futures, commodity futures markets and also
corporate finance specialists and off-market traders. Around 1,350 firms are regulated
by the SFA.
Securities and Futures Authority, SFA Disciplines Natwest and 2 Individuals, FAS.GOV.UK, May
18, 2000, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/additional/sfa008-00.pdf.
754. SFA Board Notice, supra note 740, at 2.
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ingly, at NatWest, the option traders, including Papouis and Dodgson,
were providing the information on the price evaluations to the back
office at 11 a.m. each day.755 "It was the responsibility of the operating
department to input the data provided by the trader[s]" 756 and to rec-
oncile the values by making a comparison to those of exchanges; it
was the finance department's responsibility to supervise whether the
trading positions were being independently evaluated and the posi-
tions properly evaluated. 757 However, beginning in October 1996, the
finance department took charge of reconciling the values.758 Under
these circumstances, the potential existed for the finance department
to fail to detect the option pricing by traders on their own due to the
lack of price reconciliation ability, and, consequently, the traders spot-
ted a chance to manipulate the information on option prices. 759
Between March 1995 and December 1996, Papouis concealed the
loss due to the overvaluing of the option position on the
deutschmark. 760 By March 1995, the concealed loss amounted to 1.1
million pounds, reaching 22.4 million pounds at the end of
December.761
In February 1996, Papouis heard from the staff at the back office of
NatWest that the option price on the mark on the exchange at the
back office had a higher estimate than the market price. 762 Papouis
reduced the value of the option accordingly with the resulting loss
amounting to 24.16 million pounds.7 63 In addition, to conceal the loss,
he exchanged the books (accounts) for options on the deutschmark
and swaptions. 764
The reason he used such methods was they were easy to conceal the
loss in case of deutschmark swaptions, a derivative instrument whose
price calculation was relatively more complex than deutschmark op-
tions.765 As a result, on the options book there was a profit, but on the
swaptions book there was a loss made by manipulating the volatility
and increasing the value of the swaptions position.766 Before retiring
from NatWest, Papouis consistently manipulated the volatility of
755. Id.
756. Id.
757. Id.
758. Id.
759. See SFA Board Notice, supra note 740, at 2.
760. Id.
761. Id.
762. Id.
763. Id.
764. See SFA Board Notice, supra note 740, at 2.
765. Wolfe, supra note 735, at 3.
766. One industrial reporter states:
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swaptions and options on the deutschmark to increase the value of the
positions until December 1996.767 NatWest, in turn, suffered a loss:
The magnitude of the loss may have been a reflection of the length
of time it took the bank to pick up the inappropriate calibration.
Observers suggest that the incorrect volatility may have been used
on the book since late 1994, or about when the bank entered this
particular business.768
In February 1997, after the mispricing was disclosed, the book value
of swaptions and deutschmark options fell by 55.6 million pounds. 769
In addition, between December 1995 and February 1996, Dodgson
continued to record the options on pounds higher than the market
prices. 770 In most cases, the price differences were considerable. In
February 1996, Dodgson began to manipulate the volatility of options
to adjust the option prices on the book similar to the market prices. 77'
After such price manipulation was disclosed, the value of the options
book for pounds dropped by 24.6 million pounds. 772
In February 1997, through an internal audit, NatWest discovered
the discrepancy in the deutschmark swaptions book. 773 The investiga-
tion revealed that options on the deutschmark and pound, as well as
the prices of swaptions had been overestimated.77 4 About 90 million
pounds of loss had been concealed with the deutschmark options
book loss at 55.6 million pounds while the loss on the pound options
book reached 24.6 million pounds.77 5 As a result, around February
1997 when the person in charge of the back office of NatWest discov-
NatWest won't detail the portfolio, but a market consensus believes NatWest's sterling
and Deutschemark options dealers were creating the illusion of profit by matching op-
tions they had sold, either at strike prices which had since gone out of the money, or
which were initially out of the money, against options of other maturities and perhaps
at other strike prices .... The illusion of profit can also be created by matching options
against swaptions. Swaptions have a lower volatility since they are a series of interest
rate options. Buying swaptions and selling options can bring a net gain in premium and
show a superficially matched position. If a bank in this position is indifferent to the
volatility mismatch it is also indifferent to pricing out of line with the market. In the
rarefied world of out-of-the-money options there often is no liquid market.
Shirreff, supra note 395, at 46.
767. Wolfe, supra note 735, at 3.
768. Margaret Elliott, Controlling Model Risk, DERIVATIVES STRATEGY, June 1997, at *4,
available at http://www.derivativesstrategy.com/magazine/archive/1997/O697feal.asp.
769. SFA Board Notice, supra note 740, at 2.
770. Id.
771. Id.
772. Id.
773. Id.
774. SFA Board Notice, supra note 740, at 2.
775. Id.
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ered the price difference between the market price on the exchange
and the price on the system, the situation was already out of hand.776
C. Results of Use of Derivative Instruments
The manipulation of option price evaluations and exchange of
books for derivative instruments to cover the loss by Papouis was dis-
covered at the end of February 1997 after he had transferred to Bear
Stearns.777 Dodgson also resigned after it was revealed he consistently
record mismarked option prices.778 The loss resulting from the manip-
ulation of option prices by these two traders amounted to about 90
million pounds. 779 Luckily, it appeared no personal gains had been
made through collusion with a third party, nor had anything occurred
that caused any damage to the customers' interests.780 However, after
these facts were disclosed, the business reputation of NatWest man-
agement as to its investors and shareholders suffered a blow.78 1
In May 2000, after a long investigation of SFA, the risk control sys-
tem of banks as well as the internal control system was subject to criti-
cism. 782 Between January 1994 and February 1997, the internal and
external investigators discovered that problems with the internal con-
trol system relating to the transaction details of Papouis had already
been reported to the management. 783
The report noted a difference between the market price and the
estimated prices of NatWest; additionally, an independent estimation
of the transaction positions had not been properly made.78 4 Further-
more, no internal control system existed because the division of oper-
ations between the trading department and the back office was
unclear.785
SFA imposed penalties of 420,000 pounds on the company for its
negligence. 786 SFA penalized Papouis and Dodgson by fining them
50,000 pounds and 5,000 pounds, respectively, for violations of fair
trading and breach of their fiduciary duties as supervisors, it also sub-
776. Id.
777. Wolfe, supra note 735, at 1.
778. Id.
779. See SFA Board Notice, supra note 740, at 2.
780. Id. at 4.
781. Wolfe, supra note 735, at 1.
782. Id.
783. Id. at 4.
784. Id.
785. Id. at 1.
786. SFA Board Notice, supra note 740, at 1.
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jected them to disciplinary action. 787 However, what was more damag-
ing was not the financial loss, but the loss of National Westminster's
reputation. In the end, NatWest was sold to BT without restoration of
its lost reputation; the holding company National Westminster also
was taken over by the Royal Bank of Scotland in February 2000.788
D. Implications
The NatWest failure occurred during tightened supervision of deriv-
ative instruments due to the Barings case, again calling for recognition
of its importance. The cause of NatWest's failure in the internal risk
control is due to the lack of a clear division of work between the trad-
ing department and the back office. 789 "The other factor that shines
out of the NatWest affair is the seeming lack of consistency in the
inputs used by the bank." 790 Because Papouis provided the back office
with the implied volatility required for evaluation of the market prices
of daily options and swaptions, he was able to manipulate the option
prices.
To prevent such price manipulation, these parameters should have
been checked by an independent department.791 Particularly, as com-
pared to other financial assets, in the valuation of the option, its im-
plied volatility is an important factor, but one impossible to observe.
Its unique characteristics, including price evaluation mode, data, and
values from the model, must be confirmed individually. In other
words, for risk control over the derivative instruments to work, the
functions and responsibility must be clearly identified between the
787. Id.
788. Wolfe, supra note 735, at 4.
789. See Lindholm, supra note 451, at 103. Earlier the benefit of the internal risk control
system was pointed out in that it:
[C]an dramatically reduce banks' credit losses by [] swaps to reflect the amount of
default risk assumed .... Moreover, internal risk control systems that set maximum
losses on any single transaction help to prevent losses from derivatives traders or bank-
ers trying to hide failed deals. Thus, by following the self-discipline imposed by internal
risk control systems, market participants effectively control counterparty default risk.
Id.
790. Elliott, supra note 768, at *4 (referring to Gotham Derivatives' Ullah , Elliott noted that
[ilIf flat volatility was used in the sterlinglDeutschemark book, why was not it used in the ster-
ling/dollar book or Deutschemarkldollar book?").
791. See Scheerer, supra note 152, at 164. "It is generally recommended that counterparty
credit risk be controlled through a formal and independent credit process. ... U.S. and interna-
tional banking regulators have identified credit risk as the most significant risk associated with
the financial derivatives activities of banks." Id. However, it should be emphasized that the inter-
nal supervision of the financial institution is the first order of business.
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trading department and back office, and an independent evaluation
procedure for positions must be established. 792
In addition, the case of NatWest again made people aware of the
importance of cultivating and ensuring specialists regarding derivative
instruments. Although the global derivatives market is consistently
growing, there is a lack of professionals who can completely grasp the
special features of derivative instruments and use them appropriately.
This suggests the importance of establishing a specialized risk control
system and ensuring it is staffed by professionals who can efficiently
maintain the system. 793
Most of NatWest's loss resulted from not properly carrying out the
valuation of the options on the exchange. 794 As for OTC options, esti-
mation of their values was not easy because they were complex deriv-
ative instruments; however, for options on the exchange whose prices
were disclosed on the concerned exchanges, estimation was not as
difficult.
Therefore, there should be recognition that OTC derivative instru-
ments are likely to cause big losses, but, historically, many occasions
exist where enormous losses also resulted from simple derivative in-
struments on the exchanges. 795 Therefore, as to risk control, special
attention must be also given to the derivative instruments on the
exchanges. 796
In conclusion, NatWest began to make people understand the im-
portance of loss of corporate reliance and reputation instead of focus-
ing on the size of the loss. The loss itself did not doom NatWest, but
the loss of NatWest's trustworthiness due to the manipulation of op-
792. See Shirreff, supra note 745, at 44 (diagnosing the problem and suggesting different
causation).
793. "[A]ny good risk controller should be able to generate and calibrate from the market, a
price matrix which within a few basis points of actual market volatilities. The fact that NatWest's
hole was so big means that it wasn't due to poor calibration of its trading or risk management
models . I..." d. at 1-2.
794. See Elliott, supra note 768, at *4. One derivatives industry expert argues that "[i]f the
bank had used different volatilities for each strike, a so-called volatility smile, the book would
have been priced more closely with the market and NatWest wouldn't have incurred the mispric-
ing loss." Id.
795. Industry case studies are available at http://www.erisk.com/Learning/CaseStudies.asp.
796. International Monetary Market President McDonough made the following remarks:
The public needs to know generally about the role that derivatives play in today's econ-
omy and specifically about how derivatives affect the financial condition of the firms in
whose securities they invest .... Thus, all participants in derivatives activities have a
shared interest in providing the public with a better understanding of these instruments,
regardless of the specific markets in which the instruments trade.
McDonough Address, supra note 416, at *5-6.
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tion prices led to the sale, not only of NatWest, but of its holding com-
pany as well.
IX. IMPLICATIONS OF THESE FAILURES IN THE ANALYSIS OF OTC
& EXCHANGE-BASED DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS
A. The Systematic Infra of OTC Derivative Instruments
From the analysis of the series of derivatives-market-failure cases
discussed earlier, it can be inferred systematic improvement to the
concerned securities and banking industries, discussed infra, is neces-
sary to minimize the possibility of failure in the use of derivative in-
struments. The accounting treatment of OTC derivative instruments
and regulations concerning netting is representative of the discussion
infra related to OTC derivatives. 797
As seen in the cases of P&G, Gibson Greetings,798 and MGRM,799
to induce sound use of OTC derivative instruments, it is necessary to
maintain the standards of accounting treatment for derivative instru-
ments. In the United States, the FASB established the standard for
accounting for certain derivative instruments and hedging activities,
No. 133, which became effective on June 15, 2000.800 This standard
sets a consistent guideline for the accounting treatment of derivative
instruments, the treatment of hedge accounting, and the problems of
disclosure.801 First, as to derivative instruments, all the companies are
required to record all the derivative instruments as assets or debts on
797. Derivatives "can help manage market and price risks for investors as well as for issuers of
securities." Id. at *3. However, unless accompanied by accounting integrity and disclosure, this is
nothing but a visionary project that will soon collapse. In his address McDonough emphasized
that:
One of the most important efforts that the financial industry should undertake is to
improve accounting and disclosure practices .... Accounting and disclosure practices
should ensure that an institution's derivatives positions are meaningfully integrated
into an overall view of the firm's financial condition and exposure to financial risks....
A common feature of recent financial crises, including those involving derivatives, is
how financial innovation has made traditional accounting measures of leverage almost
meaningless. Financial derivatives by their very nature can make a firm's true leverage
be far higher than it appears in traditional accounting statements or management re-
ports .... A critical challenge facing the financial industry today is how to describe
leverage in meaningful ways in accounting and disclosure statements.
Id. at *6-7
798. See supra Part III.C.
799. See supra Part VI.D.
800. See FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING No. 133, supra note 254, at 6.
801. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
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the financial statements at fair value, 802 and companies' estimated
profits and losses should be reflected in the current term.80 3
The International Accounting Standards Board ("IASB") that sets
international accounting standards created the IAS 39 Financial In-
struments: Recognition and Measurement in December of 1998,
under which derivative instruments, 80 4 all financial assets 80 5 and
debts806 are to be estimated at fair market price. 80 7
In the countries of all global financial market participants, either
the Financial Supervisory Service or Accounting Institute should pro-
802. See FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING No. 133, supra note 254, at 15-16 T
20.
803. See FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING No. 133, supra note 254, at 18
22.a.
804. It is noted that:
Common Examples of Financial Instruments within the Scope of IAS 39 are: (i) cash,
(ii) demand and time deposits, (iii) commercial paper, (iv) accounts, notes, and loans
receivable and payable, (v) debt and equity securities. These are financial instruments
from the perspectives of both the holder and the issuer. This category includes invest-
ments in subsidiaries, associates, and joint ventures, (vi) asset backed securities such as
collateralized mortgage obligations, repurchase agreements, and securitized packages
of receivables, and (vii) derivatives, including options, rights, warrants, futures con-
tracts, forward contracts, and swaps.
IAS Plus, IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, http://www.iasplus.com/
standard/ias39.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2008) (summarizing International Accounting Standard
39). Under the ISA 39:
A derivative is a financial instrument: whose value changes in response to the change in
an underlying variable such as an interest rate, commodity or security price, or index;
that requires no initial investment, or one that is smaller than would be required for a
contract with similar response to changes in market factors; and that is settled at a
future date.
Id.
805. "IAS 39 requires financial assets to be classified in one of the following categories: (i)
financial assets at fair value through profit or loss, (ii) available-for-sale financial assets, (iii)
loans and receivables, and (iv) held-to-maturity investments." Id.
806. It is noted that:
IAS 39 recognizes two classes of financial liabilities: [lAS 39.47] (i) financial liabilities
at fair value through profit or loss. (ii) other financial liabilities measured at amortized
cost using the effective interest method. The category of financial liability at fair value
through profit or loss has two subcategories: (i) Designated. A financial liability that is
designated by the entity as a liability at fair value through profit or loss upon initial
recognition. (ii) Held for trading. A financial liability classified as held for trading, such
as an obligation for securities borrowed in a short sale, which have to be returned in the
future.
Id.
807. "Fair value is the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled,
between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm's length transaction. IAS 39 provides a hierar-
chy to be used in determining the fair value for a financial instrument: [IAS 39 Appendix A,
paragraphs AG69-82]." Id. "Initially, financial assets and liabilities should be measured at fair
value (including transaction costs, for assets and liabilities not measured at fair value through
profit or loss)." Id.
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vide for systematic accounting regulations of OTC derivative instru-
ments and of structured bonds with characteristics similar to OTC
derivative instruments. In particular, the definition of hedge account-
ing and its acknowledged range are expected to have a direct influ-
ence on the promotion of OTC derivatives markets.
As seen in LTCM, 808 to prevent failure in the use of OTC derivative
instruments on the individual corporate level and its spread into the
financial system, clear regulations must be made in the bankruptcy
law regarding netting. 809 In U.S. bankruptcy law, for safety considera-
tions in the transactions of OTC derivative instruments, financial con-
tracts with the right to exercise the offsetting power are separately
listed and approved due to the exemption from the application of the
automatic stay.810 In emerging market countries, in case of default on
808. See supra Part IV.E.
809. In the United States, the systemic risk in the financial market may be somewhat avoided
by amendment of the Bankruptcy Code.
Prior to the enactment of the [Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of] 2005 act ("2005 Act"), those safe harbor transactions were already granted
special protections under the bankruptcy code. For example, a party deemed to be a
"forward contract merchant" was entitled to enforce its contractual rights of setoff with
respect to forward contracts, notwithstanding the bankruptcy filing by counterparty.
Likewise, a party deemed to be a "swap participant" was entitled to enforce its contrac-
tual rights of setoff with respect to swap agreements, notwithstanding the bankruptcy
filing by counterparty. Absent these safe harbor provisions, bankruptcy [code] sections
362 and 365 would generally preclude a forward contract merchant or swap participant
from liquidating its forward contract or swap agreement positions with a bankrupt
counterparty, or from realizing against any property posted as collateral, without first
obtaining relief from the automatic stay from the bankruptcy court. However, the pro-
tections for safe harbor transactions were further broadened and, in some cases, clari-
fied under the 2005 Act. Among other things, the 2005 Act expands the category of
contracts that qualify for the special protections under the bankruptcy code and pro-
vide express authorization for cross-product netting among protected transactions (i.e.,
swap agreements, forward contracts, commodity contracts, repurchase agreements and
securities contracts) under a "master netting agreement." As a result, the changes im-
pact both how safe harbor transactions are structured, as well as how those contracts
are drafted.
McDermott, Will & Emery, The Effect of the New Bankruptcy Code on Safe Harbor Transaction,
MWE.COm, Nov. 9, 2005, http://www.mwe.com/index.cfi/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/ob-
jectjid/2546b8ca-c8ea-414b-b23c-e1936175ca82.cfm.
810. 11 U.S.C. §362(b)(6) provides:
The filing of a [bankruptcy] petition. . . does not operate as a stay.., of the setoff by a
commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institutions, or
securities clearing agency of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with
commodity contracts,... forward contracts, or securities contracts,... that constitutes
the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, . . . or settlement pay-
ment, . . . arising out of commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts
against cash, securities, or other property held by or due from such commodity broker,
forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institutions, or securities clearing
agency to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle commodity contracts, forward contracts,
or securities contracts.
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an obligation by one concerned party to the OTC derivative instru-
ment contract, it is necessary to clearly stipulate as to the legal validity
of netting by the OTC derivative instrument contract in bankruptcy
law.811
B. Financial Institutions
As indicated by the cases of Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust
Co.,812 In re Gibson Greetings, Inc.,813 and Diamond Fund v. JP Mor-
gan,814 compliance by the trading securities firms and investment
banks with their duty of loyalty is very important in the operation of
OTC derivative instruments. Note that the basic rationale behind the
theory is a securities dealer is "under a special duty, in view of its
expert knowledge and proffered advice, not to take advantage of its
customers' ignorance. '815 Particularly, in dealing with ordinary com-
panies as customers who lack knowledge, skill, and analytical ability in
dealing with OTC derivative instruments, it is important the securities
dealer's plan includes instruments based on good faith and accompa-
nied by an appropriate explanation of the instruments that will inform
the customer about the degree of risk they contain. 816
11 U.S.C. §362(b)(6) (2006). Additionally, 11 U.S.C. §362(b)(7) provides:
The filing of a [bankruptcy] petition. . . does not operate as a stay ... of the setoff by a
repo participant, of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with repurchase
agreements that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin pay-
ment,.., or settlement payment,... arising out of repurchase agreements against cash,
securities, or other property held by or due from such repo participant to margin, guar-
antee, secure or settle repurchase agreements.
11 U.S.C. §362(b)(7) (2006).
811. There is however an argument that the exemptions cover too wide a scope of transactions
so there will be a need to set limits. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 384, at 98. Edwards &
Morrison state:
[T]he language of the Code encompasses far too many transactions. Fear of systemic
risk is warranted only in cases involving the insolvency of a major financial market
participant, with whom other firms have entered derivatives contracts of massive value
and volume. Yet the Code offers special treatment to derivatives no matter how large
or small the counterparty. Thus, Congress' stated justification for the special treatment
is incomplete, as it applies only to a fraction of all firms that enter into derivatives
contracts.
Id.
812. See supra Part III.A.
813. See supra Part III.B.
814. See supra Part V.D.
815. Madison, supra note 5, at 280.
816. However, some industry experts argue that the firm's duty and defense should be based
on the "sound principles and practices" which limit a "conscious and disciplined approach to risk
management." Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 1268.
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As indicated in the cases of Orange County, 17 Barings, 18 and
NatWest,819 an efficient risk control system (independent evaluation
and supervision of positions and independent reporting) should be
constructed to create clear division of work between the trading de-
partment and back office and to minimize the possibility of failure
with OTC derivative instruments. In particular, reports to the CEO
and board of directors should be made independently by both the
trading department and back office. In addition, as in NatWest, when
the back office is evaluating the value of OTC derivative instruments,
to say an independent pricing is being made is difficult when the back
offices uses the data exactly as it was provided by the trading depart-
ment (e.g., data on the volatility of an option).
Evaluation of performance by the traders of derivative instruments
should be based not only on the rate of return itself, but also on the
rate of return reflecting the risk. As can be understood in the analysis
of Barings and Orange County, when a high return was earned
through the use of derivative instruments, an enormous amount of
risk was generally assumed. In other words, in many cases the results
were mostly ascribed not to the outstanding ability of the users of de-
rivative instruments, but to the fact they had taken a higher risk than
others. Therefore, when the securities firm evaluates the trader's per-
formance, the simple rate of return should not be used as the measure;
instead, the rate of return reflecting the risk should be used. When
there is a loss from the derivative instrument transaction in particular,
use of the doubling-up strategy,s20 where additional risk is assumed in
an attempt to limit the loss incurred by the traders, should be
prevented.
As analyzed in Orange County,821 LTCM,8 22 and Barings,823 when
use of OTC derivative instruments fails, the traders and management
are involved, which opens up the issues of moral hazard stemming
from incentives problems. For example, in the case of Barings, super-
visors of Leeson received much personal benefit from his perform-
ance. Independent and objective supervision under the circumstances
could hardly have been expected where the incentives of the manage-
ment, the supervisor, and Leeson all corresponded to each other. This
is why an independent department's supervision and audit are neces-
817. See supra Part IIE.
818. See supra Part VII.D.
819. See supra Part VIII.D.
820. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
821. See supra Part ILE.
822. See supra Part I.E.
823. See supra Part VII.D.
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sary, rather than mere supervision by the immediate superiors of the
traders of OTC derivative instruments.
C. Investors and the Trade Counterparties
"One of the big advantages of OTC derivatives products is the abil-
ity to customize the contract to provide solutions to the financial risks
confronted by the contracting parties. '824 Clear purposes of invest-
ment must be established that reflect the characteristics of the users of
OTC derivative instruments. 825 As the Orange County case demon-
strated, financing through repos is not an appropriate strategy, nor are
investments in inverse FRNs, for municipalities; guaranteeing the
principal should be the most important investment goal.82 6 In another
words, the problem lies neither with the repos, nor with inverse FRNs,
but with the users, who should always set an investment goal that re-
flects their own characteristics and make use of only those instruments
suitable for it.
As indicated in the cases of P&G,827 Gibson Greetings, 28 and Dia-
mond Fund,829 to minimize the possibility of failure in the course of
using OTC derivative instruments, end users must make use of deriva-
tives corresponding to their abilities. In particular it is advisable to
avoid instruments difficult to hedge or evaluate. Particularly if the in-
vestment purposes of the users are clearly set forth at the early stage
and the users employ instruments whose structure can be analyzed
and value estimated, the potential for failure can be minimized. As the
experience and knowledge of derivatives gradually increases, the
range of instruments can also expand.
The cases of Orange County,830 P&G,831 Gibson Greetings,832 and
LTCM833 show attention must be given to either investments or the
use of instruments with highly leveraged inverse structures that move
inversely to the benchmark index. As in the leveraged interest rate
824. See Gibson, supra note 1, at 538 (comparing exchange-listed vs. OTC derivatives
products).
825. As one commentator has noted, in a free market economy, "if investors find that deriva-
tives enhance the quality of their in vestment portfolio, despite losses, it will behoove them to
implement internal systems that monitor the suitability of their own investments." Sienko, supra
note 121, at 130-31.
826. See supra Part I1.E.
827. See supra Part III.A.
828. See supra Part III.B.
829. See supra Part V.A, D.
830. See supra Part II.B, C.
831. See supra Part III.A.
832. See supra Part III.B.
833. See supra Part IV.B, C.
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swaps in P&G and Gibson Greetings, a high return may be expected
from certain investment amounts if the structure of the OTC deriva-
tive instrument is leveraged; but, if the expectation proves wrong, a
risk at least that high should be assumed. In addition to leverage in
the structure of the instruments, the use of leverage in financing
should be given attention.
As with hedge funds, use of leverage to a certain extent is necessary
in raising funds if the financing company is professional in OTC deriv-
ative transactions. However, transactions where the leverage reached
25-fold, 834 such as in the case of LTCM, need to be regulated from the
level of the hedge fund itself and from the level of stability in the
financial market through the regulatory authority.835 In addition, as in
inverse FRNs, if an instrument moves inversely to the direction of the
standard index, a lot of attention must be given when the return
moves opposite of the entire market and, therefore, has low liquidity.
Particularly, the cases of Orange County,836 P&G,837 Gibson Greet-
ings,838 Diamond Fund,839 and Baring840 were indicative of structures
where the loss would be unlimited if things did not turn out as ex-
pected and should be avoided. However, in many cases, the higher the
possibility a structure may lead to a loss, the more difficult it is to find
the risk factors. In other words, because the risk factors are built into
the overall structure of OTC derivative instruments in a complex way,
it is necessary to understand the structure of the products. Outside
professionals can be an alternative if a company lacks analytical and
evaluative abilities itself in this area.
D. Supervision and Regulatory Authorities
One commentator argues that "many past and current U.S. regula-
tory debates about derivatives only pay lip service to hedging risks
efficiently and instead revolve around political or jurisdictional turf
834. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
835. One commentator argues that:
[T]he LTCM episode suggests that the most important risk to financial stability may
come from the possibility that derivatives counterparties, exempt from the automatic
stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, may "run" on a financially distressed firm (or
firms), causing a liquidity shortage that has the potential to spill over to other firms and
markets and cause widespread instability in financial markets.
Edwards & Morrison, supra note 384, at 105-06.
836. See supra Part II.C.
837. See supra Part III.A.
838. See supra Part III.B.
839. See supra Part V.B.
840. See supra Part VII.B.
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battles. ' 841 One of the important implications that can be derived
from the case analysis of failures in use of OTC derivative instruments
is the countermeasures taken by the regulatory authorities.842 Notably
in dealing with Orange County, the SEC did not make the mistake of
burning down the structure to get rid of an infestation.8 43 In other
words, based on the awareness that the structured bonds and deriva-
tives vehicle are basically effective securities, the SEC adhered to
their standpoint of settling the problems resulting from the improper
use rather than condemning their use in general, recognizing that it is
often difficult to determine the price of the derivatives or of a struc-
tured bond that has been specially devised to be suitable for a particu-
lar purpose.
In addition, structured bonds have diverse built-in derivative instru-
ments, but, as they are sold as bonds, unsophisticated investors are
likely to mistakenly consider them to be safe instruments. Therefore,
the SEC did not regulate the structured bond itself, but went in a dif-
ferent direction of requiring companies to tighten their explanations
regarding the inherent risk in the structured bonds when selling to
unsophisticated investors. 844 In other words, the SEC concluded that
the best practice for regulating derivative instruments was to require
investment institutions to clearly state the purposes of investment and
establish a risk control system while inducing securities firms to be
faithful to their duty of due care in the course of dealing instruments
and to tighten their disclosure to investors. 845
As noted by one commentator, "[m]ost derivatives transactions fall
into [a] category that is either devoid of regulation or subject to ill-
defined regulation. ' 846 From the supervisory and regulatory authori-
ties' standpoint, as well as in global market participant countries, the
effort to settle emerging problems due to the misapplication of instru-
841. Huang, supra note 1, at 487.
842. According to one commentator, the "Derivative investments implicate four basic regula-
tory requirements relating to: (i) disclosure of investment policies and objectives; (ii) restrictions
on leverage; (iii) custody of portfolio assets; and (iv) asset diversification." Roiter, supra note 13,
at 276.
843. See SEC ORANGE CouNTY REPORT, supra note 103, at *1-11. See also JORION I, supra
note 31, at 90.
844. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. It should be noted that "[m]uch of the current
U.S. federal securities regulatory philosophy is based on a model of consumer sovereignty."
Huang, supra note 1, at 489.
845. The best approach to mitigating possible risk from a derivatives transaction failure is to
employ appropriate risk management procedures, but in the event of a market failure, the regu-
latory authority's intervention may be the only recourse. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 384,
at 106.
846. Madison, supra note 5, at 276.
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ments should precede the regulation of the instrument itself. A
kitchen knife could injure people when held by a robber, but in the
hands of a cook it can be used to make good dishes. 847 Even though
derivatives regulation includes a complicated regulatory goal, prohib-
iting its use in general just because it may be misused would be a
mistake. 8
X. CONCLUSION
Modern OTC derivatives vehicles existed before exchange-traded
products.849 However, since the Chicago Mercantile Exchange began
trading derivatives instruments in 1972, when properly used, these in-
struments can still be construed as essential tools for escaping finan-
cial risk despite recent disasters. 850 Currently, a "Renaissance Era"
exists, in which, by the help of highly developed financial engineering,
"markets have been transformed by forces of securitization and
globalization, "851 still leaving numerous unsolved legal and theoretical
issues to be identified and analyzed before practical implications can
be drawn.
However, risks still exist in the financial market because the every-
day, real world is changing its shape and increasing its volatility due to
both internal and external factors. In order for the risk to be swept
away, it is extremely important to learn from analyzing past failures.
General practice attorneys may be reluctant to try to understand the
various derivatives products because of their complexity, preferring
instead to leave this area to professional financial engineers. However,
as more and more refined financial devices appear in the capital mar-
ket, lawyers engaged in that market must become familiar with them
and know whether they meet their clients' needs.
Notwithstanding this need for an awareness regarding the whole de-
rivatives instrument mechanism, discussion and analysis of derivatives
vehicles based on high dimensional mathematics is well beyond the
847. "[D]erivatives remain an important business tool used to effectively manage even greater
risks .... Because of their risk-hedging benefits when used properly .. " Rosenthal, supra note
5, at 1256, 1269. See also McKown & Purcell, supra note 11, at 119.
848. See Huang, supra note 1, at 487-88 (stating the characteristics of derivatives regulation).
849. See supra note 276 and accompanying text. Derivatives are not a concern of only small
sophisticated group of experts but well-known investment vehicles for people in today's financial
marketplace. Id. Even though financial engineers resort to complex mathematical formula to
analyze and design derivatives vehicles, as to derivatives, "we are all modern." Id. Because the
"sum of human knowledge grew to exceed the human capacity to understand it." Cohen, supra
note 17, at 2003.
850. Id. at 2004.
851. Phillips, supra note 256, at 241.
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scope of this Article, so description of those approaches were mini-
mized as much as possible. Instead, four areas of concerns were inves-
tigated: (i) industry infrastructure, including accounting issues as a
regulatory tool; (ii) role of intermediary financial institutions such as
securities firms or investment banks; (iii) investors and transaction
counterparts, and (iv) selected regulatory issues.
The nightmare in the financial derivative market is, at any time, an-
other storm may be on the way without notice. The pattern and results
of such disaster are known from history; however, many people may
feel at ease when, in a particular year, nothing is brewing in the deriv-
atives industry.852 This Article may have contributed to reinstilling a
sense of alarm that so long as the market exists, there are risks; but a
disaster can be avoided when lessons from the past are heeded, espe-
cially the lesson of not waiting to lock the stable door until after the
horse is stolen.
852. Professor Cohen said, "Yet there are snakes in Eden." Cohen, supra note 17, at 2006.
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